Product Description

Janet Tavakoli takes you into the world of Warren Buffett by way of the recent mortgage meltdown. In correspondence and discussion with him over 2 years, they both saw the writing on the wall, made clear by the implosion of Bear Stearns. Tavakoli, in clear and engaging prose, explains how the credit mess happened beginning with the mortgage lending Ponzi schemes funded by investment banks, the Fed bailout and its impact on the dollar. Through her narrative, we hear from Warren Buffett and learn how his enduring principles caused him to see the mess that was coming well in advance and kept him and his investors well out of the way.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #77572 in Books
• Published on: 2009-01-09
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Hardcover
• 304 pages

Features

• ISBN13: 9780470406786
• Condition: NEW
• Notes: Brand New from Publisher. No Remainder Mark.
• Click here to view our Condition Guide and Shipping Prices

Amazon.com Review

Morgan Stanley's David M. Darst on Dear Mr. Buffett: What an Investor Learns 1,269 Miles from Wall Street

In 14 Chapters, 265 pages, and 443 footnotes drawing upon 119 sources, structured finance and derivatives consultant and expert witness Janet M. Tavakoli writes about her “meeting with Warren Buffett on the eve of the greatest market meltdown in history” and how meeting him subtly changed the way she looks at global financial markets.

But Dear Mr. Buffett: What an Investor Learns 1,269 Miles from Wall Street is much more than a personal investing bildungsroman. The book is so loaded with lessons, warnings, admonishments, and recommendations that readers will find themselves copiously underlining the text and filling the margins with stars, checkmarks, and exclamation points. Dear Mr. Buffett is wide ranging and hard hitting, written with humility, great specificity, honesty, humanity, and historical awareness.

Captious (or offended) readers may criticize the book as: too harsh in parts; overly broad-brush in its treatment of micro and macro events; and possibly bordering on solipsism when Tavakoli frequently cites her own articles, letters, e-mail exchanges, telephone conversations, and television appearances. Serious financial debacles in the post-Millennium years have left plenty of blame to be apportioned among firms, regulators, the financial system, and let’s face it, human nature, and though polite and deferential, Tavakoli (called by Business Week “the Cassandra of credit derivatives”) is not reticent. At times, her tone can be Biblically prophetic.

That said, Dear Mr. Buffett is worth its weight in gold for two main reasons. First, the timeless investment lessons laced throughout the book. To cite a few:

Review
"Dear Mr Buffett is, like its author, strongly, often harshly, and, more than rarely, tartly, opinionated. The attitude is, however, well-supported by the facts; should anyone ever display the slightest interest in criminalizing the criminals who led us down this path, a prosecutor could do worse than ordering up copies for the grand jury. One thing the world is not going to run out any time soon is books on subprime credit-turned-global financial meltdown. But it's doubtful that many, or any, will so closely match the ripping yarn of financial upset with concepts that any - and perhaps every - investor can apply to their own financial security. This book was already at the printer when the Madoff Maelstrom broke, but it's highly doubtful that anybody who absorbs the message of Dear Mr Buffett will ever need confront that kind of mayhem."
-- Seeking Alpha's Greg Newton

From the Inside Flap

If legendary investor Warren Buffett invited you to lunch, what would you talk about? That was the question faced by structured finance expert Janet Tavakoli after she sent the Oracle of Omaha her book on credit derivatives, and he replied with an invitation. Now, in Dear Mr. Buffett, she gives you a seat at the table for the extraordinary conversation that began at that lunch and has continued through some of recent financial history's most turbulent moments.

Dear Mr. Buffett reveals how Buffett's wisdom shines through in today's financial world, including how he uses derivatives in classic Buffett style—with prudence, transparency, and an aversion to Wall Street's herd mentality. Sampling their wide-ranging conversations and correspondence, Tavakoli offers both Buffett's and her own sharp insights into the mortgage crisis, hedge funds, shoddy accounting practices, and overall devolution of the markets.

Along the way, Tavakoli sheds light on an aspect of Buffett's success often overlooked by those focusing on his consistent returns and distinctive value investing approach. In addition to making the right picks for steady, long-lasting gains, Buffett has also avoided many major financial meltdowns and crashes, seeming to see them coming before they arrive. Whatever your level as an investor, you'll fine-tune your own analytical skills as you discover how both Buffett and Tavakoli were able to spot danger on the financial horizon.

In Dear Mr. Buffett, you'll also find answers to questions such as:

• How does Buffett find the rare opportunities for true arbitrage?

• What is the Golden Fleece Award, and why does Buffett call it "a gem"?

• How can Nobel laureates get investing so wrong in practice?

• How does Buffett's concept of value carry over to life beyond investing?

