Product Description

Rees offers the first in-depth account of the extraordinary transformation in the safety standards, operations, and management of the nation's nuclear facilities spurred by the accident at Three Mile Island. Detailing the surprising success of self-regulation within the nuclear industry, his book reveals the possibilities for effective communitarian action.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #1853752 in Books
• Published on: 1994-05-28
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Hardcover
• 245 pages

Customer Reviews

Hostages of Each Other
This book is about how the Nuclear Energy Industry "bootstrapped" itself to improve operational and nuclear safety after the TMI accident. Prior to TMI, the NRC had been enforcing minimum safety requirements, not promoting operational excellence. The industry realized it might not economically survive another TMI, and while the fundamental design of the plants appeared to be safe, significant operational improvements were needed to reduce the chance another similar accident. The industry formed INPO (the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations) to share information and resources to promote excellence and safety in operations. The book is full of stories of what happened and quotes from the principles involved (no heavy technical stuff) and I found it an enjoyable, interesting read. The author is a professor at the Center for Public Policy at Virginia Tech, and I detected no pro or anti-nuke sentiment, just lots of well researched information. Probably the best book I have read on the subject.

Persuasive Argument For Communitarian Regulation
Joseph Rees has written a superior account of the improvements in nuclear systems safety since the Three Mile Island accident. Without getting too deep into the technical details of nuclear systems or chemistry (other than a basic explanation of the general theory of plant operation and a bit of detail about the faulty PORV design), Rees analyzes TMI from a human factors and safety systems vantage point, and subsequently details the improvements made to the US nuclear power industry since the accident.

Rees especially details the workings of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), a non-governmental industry group which oversees safety more diligently than even the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in a system that Rees dubs "communitarian regulation." He details industry problems such as "nonconservative decision making" and provides useful analogies to other industries. The case of Consolidated Edison (p. 154) is of particular interest for those people interested in studying corporate safety systems and programs.

I highly recommend this book to anyone with an interest in nuclear power, and particularly to professionals and students with an interest in industrial safety, regardless of their specific field. This book has applications in every industry, and will improve the understanding of human factors and industrial safety for any interested reader.

Important insights into Organizational Culture
A fascinating account of how the US nuclear power industry got its act together largely without regulatory input, but rather on the assumption that if there was one more major mishap, the public would demand the end of their business. Interestingly, they ended up borrowing many of the techniques used by Admiral Rickover and the US Navy.