Product Description

"The fall of Atlanta in September 1864 was an important strategic and psychological victory for the war-weary North, virtually assuring that the Union would win the Civil War while assisting Lincoln in his reelection efforts. This concise volume by McMurry . . . closely examines this significant military campaign, places the struggle in its social and political contexts, and includes useful topical appendices and a bibliographical essay. Given its brevity, focus, and the author's unique insights, this readable and well-documented volume will be welcomed by Civil War enthusiasts and scholars alike."—Library Journal "The fall of Atlanta in September 1864 was an important strategic and psychological victory for the war-weary North, virtually assuring that the Union would win the Civil War while assisting Lincoln in his reelection efforts. This concise volume by McMurry . . . closely examines this significant military campaign, places the struggle in its social and political contexts, and includes useful topical appendices and a bibliographical essay. Given its brevity, focus, and the author's unique insights, this readable and well-documented volume will be welcomed by Civil War enthusiasts and scholars alike."—Library Journal

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #321470 in Books
• Published on: 2001-09-01
• Released on: 2001-01-01
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 236 pages

From Publishers Weekly
Part of a new series on the great campaigns of the Civil War, this is a model interpretive survey. McMurry, an independent scholar best known for his comparative analysis of the Confederate Armies of Tennessee and North Virginia, incorporates conventional military history at strategic, operational and tactical levels, but also pays attention to wider factors. Chief among these was the Union presidential election scheduled for November 1864. McMurry believes Lincoln needed a major military success to win reelection. That success came not with the capture of Atlanta itself, but with Confederate General Joseph Johnston's refusal to attempt to halt William T. Sherman's Union invasion of Georgia, chronicled here in detail. Johnston's successor, John Bell Hood, failed, unable to compel his forces to perform the complex, rapid maneuvers he demanded of them in the battles around Atlanta. Sherman, for his part, wasted repeated opportunities to destroy or cripple a numerically inferior enemy in the campaign's early stages, and was able to do no more than blunt Hood's attacks around Atlanta. McMurry concludes that none of the three generals was either good enough or bad enough to contribute to a great military victory by either side, although he arguably underestimates the difficulty of achieving that kind of victory under the tactical conditions prevailing in 1864. He is on firmer ground asserting that, by ensuring Lincoln's reelection, the Atlanta campaign assured continued Union prosecution of the war and eventual failure of the Confederacy's bid for independence. Clear prose and unrushed presentation make this a thoroughly satisfying outing. History Book Club selection. (Oct.)
Copyright 2000 Reed Business Information, Inc.

From Library Journal
The fall of Atlanta in September 1864 was an important strategic and psychological victory for the war-weary North, virtually assuring that the Union would win the Civil War while assisting Lincoln in his reelection efforts. This concise volume by McMurry (John Bell Hood and the War for Southern Independence) closely examines this significant military campaign, places the struggle in its social and political contexts, and includes useful topical appendixes and a bibliographical essay. Given its brevity, focus, and the author's unique insights, this readable and well-documented volume will be welcomed by Civil War enthusiasts and scholars alike, who would have difficulty finding a short treatment of the topic published independently elsewhere. It will thus be a useful addition to larger academic and public libraries, even if they already own more extensive studies, such as Albert Castel's Decision in the West (LJ 11/1/92).ATheresa McDevitt, Indiana Univ. of Pennsylvania
Copyright 2000 Reed Business Information, Inc.

Review

Customer Reviews

MARCHING THROUGH GEORGIA REVISITED
Richard McMurry writes an interesting account covering the1864 military and political events in North Georgia stating "Gettysburg had brought no alteration in the relative strength or position of the opposing armies or in the course of the war" noting that Union successes at Gettysburg, Vicksburg and Chattanooga boosted Northern morale and assured that southerners couldn't gain a military victory and secure Federal recognition of Confederate independence. The author outlines the responses of the Confederacy and Union to this strategic dilemma with a narration of Sherman's North Georgia campaign that ultimately resolved the problem.

Lincoln appointed Grant commander of the Federal Armies and Jefferson Davis appointed Joseph E. Johnston, a general he did not trust; commander of the Army of Tennessee and the text states "All the Rebels would pay a very high price for Jefferson Davis long-standing evasion of the command personnel problems in the West." The author makes the fascinating observation that " By 1864 two irrefutable facts about the conflict should have been clear....neither side was likely to win the war in Virginia. The Confederates were too skilled to loose, at least as long as Lee lived, but not strong enough to win.The Northerners...were too strong to lose the war in Virginia but not skilled enough to win it there."

McMurry notes that Grant having nearly achieved military victory in the West, Grant made two decisions that made a Northern victory costly while enhancing Confederate independence chances. The strategy in Virginia to defeat Lee and prevent moving Rebel troops elsewhere; and two, appointing Sherman in Georgia instead of Thomas. Both decisions resulted in "Ten of thousands of Americans --North and South-- paid for this misjudgment with their lives...." and "The outcome of the war remained doubtful much longer..." The author observes that Thomas finished the war as a general "who never suffered defeat on a battlefield where he was in command" concluding "On the basis of his record, Sherman did not merit such a promotion...."

