Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror
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Average customer review:Product Description
Based on over five years of research, Inside Al Qaeda provides the definitive story behind the rise of this small, mysterious group to the notorious organization making headlines today.
Product Details
- Amazon Sales Rank: #59544 in Books
- Published on: 2003-06-03
- Released on: 2003-06-03
- Original language: English
- Number of items: 1
- Binding: Paperback
- 416 pages
Editorial Reviews
Review
A comprehensive study of the terror group. -- The Mirror, London
Excellent. -- Wolf Blitzer, CNN
[Gunaratna is] the foremost English-speaking expert on the terror network. -- Dan Rather, CBS Evening News
Review
[Gunaratna is] the foremost English-speaking expert on the terror network. (Dan Rather, CBS Evening News) A comprehensive study of the terror group. (The Mirror, London) Excellent. (Wolf Blitzer, CNN)
From the Inside Flap
Inside Al Qaeda examines the leadership, ideology, structure, strategies, and tactics of the most violent politico-religious organization the world has ever seen. The book is based on five years of research on Al Qaeda, including extensive interviews with its members; field research in Al Qaeda-supported conflict zones in Central, South and Southeast Asia and the Middle East; and monitoring Al Qaeda infiltration of diaspora and migrant communities in North America and Europe.
The definitive work on Al Qaeda, this book is based on five years of research, including extensive interviews with its members; field research in Al Qaeda-supported conflict zones around the globe; and monitoring Al Qaeda infiltration of diaspora and migrant communities in North America and in Europe.
Inside Al Qaeda examines the leadership, ideology, structure, strategies and tactics of the most violent politico-religious organization the world has ever seen. Although founded in 1988, Al Qaeda merged with and still works with several other extremist groups. Hence Al Qaeda rank and file draw on nearly three decades of terrorist expertise. Moreover, it inherited a full-fledged training and operational infrastructure funded by the United States, European, Saudi Arabian and other governments for use in the anti-Soviet Jihad.
This book sheds light on Al Qaeda's financial infrastructure and how they train combat soldiers and vanguard fighters for multiple guerrilla, terrorist and semi-conventional campaigns in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, the Caucuses, and the Balkans. In addition, the author covers the clandestine Al Qaeda operational network in the West.
Gunaratna reveals:
* how Osama bin Laden had his mentor and Al Qaeda founder, 'Azzam', assassinated in order to take over the organization and that other Al Qaeda officers who stood in his way were murdered.
* Al Qaeda's long-range, deep-penetration agent handling system in Western Europe and North America for setting up safe houses, procuring weapons, and conducting operations
* how the O55 Brigade—Al Qaeda’s guerrilla organization—integrated into the Taliban
* how the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui forced Al Qaeda to move forward on September 11
* how a plan to destroy British Parliament on 9/11 and to use nerve gas on the European Union Parliament were thwarted
* how the Iran—Hezbollah—Al Qaeda link provided the knowledge to conduct coordinated, simultaneous attacks on multiple targets, including failed plans to destroy Los Angeles International Airport, the USS Sullivan, the Radisson Hotel in Jordan, and eleven US commercial airliners over the Pacific ocean
* that one-fifth of international Islamic charities and NGOs are infiltrated by Al Qaeda
* how the US response is effective militarily in the short term, but insufficient to counter Al Qaeda's ideology in the long-term
Finally, to destroy Al Qaeda, Gunaratna shows there needs to be a multipronged, multiagency, and multidimensional response by the international community.
Customer Reviews
Failure to document a controversial claim...
This book appears to be a good reference source. I don't have the expertise to judge its accuracy, but I'm willing to assume the author knows his field.
There are problems. Foremost among them is Gunaratna's charge that Osama bin Laden acquiesced in the killing of his mentor, Sheikh Azzam, in 1989. This claim is worded more boldly on the cover flap: "[Gunaratna reveals] how bin Laden had his mentor and Al Qaeda founder, 'Azzam,' assassinated in order to take over the organization and how other Al Qaeda officers who stood in his way were murdered."
Gunaratna may "reveal" this to readers who haven't heard the rumors, but he doesn't prove it. He simply asserts that there was a falling out between Azzam on one side, and bin Laden and Egyptian members of their group on the other, because Azzam opposed using terror tactics. He claims the Egyptians assassinated Azzam after having "won over Osama to their cause"--that he "sanctioned, if not condoned" the killing. A sample of Gunaratna's biased writing: "All this is of a piece with Osama's exceedingly duplicitous nature."
