Product Description

In I of the Vortex, Rodolfo Llinás, a founding father of modern brain science, presents an original view of the evolution and nature of mind. According to Llinás, the "mindness state" evolved to allow predictive interactions between mobile creatures and their environment. He illustrates the early evolution of mind through a primitive animal called the "sea squirt." The mobile larval form has a brainlike ganglion that receives sensory information about the surrounding environment. As an adult, the sea squirt attaches itself to a stationary object and then digests most of its own brain. This suggests that the nervous system evolved to allow active movement in animals. To move through the environment safely, a creature must anticipate the outcome of each movement on the basis of incoming sensory data. Thus the capacity to predict is most likely the ultimate brain function. One could even say that Self is the centralization of prediction.

At the heart of Llinás's theory is the concept of oscillation. Many neurons possess electrical activity, manifested as oscillating variations in the minute voltages across the cell membrane. On the crests of these oscillations occur larger electrical events that are the basis for neuron-to-neuron communication. Like cicadas chirping in unison, a group of neurons oscillating in phase can resonate with a distant group of neurons. This simultaneity of neuronal activity is the neurobiological root of cognition. Although the internal state that we call the mind is guided by the senses, it is also generated by the oscillations within the brain. Thus, in a certain sense, one could say that reality is not all "out there," but is a kind of virtual reality.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #104177 in Books
• Published on: 2002-03-07
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 314 pages

Features

• ISBN13: 9780262621632
• Condition: NEW
• Notes: Brand New from Publisher. No Remainder Mark.
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Amazon.com Review
What is it about neuroscience that graces its practitioners with humility? Rodolfo Llinas of the NYU School of Medicine continues this tradition of quietly tackling the deepest issues in I of the Vortex. This exposition on the evolution and development of consciousness is accessible and intriguing enough to interest readers more philosophically than scientifically oriented. Grounded in research, the book posits our awareness as an artifact of the cortico-thalamic binding of perceptions and movements in synchrony; Llinas uses this theory as a launching pad for more far-reaching considerations of selfhood all the more relevant for their correlation with the facts.

Charmingly illustrated with artistic and scientific images cleverly supporting the arguments, the book is a quick if challenging read, and it explains all the scientific basics for those approaching from the humanities. Synthesizing evolution, philosophy, and neuroscience is becoming an increasingly popular endeavor for introspective eggheads, and we should be grateful: the question of consciousness affects us all and touches on every other field, from theology to particle physics. I of the Vortex is a welcome contribution to the theory of mind and essential reading for the introspective. --Rob Lightner

Review
"Anyone interested in new ways of thinking about organization of the brain would do well to give it a look."
— Ilya Farber, Nature

"I of the Vortex is an exciting book, full of imagination, fit for the well-educated lay reader."
— Edgar Garcia-Rill, Forum

"Rodolfo Llinas...offers this compelling synthesis of neurology, from the function of the neuron to the workings of the mind."
— Science Books & Films

About the Author
Rodolfo R. Llinás is the Thomas and Susanne Murphy Professor of Neuroscience and Chairman of the Department of Physiology and Neuroscience at the New York University School of Medicine.

Customer Reviews

Novel ideas; thought-provoking
This is another in a spate of recent popular books by leading neuroscientists attempting to explain consciousness and the mind. They are a bit like the fable of the blind men and the elephant. Damasio, a neurologist, (The Feeling of What Happens) takes a neurological perspective; Freeman (How Brains Make up Their Minds)uses a systems approach derived from his research into olfaction; Edelman (A Universe of Consciousness)takes more of a neuroanatomical approach (massive reentrant systems)and in this book Llinas works from his background in cellular physiology up from the level of the single cell. Llinas' book is the best referenced of the above, and he really has some good insights. His discussion on qualia as a sensory "fixed action pattern," analogous to motor FAPs, I thought particularly original. I also liked his idea of the origin of the self as a brain representation of the body, which has profound implications, for it implies virtually all animals have at least a primitive "sense of self." Although the link between cellular physiology and higher levels of nervous system organization is not (understandably) well bridged in the book, all in all, I think Llinas describes a good chunk of the elephant...definitely worthwhile reading.

worth the attentional investment
Llinas cuts to the chase of consciousness in a quick and original way. Initially, his tack may strike the nonspecialist reader as narrowly technical, and for good reason: he is a benchworking neurophysiologist. On re-reading, his big picture comes into view, and it is utterly convincing without being exclusive, characteristic of the inventive scientist.

