Product Description

If you want peace, prepare for war. A buildup of offensive weapons can be purely defensive. The worst road may be the best route to battle. Strategy is made of such seemingly self-contradictory propositions, Edward Luttwak shows--they exemplify the paradoxical logic that pervades the entire realm of conflict. In this widely acclaimed work, now revised and expanded, Luttwak unveils the peculiar logic of strategy level by level, from grand strategy down to combat tactics. Having participated in its planning, Luttwak examines the role of air power in the 1991 Gulf War, then detects the emergence of "post-heroic" war in Kosovo in 1999--an American war in which not a single American soldier was killed. In the tradition of Carl von Clausewitz, Strategy goes beyond paradox to expose the dynamics of reversal at work in the crucible of conflict. As victory is turned into defeat by over-extension, as war brings peace by exhaustion, ordinary linear logic is overthrown. Citing examples from ancient Rome to our own days, from Barbarossa and Pearl Harbor down to minor combat affrays, from the strategy of peace to the latest operational methods of war, this book by one of the world's foremost authorities reveals the ultimate logic of military failure and success, of war and peace.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #46259 in Books
• Published on: 2002-01-31
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 320 pages

Review
Fascinating...Luttwak succeeds admirably in revealing the complex and invariably contradictory relationship between the various levels of strategic action; our grasp of the "process" of conflict is correspondingly enhanced and the reader left properly skeptical about claims that his or that technical innovation will provide an ultimate and foolproof defense. Luttwak's achievement is therefore considerable: Like his mentor Clausewitz he has recognized that the study of war cannot be subject to the 'intellectual codification used in the [mechanical] arts and sciences.' Rather, it requires philosophical rigour and historical understanding of a kind rarely found in the narrow, ahistorical world of the scenario builder. These intellectual virtues are abundantly present in this book, and teacher and student alike can only benefit from a close reading and assessment of its central hypothesis. -- J. E. Spence "Times Higher Education Supplement"

Review
Knowledgeable, historically informed, acid, blunt. Like or dislike Luttwak's merciless style, agree or disagree with his uninhibited judgments, his book is an immense contribution to the understanding of strategy--the interplay of adversaries that threaten or use force to resolve their conflicts.
--Thomas C. Schelling, Harvard University

About the Author
Edward N.

Customer Reviews

Self-Fulfilling Prophecy
This is a sprawling, but very important and perceptive analysis. Luttwak's often revised book has several messages. The most topically interesting one was apparently missed by the reviewers, who concentrated on the paradoxical nature of strategic relations.
Luttwak notes that modern industrial societies will not tolerate casualties in war, and that therefore battlefield strategies must focus on winning wars without direct contact with the enemy and without risk of lives. He claims that while the strategic bombing of WW II was a failure, strategic bombing as practised in Iraq in 1991 and in Kossovo was a success. According to Luttwak, the difference is more accurate intelligence and more accurate bombing - not necessarily cruise-missiles.

He points out that with a smaller expenditure of bombs in 1 month in 1991 than the allies had expended in Germany in 1945, the coalition succeeding in totally disrupting Iraq communications and industry.

The outlines of how the next war ought to be fought, and in fact was fought, were clear from Luttwak's presentation. One almost gets the feeling that the war was fought to prove his theory, and it is very likely that changes in US defense policy are being based on lessons drawn from the success of the war, in the light of Luttwak's recommendations.

Luttwak does not take into account that not all enemies are equal. The strategy that worked so well for Iraq might not work for a more organized and determined foe such as North Korea.

Ignore the Detractors, This Book is Brilliant
Edit of 21 Dec 07 to add links.

My own discovery of how the threat changes depending on the levels of analysis would not have occurred without this brilliant book by Edward Luttwak. It was his careful and reasoned discussion of how specific capabilities and policies might not make sense at one level of analysis, but do when combined with others, that helped me understand why US (and other) intelligence communities continue to get so much wrong.

First to credit Luttwak: anti-tank weapons make no sense in isolation (tactical level), but if they slow the tank down enough to allow artillery and close air support to have an impact (operational level), they might close gaps and win victories (strategic level). Bottom line: nothing in war can be considered in isolation (including, one might add, the post-war needs that enable an exit strategy).

It was from Luttwak's work that the Marine Corps Intelligence Center (today the Marine Corps Intelligence Command) developed the new model for analysis that distinguished between the four levels of analysis (strategic, operational, tactical, and technical), combined that with the three major domains (military, geographic, and civil), and then cross-walked that against every single mission area (infantry, artillery, tanks, aviation, etcetera).

One simple example of the importance of Luttwak's work to intelligence: at the time (1990) the Libyan T-72 tank was considered by the US Intelligence Community to be a very high threat because it was the best tank that money could then buy--but on reflection, we found this was true only at the technical level of optimal lethality. At the tactical level the tank was being stored in the open, poorly maintained by poorly trained crews, parts cannibalization occurring regularly, this dropped the threat to low. At the operational level there were a significant number of the tanks scattered around and available, this raised it to a medium threat at that level. At the strategic level, the tanks could not be sustained in battle for more than two weeks, and dropped again to low.

Edward Luttwak, in company with Colin Gray, Martin van Creveld, Ralph Peters, and Steve Metz, is one of the most brilliant and clear-spoken of the strategists writing in English, and this book will remain--for years to come--a fundamental building block in the learning and maturation of national security strategy.

Other recommended books at this level:
Modern Strategy
Transformation of War
The Changing Face of War: Lessons of Combat, from the Marne to Iraq
Wars of Blood and Faith: The Conflicts That Will Shape the 21st Century
Security Studies for the 21st Century
Strategy: Process, Content, Context--An International Perspective
The Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century
The Sword and The Pen - Selections From The World's Greatest Military Writings
War and Peace and War: The Rise and Fall of Empires

A Penetrating Analysis on Strategy
This book discusses the dynamic and sometimes contradictory uses of 'strategy' in five different levels: Grand Strategic level, Theater Strategic level, Operational level, Tactical level, and Technical Level. Because of the dynamic nature of strategy, conflicts of interests often arise between different levels - so that what one sees as logical at one level may not be acceptable in another. Indeed, this book sets out to address the confusing nature of the problem and puts the entire issue into perspective with the concept of 'paradox'. Historical examples are used to expound his arguments. As always, Luttwak's work is incisive and provocative. Enjoy it!