Dear Mr. Buffett is a witty, well-told account of how principle triumphs over greed and panic, and is a must-read for all those seeking the timeless wisdom that has beaten, and continues to beat, the market.

Customer Reviews

The Sub-Prime Crisis: The Good, The Bad, and The Guilty
Janet Tavakoli, a well-known expert in the world of credit derivatives and structured products (yes, those toxic assets) has written a remarkably entertaining and insightful book in which she combines Mr. Buffett's wisdom and advice with her own views about the credit crisis. Tavakoli's previous books, all about highly technical topics, allowed her to show only one set of skills, albeit an important one: her ability to explain technical issues in an accessible manner. In Mr. Buffett, however, a book for the general public that contains no formulas or equations, she demonstrates that she can write not only with clarity but with wit. Her prose is agile and precise, and her words punch her victims always fatally, and not once, but just in case, many times. Hints of this refreshing style were somehow present, although not totally in the open, in her previous book (Structured Finance & Collateralized Debt Obligations). Despite the subject matter she managed to include comments about triboluminescense, sexual positions, and the Nogorno-Karabakh dispute while making reference to characters as diverse as Michael Moore, Richard Feynman, Shakespeare and Paul Marcinkus.

Mr. Buffett started with an invitation by The Sage of Omaha to Tavakoli in June 2005 ("Be sure to stop by if you are ever in Omaha and want to talk credit derivatives") after she had mailed him a copy of her latest derivatives book. Knowing that she would never have any reason to be near Omaha, Tavakoli volunteered a few days to visit. Shortly thereafter, she flew from Chicago (where she lives) to have lunch with Mr. Buffett in a place "with no décor but good food." That started a dialogue between the two of them (through subsequent phone calls, e-mails, and letters) that seems to be still going on.

In a sense, Tavakoli's book is more about the current crisis rather than Mr. Buffett, although there is enough about him to satisfy the Buffett-curious reader. He comes across as a deceptively affable man who advises her not to neglect her love life, enjoys and values gossiping, reads financial reports the way a teenager reads Playboy, and believes there is no difference between value and growth stocks. This came as personal relief because I always failed to see the difference between them no matter how hard all the mutual funds prospects I have seen try to make that point. On a more serious note, Mr. Buffett seems not to take the Efficient Market Theory (or dogma?) too seriously. Not a surprise if you think that his track record as investor is a living proof of the fallacy of the theory. More important, Buffett reminds us of the danger of leverage: anyone can show great investment returns with leverage (inflated revenues, he calls them). It is when things go the other way, and leverage magnifies the mistakes, that you can really see who has been swimming naked.

But the backbone of the book (and its most interesting aspect) is the critique and analysis of the current financial crisis that Tavakoli intertwines cleverly within her own dialogue with Mr. Buffett. She makes a convincing case that at the root of the present crisis there was a bad combination of dishonest executives and bankers under the surveillance of incompetent, and probably equally dishonest, regulators.

For example, the chapter about the backdating of stock options scandal, although not strictly related to the credit crisis, makes you wonder about the character of the people running corporate America: in the 2006-2007 timeframe more than 120 U.S. companies were under investigation for accounting irregularities; 85 ended up amending their earning statements. She is very critical of the role played by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), which invoked an obscure 1862 provision to undermine the states' ability to police predatory lending. This decision, she believes, had a very negative effect on mortgage origination standards and their subsequent re-packaging by investment bankers. Additionally, she castigates the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for failing to oversee the investment banks. And when it comes to the rating agencies, which blessed some of these securitizations with AAA ("very safe") ratings, she employs the term "financial astrology". Enough said! Ironically, Mr. Buffett, who through its investment company (Berkshire Hathaway) owns almost 20% of Moody's stock, has admitted to her that this is one investment he is not proud of.

Tavakoli also paints a disturbing picture when she describes the collapse of two Bear Stearns investment funds (she received a "thinly veiled threat" by the fund manager after she was quoted in the press saying something he did not like); when she explains how the well-connected Carlyle group got help from the Fed while a less plugged-in fund, Peloton, was let go; and when she shows that her initial assessment of AIG, Merrill, and Citigroup losses (all made in late 2007 and early 2008 and in contradiction with the information released by those companies at the time) was ultimately right on the money. The list of financial and ethical shenanigans is long and compelling, full of juicy anecdotes, and supported by solid data and well-articulated reasoning. Although is fun reading about these issues it is quite depressing to think about them: you get the sense that the story is more in tune with the doings of a corrupt military dictatorship in a third world country rather than the oldest democracy in the world.