The theme of this book is an explanation (not just description) of consciousness as evolutionarily generated from the motor system. This is counterintuitive: we're used to hearing that consciousness emanates from the processing of sensory/perceptual data, a presumption so widely accepted that it seems incontrovertible. Thus, Linas' standing as a recognized expert allows him to cite basic experimental findings, then bring along other ideas at a more speculative (yet still scientific) stage, to build a thesis of substantial generality. In fact, given the unitary quality of subjective experience, such generality is requisite.

So what is the thesis? That the centralization of motricity is constituitive of consciousness. Centralization (`cephalization') takes the intrinsic coupling and coordination of muscular movement and embeds it in progressively higher levels of the nervous system. Again, this might first seem unexciting; but Llinas underpins his ideas with a cogency which few others could muster, then guides us up the neuraxis to higher brain levels.

He starts with a typically astute interpretation: essential tremor as evidence of a pulsatile control system operating at the tactical level, coping with a computationally intractable confusion of sensory data, whose control any mobile life form must develop. Primitive muscular coordination is then shown to require neural coordination at a higher evolutionary level. The command system penultimately culminates in the basal ganglia, the generator of `fixed action (stereotyped) patterns' of behavior; and, from there, goes to thalamocortical and limbic circuitry where such FAP's are now strategic, and ultimately voluntary.

If one describes the transformation of sensory to motor coordinates as occuring in a state space (called vectorial coordinate space) it's then possible to give a principled account of consciousness as that virtual space which describes those transformations in a broader context of social and emotional dimensions. Put more practically, consciousness emerges unforced as a survival necessity, without which we'd never be able to decide whether to whistle or urinate as a predator (one's boss) enters the men's room.

In truth, there are gaps: Llinas' original papers lack the sweep (other than oscilloscopic) which would give detailed rather than general support to the broader issues here addressed. The 40 Hz hypothesis rests upon MEG studies which one is hard-pressed to coordinate with `conventional' fMRI and PET imaging, let alone individual neurons.

But this is a minor caveat on a playing field where few contributors even agree on the rules of engagement. An investment of attention to the thesis of this book proves surprisingly rewarding.

Very worthwhile
The author presents quite a plausible theory of mind, based on his work as a neuroscientist. I suspect Llinas is very much on the right track to illuminating the physical basis of consciousness.

Building chapter-by-chapter simultaneously on the apparent evolutionary development from the simplest neuronal system to the centralized brain, and on the results of brain scans and other experiments, Llinas brings us calmly and reasonably to the resultant human mind of today.

For Llinas, consciousness is the synchronized 40Hz firing of regions of the cortex over time. That is, consciousness is not just a given pattern of firing in 3-space, but is a 4-space relation. That additional dimension of time multiplies enormously the potential number of brain patterns that could occur in an individual. But it also makes the topic that much harder to study.

The writing feels like it has been written by someone who knows alot: there are many points where conceptual connections are not made entirely explicit (because it probably seemed so self-evident to Llinas) and the reader must fill in those gaps. Also, some of his non-neurologic language is quite technical: the description of the "self" as a calculated eigenvector, or the "vortex" which is essentially an attractor (as known in mathematics), that can make Llinas sound like a cold, hard-nosed scientist.

However, Llinas is refreshingly 'human'. For him, it is quite reasonable to assume (as a common consequence of evolution and similarity of brain structure) that many other species have forms of consciousness. Indeed, he devotes an entire chapter to qualia, and contends that qualia exist as essential brain feature, not only for humans but for cats and dogs and most other animals with brains of the same evolutionary genre (and that even in the case of invertebrate (octopus) brains he argues that the burden of proof is on those who would deny qualia).

One caveat: be aware that Llinas does not explicitly delineate between accepted facts and his theory - the book flows as one whole. It is not intented as deception. As he says in the preface "This book presents a personal view of neuroscience...".