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The Lessons of Terror: A History of Warfare Against Civilians

The Lessons of Terror: A History of Warfare Against Civilians
By Caleb Carr

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Military historian Caleb Carr’s groundbreaking work anticipated America’s current debates on preemptive military action against terrorist sponsor states, reorganization of the American intelligence system, and the treatment of terrorists as soldiers in supranational armies rather than as criminals. Carr’s authoritative exploration demonstrates that the practice of terrorism, employed by national armies as well as extremists since the days of ancient Rome, is ultimately self-defeating. Far from prompting submission, it stiffens enemy resolve and never leads to long-lasting success.

Controversial on its initial publication in 2002, The Lessons of Terror has been repeatedly validated by subsequent events. Carr’s analysis of individual terrorist acts, and particularly of the history of the Middle East conflict, is fundamental to a deep understanding of the roots of terrorism as well as the steps and reforms that must be taken if the continuing threat of terrorist behavior is to be met effectively today and, finally, eradicated tomorrow.


Product Details

  • Amazon Sales Rank: #268277 in Books
  • Published on: 2003-03-11
  • Released on: 2003-03-11
  • Original language: English
  • Number of items: 1
  • Binding: Paperback
  • 320 pages

Editorial Reviews

Review
?The Lessons of Terror is so earnest, so well informed and so outrageous...that almost any reader will find something to love and something that will make you want to throw the book across the room. It is, in short, pure Carr.??Newsweek

?After the deadly attacks against the United States, many Americans now may view Carr?s earlier arguments as prescient and his approach as the only one that has a chance of working. The Lessons of Terror is fascinating to read and provocative in the best sense of the word.? ?The Christian Science Monitor

?A provocative history of warfare against civilians from Roman times to the present.??Time

?It crosses political boundaries. It offends and provokes, refreshes and energizes.??Chicago Sun-Times -- Review

Review
The Lessons of Terror is so earnest, so well informed and so outrageous...that almost any reader will find something to love and something that will make you want to throw the book across the room. It is, in short, pure Carr.”—Newsweek

“After the deadly attacks against the United States, many Americans now may view Carr’s earlier arguments as prescient and his approach as the only one that has a chance of working. The Lessons of Terror is fascinating to read and provocative in the best sense of the word.” —The Christian Science Monitor

“A provocative history of warfare against civilians from Roman times to the present.”—Time

“It crosses political boundaries. It offends and provokes, refreshes and energizes.”—Chicago Sun-Times

From the Inside Flap
Military historian Caleb Carr's groundbreaking work anticipated America's current debates on preemptive military action against terrorist sponsor states, reorganization of the American intelligence system, and the treatment of terrorists as soldiers in supranational armies rather than as criminals. Carr's authoritative exploration demonstrates that the practice of terrorism, employed by national armies as well as extremists since the days of ancient Rome, is ultimately self-defeating. Far from prompting submission, it stiffens enemy resolve and never leads to long-lasting success.

Controversial on its initial publication in 2002, The Lessons of Terror has been repeatedly validated by subsequent events. Carr's analysis of individual terrorist acts, and particularly of the history of the Middle East conflict, is fundamental to a deep understanding of the roots of terrorism as well as the steps and reforms that must be taken if the continuing threat of terrorist behavior is to be met effectively today and, finally, eradicated tomorrow.


Customer Reviews

Timely Book Uses History to Dissect the Future of Security4
This is a timely book that is well written in the main. It is somewhat marred by the author's absolutism in arguing his main thesis that warfare against civilians (terrorism) is always a losing strategy for the perpetrators. His secondary thesis is that surgical, preemptive strikes have been consistently the most effective way of eliminating terrorist threats (all the more interesting since Carr wrote this book before the Iraq War).

Caleb Carr looks at history from Roman times to the current Arab-Israeli conflict to argue that terrorism always loses. Terrorism, or attacks on civilians, differs from guerilla warfare in that guerillas use their irregular forces and tactics to target opposing/occupying military personnel and targets. Terrorists just kill and maim wantonly, under the mistaken belief that carnage and death will force change or lead the terrorists to their goals. The historic evidence is otherwise. Terrorism almost always hardens the hearts and steels the minds of both targets and local populations against the perpetrators and frequently begets terrorism as a response.

