Product Description

"Before reading The Panic of 1907, the year 1907 seemed like a long time ago and a different world. The authors, however, bring this story alive in a fast-moving book, and the reader sees how events of that time are very relevant for today's financial world. In spite of all of our advances, including a stronger monetary system and modern tools for managing risk, Bruner and Carr help us understand that we are not immune to a future crisis."
—Dwight B. Crane, Baker Foundation Professor, Harvard Business School

"Bruner and Carr provide a thorough, masterly, and highly readable account of the 1907 crisis and its management by the great private banker J. P. Morgan. Congress heeded the lessons of 1907, launching the Federal Reserve System in 1913 to prevent banking panics and foster financial stability. We still have financial problems. But because of 1907 and Morgan, a century later we have a respected central bank as well as greater confidence in our money and our banks than our great-grandparents had in theirs."
—Richard Sylla, Henry Kaufman Professor of the History of Financial Institutions and Markets, and Professor of Economics, Stern School of Business, New York University

"A fascinating portrayal of the events and personalities of the crisis and panic of 1907. Lessons learned and parallels to the present have great relevance. Crises and panics are as much a part of our future as our past."
—John Strangfeld, Vice Chairman, Prudential Financial

"Who would have thought that a hundred years after the Panic of 1907 so much remained to be written about it? Bruner and Carr break significant new ground because they are willing to do the heavy lifting of combing through massive archival material to identify and weave together important facts. Their book will be of interest not only to banking theorists and financial historians, but also to business school and economics students, for its rare ability to teach so clearly why and how a panic unfolds."
—Charles Calomiris, Henry Kaufman Professor of Financial Institutions, Columbia University, Graduate School of Business

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #20355 in Books
• Published on: 2007-08-31
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Hardcover
• 272 pages

From Publishers Weekly
Though business professors Bruner and Carr approach their subject, the spectacular financial crisis that gave America the FDIC and the Federal Reserve, with grave pedantry, they devote the majority of the book to the more colorful events and personalities of the crisis, which even academic prose cannot dull. The chronicle follows one speculator's attempt to corner the copper market, which leads to panic, the failure of banks and trusts and the impending bankruptcy of New York City. In the midst of chaos, one man was able to halt the domino effect with calm, character and capital: J. Pierpont Morgan. The Panic, the authors note, hit America at a moment eerily similar to our own: coming off 50 years of postwar economic expansion with a Republican "moralist" in the White House, an increasingly interventionist government, the formation of enormous new corporate conglomerates and a muckraking news media fueling resentment. Further, in a didactic final chapter, "Financial Crises as a Perfect Storm," the authors list the seven forces that, once converged, trigger alarm in investors, among them "buoyant growth," "inadequate safety buffers," "adverse leadership" and "undue fear, greed, and other aberrations"; that many (if not all) of these conditions are already met by today's market gives this authoritative history a relevance and vitality that should make business types sit up and take notice.
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Review
"Last year, on the 100th anniversary of their book's subject, Robert F. Bruner and Sean D. Carr published The Panic of 1907: Lessons Learned from the Market's Perfect Storm (John Wiley & Sons). A year later, as we weather a far greater financial storm, the book's lessons are more relevant than ever. From their analysis of one of the worst banking panics in U.S. history, when dozens of banks and trust companies failed, Bruner and Carr conclude that financial crises typically result from the convergence of certain elements into a 'perfect storm.' The book is an engrossing read, featuring characters such as Augustus Heinze, the brash entrepreneur; Charles Barney, the tragic trust president; and, above all, J.P. Morgan, Wall Street's indispensable man." (Edward Teach, CFO Magazine, December 1, 2008)

"The Panic of 1907 is a great tale, and I recommend it to any investor with an interest in history. I also recommend it to any investor who wants to understand what is happening right now." (Cliff Ransom, Ransom Research, Inc., October 31, 2008)

"There is a great book that came out last year, by Robert F. Bruner and Sean D. Carr, entitled The Panic of 1907. It details the fear that gripped the market during that time a century ago. Fear bred mistrust, and mistrust bred repeated runs on the bank. Only when J. Pierpont Morgan himself stepped in to assert authority in the crisis was confidence restored and the downward slide and expanding wave of panic halted. The events of that time are remarkably similar to what is occurring today." (Steven M. Davidoff, The Deal Professor, New York Times, September 18, 2008)

"...a great academic study, which was meant to be a warning. Instead, it reads like a description of what has just happened." (Financial Times)

"A dull textbook it's not: Most chapters amount to six or seven pages of storytelling with cliffhangers… entertaining read..." (Bloomberg News)