How's this for evidence of involvement? "[Bin Laden's] cunning was...demonstrated by the fact that he left Pakistan for Saudi Arabia in the year that Azzam died. It has been impossible to pin down when exactly he left, and no sources on this have been forthcoming, but one should not in the least be surprised if it transpires he was not in Pakistan when Azzam was murdered, furnishing himself with a sound alibi and allowing him to distance himself from the act as much as possible."
The only source Gunaratna cites in support of his claims is a statement made by a prisoner a decade later: that bin Laden ordered the assassination because he believed Azzam was aiding the CIA. That's a completely different motive from the one he alleges.
What about those other murders of people who stood in bin Laden's way? More may be described in the book, but this is the only one I've found: "Mustafa Shalabi, who was close to Azzam, was killed on March 1, 1991. Although there is no evidence that Osama ordered his death, it is clear that Shalabi was not with the Egyptians who backed Osama."
No evidence. Gunaratna admits it.
Here's another blurb from the cover flap: "[Gunaratna reveals] how the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui forced Al Qaeda to move forward on the September 11 attacks." This implies that the date was moved up, as others have speculated; but again, there's no hard evidence. All Gunaratna shows is that the hijackers' financial activity picked up in the week after Moussaoui's arrest. That could well have been the case, in a late August time frame, if the attacks were planned all along for about September 11.
There are other problems. Gunaratna states in one chapter that some of the world's intelligence agencies aren't convinced al-Qaida #3 man Muhammad Atef is dead. It may be excusable that in another chapter, he says without qualification that Atef was killed last November. What's not excusable is that he also says Abu Hafs was killed in January. Muhammad Atef and Abu Hafs are or were the same man! [A later note, 8/29/02: A recent news account made clear that a second man, Mafouz Walid, used the same nom de guerre, but was usually differentiated from Atef by calling him "Abu Hafs the Mauritanian." Walid was supposedly killed in January, but it's now claimed he's still alive. Could this name-confusion have influenced the suspicions that Atef is alive?]
Something else: Gunaratna tells us Sudan's President al-Bashir once offered to extradite bin Laden to the U.S. The wording implies this happened in 2001--when bin Laden was nowhere near Sudan. Gunaratna can't mean 2001; he says the U.S. President was Bill Clinton. But the passage is hopelessly unclear.
The book's most interesting claim is that the 9/11 plot was meant to include strikes on the British Houses of Parliament, the Indian Parliament, and a target in Australia. This is based on statements made by a single prisoner, which may or may not be proven true as more facts come to light. Less startling, but new to me: Gunaratna says the men wounded in the capture of Abu Zubaydah included "1 Pakistani and 3 American officers." If he has more details, I wish he'd shared them.
Despite my quibbles, I give the book four stars for its information on names, dates, and terrorist activities in obscure parts of the world.
Authoritative and Well Researched Overview of Al Qaeda
Excellent book. A well researched and overview of Al Qaeda. Provides excellent insights into the ideology and methods of operation for one of the world's most dangerous terrorist groups. Unlike other books on this subject, this work is superbly footnoted, perhaps reflecting the author's academic background. This is essential for a truly authoritative work of non-fiction, something sadly lacking in many other books in this genre. The section on Al Qaeda's operations in Southeast Asia is groundbreaking, providing information not seen anywhere else. Tellingly much of what the author described about Al Qaeda operations in Asia was subsequently demonstrated in spades in Bali last October. The general reader might find this book somewhat dense, the print is small and the reading somewhat dry. For the serious student of modern terrrorism, however, this book is a must have. Other authors should take a lesson from Gunaratna's footnoting. Well worth the price!!
Just to add one thing
Having read the book and all of the reviews on Amazon, what more could I possibly add? A couple of the early reviews said, in essence, this book is a waste of time and money. Most of the reviews since then have, while pointing out the many editing faults, effectively demolished that put-down.
Well, there is now one thing worth adding. This week's 64 CNN Al Qaeda training tapes have provided visible verification of what Dr. Gunaratna wrote and published last spring, notably including the animal chemical weapons tests.
If one cannot quite handle this data rich volume in toto, at least read the two concluding chapters on Asia and on Al Qaeda's threat and the international response.
For importance, this book rates a 5. For content, it also rates a 5. For editing, only a 3. Net conclusion: 4 plus.