Carr's examples are many. The Romans struck not the military might of the German tribes across the Rhine, but the villages and peoples thereof. German tribes became ferocious opponents and were the ones who ended up sacking Rome. Michael Collins was on his way to winning independence for all of Ireland. His turn to terrorism stiffened British resolve (leading one British prime minister to state he would not conclude a deal with the IRA because he "would not shake hands with murder.") and undercut his local support. Palestinian terrorism has not shaken the resolve of Israel; it has produced hard line Israeli governments less likely to negotiate Palestinian autonomy or statehood. These are a few of the historic examples Carr cites in support of his argument.

While I think he is generally right, he mars his well argued position by stating that warring against civilians and non-military targets always loses. Certainly the American Indian experience shows that wars of annihilation can sometimes (obviously) reduce an opponent to absolute subjugation for the long-term. And while Rome was sacked by the descendants of tribesman who sufferings were legion along the Rhine, several hundred years elapsed from then until Rome's fall. Also, General Sherman's romp through Georgia is referred to several times, but America healed fairly well and fairly quickly after the Civil War.

Nevertheless, the author's failed attempt to prove his observation correct in every case does not mar this book's demonstration that his thesis stands up well in most cases. On the contrary, the evidence marshaled by Carr is persuasive and the conclusion convincing.

Carr also shows what has worked historically in dealing with perpetrators of terrorism. Preemptive war, surgical strikes, leadership strikes have all proven the most consistently successful means to deal with history's bad actors. The reason is simple. Responding to terrorism with terrorism creates nations of opponents among people who generally want to live in peace and are probably suffering under their terrorist leader, warlord, or ruthless tyrant and would like nothing more than to see that person removed. As Jefferson showed in dismantling the Barbary pirates (at least as a threat against American interests) and President Bush has just shown against Saddam, the surgical strike first articulated by Frederick the Great removes the problem by attacking leadership and military interests without killing so many civilians that a nation of revenge seekers is created.

Failing to act preemptively begets larger threats over time. The suffering nation is perceived as weak (terrorists and tyrants look to prey on the weak) and the threat grows. The recent evidence of this progression can be seen in the mid to late 1990's as American embassies, interests, and the USS Cole were progressively attacked by Islamic terrorists who came to believe that America's only response to such outrages would be a few cruise missiles thrown against desert encampments. As unseemly as preemptive war seems to Americans, it is certainly better than the alternative of massive casualties inflicted upon us by those who come to believe they can act with impunity because we are not willing to persecute these threats until they are eliminated.

This is an interesting and persuasive book that should be read by every member of Congress as well as all that want to know how to best protect America in this age of terrorism.

The Uselessness of Terror5
Caleb Carr does an excellent job of explaining the military nature of terrorism and its connection to the more "conventional" militaries of the world. Unlike most authors on terrorism, Carr does not split hairs between say, the PLO blowing up a bus and the Allied bombing of German cities (except of course in scale). Deliberately targeting civilians whether done by regular or irregular forces is always wrong and above all never works.
Carr points out that military effectiveness demands an end to attacks on civilians. Military leaders who have understood this have been very effective. Those who haven't, have dragged their nations down and increased the misery of war. Military force can only be effective when it is applied against the enemy's military, never when it is applied against the enemy's population. Terror does not end a conflict, it only insures that the conflict will continue.
The only real criticism I have is Carr's strange choice of the more enlightened military figures: Cromwell, von Moltke, Guerdarian. Their theories may be what Carr is getting at, but it is very easy to see places where these men lead armies to annihilate civilians. Carr tries to explain this away, but I wasn't completely convinced.

A thoughtful presentation, should be read by everyone4
This book, by a trained miliatry historian, lays out a case for the avoidance of terror against civilian populations. It then goes on to define terror in ways I had never considered.

Particularly disturbing are several discussions about the consistency with which indiginous military trained by an outside invader turn on that selfsame invader after the invasion is over. ( Sound familiar? Mujahadeen anyone?)

The early sections on the tactics of the Roman Empire were quite revealing, particularly given the parallels with modern practice.

Well worth the time.