"…the definitive guide to the stock market panic of ‘07" (The TImes)

"an important read..." (thestreet.com)

"Bruner, dean of the University of Virginia's Darden School of Business, and Carr, director of the school's Batten Institute, tell the gripping tale of one of the worst financial panics in modern history, where greed and lack of liquidity (sound familiar, people?) dragged stocks down 37 percent." (U.S. News & World Report)

"When The Business Press Maven first cast his eye for business journalism onto business books, it was with the ultimate hope of familiarizing investors with historical insight, which is more common in books than what is demonstrated in newsrooms and trading floors--where yesterday's news and trades qualify as fixtures from a bygone era . . . . That is why I am going to grant The Panic of 1907: Lessons Learned from the Market’s Perfect Storm, a resounding "Help" label from The Business Press Maven, putting it in the probable running for Top 10 Business Press Maven Books of 2007. In case you still don't get it, this is very high praise." (Marek Fuchs, The Business Press Maven, TheStreet.com)

"This retelling of Morgan's bravura performance is a page-turning mix of high finance and high drama" (Barron's)

"…the definitive guide to the stock market panic of ‘07” (The Times, Thursday 13th September 2007)

"Well worth reading" (The Business, Saturday 15th September 2007)

"With this book as their guide, readers will take away important insights...developing a deeper understanding of financial markets" (What Investment?, November 2007)

"A very worthwhile book for advisors who, having just lived through a financial crisis of global implications, are casting about for a larger conceptual framework regarding such events." (Financial Advisor)

"Steering clear of the extremes, the authors dissect the ‘perfect storm’ that blew through the financial system in 1907 and identify seven elements that converge to cause financial crisis . . . Timely read." (The Hindu Business Line, October 19, 2007)

"a useful book on market contagion" (bloomberg.com, Wednesday 5th December 2007)

"Anyone who needs convincing that financial history is constantly repeating itself should pursue this timely tome."  (Spear's Wealth & Management Survey, January 2008)

"My column today quotes from one of the most insightful books I have ever read, “The Panic of 1907.” When I read it last year, I thought it had lessons for today, but I did not realize just how quickly those lessons would become crucial." (Floyd Norris, New York Times)

"A very relevant read in today's subprime infested financial environment." (Gulf Business, February 2008)

"Bruner and Carr deliver more than just a good story." (Risk, February 2008)

"Robert Bruner and Sean Carr, both scholars from the Darden School of Business at the University of Virginia, have written a very important book titled The Panic of 1907: Lessons Learned from the Market’s Perfect Storm.
The value of Bruner and Carr’s book is not only the detailed historical examination of the 1907 financial panic but the scholarly work they did in examining the financial panics that have occurred over the past one hundred years. It was by examining numerous panics that Bruner and Carr were able to develop an outline of how panics begin, spread, and how they are ultimately resolved." (Roger G. Hagstrom, Legg Mason Growth Trust, Investment Commentary and Quarterly Report to Shareholders, March 31, 2008)

From the Inside Flap

Why do markets crash and bank panics happen? Conventional wisdom has gathered, like iron filings, at two intellectual poles: at one extreme is a hodge-podge of idiosyncratic, period-specific causes and at the other is a host of all-encompassing "single bullet" theories. In The Panic of 1907, authors Robert Bruner and Sean Carr offer an alternate perspective through a detailed narrative of one of the worst crises in modern financial history—one which ultimately transformed the American financial system and resulted in the establishment of the modern Federal Reserve.

Drawing from rare source materials, Bruner and Carr take you day by day through the crisis in 1907, revealing what happened, why it matters, and what we can learn from it. Beginning with a catastrophic earthquake in San Francisco and culminating in the shocking suicide of the deposed president of one of New York's leading financial institutions, this book will draw you into the central issues surrounding the panic of 1907. Throughout this journey, you'll not only become familiar with the events of the crisis, but you'll also discover how larger-than-life figures, such as the inestimable J. Pierpont Morgan, took it upon themselves to provide leadership—and inspire confidence—at a time of great uncertainty and instability.

Filled with in-depth insights, The Panic of 1907 offers a deeper understanding of what influences financial markets—both then and now. Through this engaging case study of the panic and crash, Bruner and Carr provide a useful framework for understanding these events, suggesting that major financial crises can be the result of a convergence of certain, unique forces—the forces of the market's "perfect storm"—that can cause investors to react with alarm.

When the many elements of the next financial storm converge, will you be ready? With The Panic of 1907 as your guide, you'll be prepared to assess, understand, and anticipate the factors that can lead to a crisis.