Both Sherman and Johnston had command personnel problems. Johnston inherited a command muddle which one historian described as a "pit of vipers". The narrative and analysis of Sherman's campaign from North Georgia to Atlanta is informative. Sherman dependence on the Western & Atlantic Railroad limited his strategic options to only advancing toward Atlanta because that was where the railroad ran.

The writer makes the intriguing statement that Union General McPherson's seizure of Snake Creep Gap on May 7th probably "determined the outcome of the campaign." adding the fascinating opinion "....if Grant had allowed Thomas to succeed to the command of the Military Division of Mississippi by seniority, the 1864 campaign in Georgia would have ended two or three weeks after its opening with "....a crushing Federal victory that, for all practical purposes would have ended the war in the West....ripping open the entire center of the Confederacy" and "save many lives during the last eleven months of the war."

As the campaign proceeded, Johnston would fortify a strong position and hope Sherman would attack. Sherman was not going to launch a massive assault against strong fortifications and moved against the Confederate left and flanked them out of every prepared position including Dalton, Resaca, Allatoona, Kennesaw Mountain, and Smyra. On July 8 Sherman crossed the Chattahoochee and the battle for Atlanta was imminent.

Davis replaced Joe Johnson with Hood on July 18, 1864 and the text notes "Rarely has a general assumed command of an army under more inauspicious circumstances than those facing John Bell Hood.... His army was backed up to a city it had to hold" which limited his strategic options and maneuvering room. Hood reversed Johnston's conservative policy striking Sherman at Peachtree Creek, Atlanta and Ezra Church but failed to cripple or destroy the opposing force.

Sherman ,after trying artillery for several days, realized the only way to force Atlanta's evacuation was to cut off all rail traffic into and out of the city. Interestingly, the text also notes "Hood too, sought some means of ....forcing his opponent to give up his position at Atlanta." Hood initiated an unsuccessful cavalry raid on railroads supporting the Federals. Sherman finding cavalry ineffective against railroads used infantry to cut the Macon & Western Railroad isolating Atlanta and Hood forcing the Rebels to abandon Atlanta. The Rebels after opening government warehouses to anyone (military or civilian) to take food, clothing etc.the Rebels burned what they couldn't take with them including five locomotives and 28 freight cars containing ammunition which exploded leveling adjacent buildings in a scene well depicted in the movie Gone With The Wind. Hood's infantry cleared Atlanta by 01:00 AM, September 2. Shortly after daylight Mayor James Calhoun rode north of Atlanta and surrendered the city.

The author concludes with an excellent analysis of the generalships of Sherman, Johnston and Hood noting that Sherman as a field general was "probably not much above average". However, by 1864 Sherman had developed a grasp of the geopolitical-psychological strategy, matched by few, realizing that a war can be won "by destroying the enemy's society and its logistical-economic-social infrastructure and he put that doctrine into practice on a grand scale...." McMurry states Davis contributed to the Rebel command failures in Georgia through his failure to involve himself in western matters.

McMurry concludes "Grant's much-vaunted plan did not work" and "It was a Confederate policy....that kept Lee from sending troops to reinforce the Rebels in Georgia, not the pressure of Grant's assaults on the Confederates in Virginia." Failure of Grant's plan resulted in tens of thousands of casualties.

A strong point throughout this work are the brief parallel accounts given of military and political activities in other areas providing a balanced account of the situations facing both Northern and Southern governments and their commanders. The books ends with two appendices analyzing Grant's strategy and Johnston's railroad strategy plus two excellent appendices titled "Numbers and Losses" and "The Atlanta Campaign and the Election of 1864".

Novel and fascinating perspective
Lots of military historians have gone over this ground, but McMurry takes an iconoclastic stance that yields fascinating results.

His broad argument is that Grant made an error in putting Sherman in charge of the "west" rather than Thomas. Grant made a second, and related, error in personally directing Meade, while leaving Sherman to himself. These goofs caused many thousands of lives on both sides. The war could have been brought to an end much sooner had the full weight of the federals been put behind a drive to and then beyond Atlanta, under Thomas' leadership and perhaps with Grant's supervision, with Meade left in control of the Army of the Potomac.

On the confederate side, I see this book as rehabilitating Hood, and as driving a stake through whatever remains of Joe Johnston's once-high but always undeserved reputation.

Joe Johnson, Hood, and Sherman at Atlanta.
Another book that tackles the subject of who lost Atlanta. Joe Johnson certainly set the stage by retreating and not seriously contesting Sherman's movements toward one of the South's largest cities. Johnson thought Sherman would charge his entrenched positions, and Sherman had no desire to take thousands of casualties. So the move toward Atlanta was one of feints and flanking movements which resulted in Sherman moving closer to Atlanta and Johnson giving up valuable real estate.

This is a nicer book than Atlanta will Fall, because it is less harsh on Joe Johnson. It is charitable to both Johnson and Hood, although it does point the finger at both for losing Atlanta. Hood is depicted as a cavilier soldier who aggressiveness would result in thousands of Army of Tennessee soldiers deaths.

This is a short read, and although a little revisionist, it backs its arguments up with solid facts, as noted in the Appendixes. A good, solid read about Sherman's drive to Atlanta.