Product Description

A Naval Postgraduate School professor and former career Special Forces officer looks at why the U.S. military cannot conduct unconventional warfare despite a significant effort to create and maintain such a capability. In his examination of Operation Enduring Freedom, Hy Rothstein maintains that although the operation in Afghanistan appeared to have been a masterpiece of military creativity, the United States executed its impressive display of power in a totally conventional manner--despite repeated public statements by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld that terrorists must be fought with unconventional capabilities. Arguing that the initial phase of the war was appropriately conventional given the conventional disposition of the enemy, the author suggests that once the Taliban fell the war became increasingly unconventional, yet the U.S. response became more conventional.

This book presents an authoritative overview of the current American way of war and addresses the specific causes of the "conventionalization" of U.S. Special Forces, using the war in Afghanistan as a case study. Drawing a distinction between special operations and unconventional warfare (the use of Special Forces does not automatically make the fighting unconventional), Rothstein questions the ability of U.S. forces to effectively defeat irregular threats and suggests ways to regain lost unconventional warfare capacity.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #434847 in Books
• Published on: 2006-04-10
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Hardcover
• 218 pages

Features

• ISBN13: 9781591147459
• Condition: NEW
• Notes: Brand New from Publisher. No Remainder Mark.
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About the Author
Hy S. Rothstein, a retired colonel in the U.S. Army with a Ph.D. in international relations, served as a Special Forces officer for more than 26 years, spending many years training and advising governments threatened by active insurgencies. He is now senior lecturer in the department of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.

Customer Reviews

Fixing Special Forces
Generals fight the last war. In the last war they were lower ranking officers in charge of troops actually doing the fighting. This gives them a lesson in how wars are fought. Most United States troops are skilled in the fighting of conventional wars. They well understand what the M-1 tanks did in Gulf War I, they understand about air power, logistics, all kinds of things that enable a heavily mechanized army to fight. They proved this well when a much smaller force quickly overcame the much larger Iraqi army in Gulf War II.

Unfortunately winning on the battlefield in Iraq and in Afghanistan didn't mean the end of the war. Instead, as we all know, the real battle was just beginning, and we haven't done very well with it.

Dr. Rothstein, a West Point graduate and a thirty year career Special Forces officer uses this book to explain how unconventional warfare has not received the attention it should in the modern military. He uses the experience in Afghanistan to illustrate the points he is describing and makes several recommendations as to how the unconventional forces of the US need to be improved, mostly at the command level.

An analytical study of conventional and unconventional uses of tactics in the mountains and valleys of Afghanistan
Afghanistan And The Troubled Future Of Unconventional Warfare by Hy S. Rothstein (Department of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California) is an analytical study of conventional and unconventional uses of tactics in the "War on Terrorism" as it is currently being waged in the mountains and valleys of Afghanistan. Arguing that although the operation in Afghanistan was presented as unconventional the Bush administration, but was in actuality, a case of America's military power being employed in a segmented and quite conventional manner, Afghanistan And The Troubled Future Of Unconventional Warfare provides an in-depth overview of the Afghan war and why certain situational intricacies may imply, but not require, unconventional or irregular tactics. An important and seminal contribution to Military Studies reference collections and reading lists, Afghanistan And The Troubled Future Of Unconventional Warfare is very strongly recommended work of impeccable scholarship.

What is the core of the problem?
In this book, the author first asserts that after the initial success of a conventional war in Afghanistan, the US has failed to prosecute a successful unconventional war as is required. Then, through a brief introduction of organization theory, he describes the problem as symptomatic of the organizational mindset of conventional forces. He makes the point, and well I believe, that the conventional warfare thinking continues to take over and attempt to shape all forces under its structure to the conventional model. This does seem often to be the case and it is a valid point. The author's recommendations for remedying the problem are, in effect, a new separate branch of the military that is more attuned to the CIA unconventional model than the DoD conventional model. Unfortunately, this seems to still leave open the probability that the regular military will slowly take over this new force and attempt to mold it also in its own image. It seems a bandaid solution to a problem requiring more than bandaids to this reviewer. I think a better solution would be something along the lines that the late Col. Hackworth proposed - a new military altogether. Still, this is an important work about how organizational structure can affect the ability of the military to perform in unconventional warfare settings. It is not specifically regarding Afghanistan as it might seem, rather, the experience in Afghanistan is only the latest symptom of a long standing disease that needs drastic treatment. A very helpful book to raise some more thoughtful ideas for the healing.