Customer Reviews

J. Pierpont Morgan Saves the World
This is a very short book about a fairly complex event. While it is accessable to the general reader, the book comes alive only when describing the recovery efforts of a group of private financiers led by J. Pierpont Morgan. More focus is needed to show how the problem developed and to help explain the dynamics of investor panic contagion. Further, government officials are given short shrift as either creators of the problem (President Roosevelt) or as Morgan's lackeys (Secretary of the Treasury Cortelyou).

The authors portray Morgan as a giant among dwarves. He almost singlehandedly ends the panic with visionary, unselfish, decisive and commanding presence. In regard to the latter attribute, Morgan is shown summoning the United States Treasury Secretary to New York, warning short sellers that they will be "properly attended to" after the crisis and ordering bank presidents to work. At one point, Morgan is almost godlike as he decides which savings institutions will be supported and which will be allowed to die.

Thus, The Panic of 1907 becomes the story of J. Pierpont Morgan vs. panic and greed. Government is given little credit for helping solve the crisis (except when the president agrees to interrupt his breakfast to promise he won't interfere with Morgan's plans). As an example of "adverse leadership," Theodore Roosevelt is listed as a primary cause of problems due to "rising regulation of an activist President."

While it may seem like a small error, the authors mistakingly credit novelist Sinclair Lewis with reporting about the meatpacking business rather than Upton Sinclair. This carelessness causes me some concern about other details presented in this work.

The reader knows more about the events of 1907 when he finishes the book but I am not sure that knowledge is balanced. Further, I did not find the lessons for today very applicable or compelling. I think the book would have benefitted from a bit more discussion about causes, effects and implications for the present. I would also be interested in a more nuanced analysis of the motives of Morgan and the other financiers who acted to help turn the corner on the panic but who must bear some responsibility for the state of finances prior to the crisis.

Detailed and Nicely Paced - 'Reads' Like and A&E Documentary
Edwin Lefevre's anecdotal account of the cash crunch of October 1907 in his timelessly street smart REMINISCENCES OF A STOCK OPERATOR (1923) has always begged for further commentary. His colorful recollection of how J.P. Morgan "saved" the New York Stock Exchange - "A day I shall never forget, October 24, 1907" - is in this current history placed in the larger context of a more general U.S. monetary crisis. Contributing events included the sudden, unexpected demand for capital following the San Francisco earthquake (1906), a Bank of England decision to slow the flow of gold to the U.S., a recklessly leveraged stock scheme hatched on Wall Street, and the absence of a central banking authority. Plunging asset values, impaired loan collateral values, a general loss of confidence, bank runs, financial ruin, and personal tragedy were the consequences of a "panic" that gripped the markets in that year. Even as one private individual, J.P. Morgan, provided the leadership and liquidity to the banking system, the City of New York, and the New York Stock Exchange, the events of 1907 dramatically underscored the need for a central bank to watch over the monetary needs of the country. The U.S. Federal Reserve as a lender of last resort was created in 1913.

The authors summarize the lessons of 1907 in a final chapter. I'm not sure that new ground is broken here, and the "perfect storm" cliche' is overdone these days, but it can be forgiven in this highly readable account. The point is that multiple contributing causes are in evidence in a financial crisis. Among those causes that stand out are an economy growing strongly where potential risks are marginalized (e.g. the recent mortgage meltdown), financial structures so interlinked or complex that no adequate overview can anticipate the impact of a failure (e.g. the size and opacity of the hedge fund industry), an exogenous shock (e.g. terrorist attacks of 2001), and a financial accident (e.g. a major bank or hedge fund collapse) that crystallizes the risks for the public. Market transparency, coordinated leadership, and adequate regulation are seen as critical elements in slowing the spread of contagion.

The authors don't go out of their way to look for these contemporary parallels, but the links are unavoidable. The strength of this book is that it is a page-turning, 'great read' with the added benefit of providing some useful, cautionary measures to help spot the next financial crisis.

a must read for anyone interested in American finance
Bruner's book is a must read for anyone interested in the history of American finance, or in the intricacies & complexities of financial crises in the US & elsewhere. The 1907 Panic was at once a watershed event in US finance, since it was the immediate stimulus for the creation of our first real central bank, the Federal Reserve. But it also was (and is) typical of financial crises generally. Those of the 19th century that immediately preceded it (that is, in the post-Civil War "Gilded Age"), and those of our own time (that is, Enron, Long-Term Capital Management, Continental Illinois, etc.). Bruner has done an fine job digging up the details of what actually happened in the October/November 1907 crisis, the personalities & institutions, and in showing how these events overlaid on an already unstable economic situation that were lowering public confidence. The book is very well written, if not novel-like, certainly approaching the form. I read nearly all of it in one sitting.