Much has been said about the acronyms used to describe the financial instruments involved in this crisis: CDOs, SIVs, CPDOs, ABS, MBS, CDS, ABCP, etc. Ironically, the list of government entities which, in her view, have something to apologize for is almost as long: SEC, FED, OCC, FDIC, FHFA, OTC, OFHEO, etc. To what extent these regulatory entities, which sometimes overlap, but also leave voids, will survive in a global market is something to ponder. The case for one regulatory body with wide international authority is becoming stronger as the case for state-level bodies become more dubious. Although Tavakoli does not make these two points explicitly, one wonders.

Some readers might feel turn off by a few Warren-and-I type of statements that seem a bit self-serving. And a case can be made that perhaps many investors deserved what they got because in their greedy quest for unreasonable returns they overlooked basic principles of prudence --a point that does not come across very strongly in the book. Lastly, Chapter 13 (The Fogs of War, Religion and Politics), a very interesting chapter in its own right, is probably better suited to be dealt with in a separate (next?) book. That said, these are minor sins in an otherwise excellent book.

The following paragraph, which appears close to the end of the book, summarizes the main thesis,
"Washington is supposed to provide a strong national defense; but we were attacked from within our borders-sometimes by those charged to protect us. Washington failed in one of its more important duties, Washington failed to protect our money."

Further down she adds, "Homeland security requires a secure homeland currency." I doubt that anyone would be left indifferent by these provocative, but well-argued, points.

There is no free lunch they say, at least according to most economists. And certainly lunch with Mr. Buffett is far from free ($ 2.11 million, according to eBay, June, 2008). Clearly, Tavakoli made a good decision when she accepted Mr. Buffett's lunch invitation. However, for the rest of us, who are unable to pony up the two million or unlikely to get invited by the great investor, this book is a very good substitute.

Front Line Explanation of the Global Financial Meltdown

This is the book that Wall Street and Washington do not want you to read. Many books will be written about the credit crisis but it is hard to believe that any will match this real time fast-paced expose. Tavakoli's 2008 book, Structured Finance, details the credit meltdown for finance professionals, and in this book she explains it in a way that everyone can understand. I agree with George Goodman aka Adam Smith who writes on the book jacket that that contrasting the madness with Warren Buffett's good sense is appropriate. He wrote Money Gameand identified Buffett as a great investor in the 1960's, before most people had heard of Warren Buffett. He also wrote a more recent book called Supermoney (Wiley Investment Classics). Contrasting the recent financial madness with Buffett's sensible warnings makes this book compelling, because it proves that the phrase "every one was doing it" is false.

Tavakoli wrote the first book ever published about credit derivatives in 1999 and exposed hidden risks that worked in favor of investment banks but against naïve investors. That led to Warren Buffett inviting her to Omaha, and this book begins with that lunch. Tavakoli then uses his value investing philosophy and contrasts that with the subsequent market madness.

There are a lot of hindsight bias plagued pundits who now claim to have spoken up, but if they gave any warning at all it was of the variety of "the sky is falling," with no specific understanding of what was happening. Some claim the events were unpredictable, but Tavakoli uses logic and facts, plus documented evidence that she said so back in the day, to explain that it would and did happen. She spoke out specifically and publicly about CDOs and wrote an early book, and the only book, to discuss the high degree of fraud and continued potential for fraud. In April 2005, she warned the IMF about credit derivatives and overrated CDOs and posted the clip on her web site. In January 2007, she wrote an article to a risk magazine saying risk managers at investment banks, and she mentioned some by name, should get out and sell the overrated securities. In February 2007 she wrote a letter to the SEC saying AAA ratings for many structured products were grossly misleading and the rating agencies should have their special status revoked for structured products. She issued a direct challenge to AIG's June 2007 accounting statements. It's all in the book plus much more. She also knew a lot of the people whose names made the news and interacted with them through the meltdown. One manager of the Bear Stearns hedge funds even tried to get her to change her public stance against their proposed initial public offering, which failed because she spoke out. Those facts make this book on the global meltdown unique, the only explanation from a pro who spoke out in a specific way in real time.

But a lot of people did the right thing, and by using Buffett as an example, Tavakoli gives us hope that we can get back on the right track.

Clear, Accessible, and Witty
I am not a finance professional, and my understanding of financial markets, especially derivatives, is basic, but I was riveted by DEAR MR BUFFETT. Much of it is because of Ms. Tavakoli's writing style: clear, accessible, and witty. Where definitions are needed, she supplies them, and her documentation is suburb. Despite the complexity of her topic, it was an easy read. In fact, she makes such a persuasive case that I came away from the book wondering why more experts didn't see the meltdown coming. At the same time, it was reassuring to know that Mr. Buffett's (and Ms. Tavakoli's) financial philosophy, ie not buying something unless you can pay for it, investing with caution, has prevailed. I would recommend this book to any investor -- large or small -- who's seeking direction for the future.