Product Details
A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954

A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954
By Michael J. Hogan

List Price: $34.99
Price: $33.00 & eligible for FREE Super Saver Shipping on orders over $25. Details

Availability: Usually ships in 24 hours
Ships from and sold by Amazon.com

40 new or used available from $17.03

Average customer review:

Product Description

A Cross of Iron provides the fullest account yet of the national security state that emerged in the first decade of the Cold War. Michael J. Hogan traces the process of state-making through struggles to unify the armed forces, harness science to military purposes, mobilize military manpower, control the defense budget, and distribute the cost of defense across the economy. President Harry S. Truman and his successor were in the middle of a fundamental contest over the nation's political identity and postwar purpose, and their efforts determined the size and shape of the national security state that finally emerged.


Product Details

  • Amazon Sales Rank: #187138 in Books
  • Published on: 2000-12-28
  • Original language: English
  • Number of items: 1
  • Binding: Paperback
  • 540 pages

Editorial Reviews

From Library Journal
Hogan, a specialist in American diplomatic and national security studies, has written a complex but interesting work on the emergence of the national security state. To create this state, it was necessary to merge the armed forces, the Defense Department, and scientists into a single unit to enhance the military's capabilities. To a large extent, this unification was accomplished in the 1950s. The driving forces were James Forrestal, Dean Acheson, and powerful members of Congress such as Carl Vinson (D-GA), who chaired the Committee on Naval Affairs, along with presidents Truman and Eisenhower. Hogan presents a compelling case but overemphasizes the importance of Truman and Eisenhower while downplaying the role of Vinson and others in the security state's creation. In fact, both Truman and Eisenhower often seemed opposed to it but succumbed to pressure from Congress and key figures like Acheson. This extremely complex study, which deals with a subject few other books handle, is designed for scholars and informed lay readers interested in the creation of the "military-industrial complex."?Richard P. Hedlund, Ashland Community Coll., KY
Copyright 1998 Reed Business Information, Inc.

From Booklist
Historian Hogan, editor of the journal Diplomatic History and author of several books on U.S. foreign relations in the twentieth century, offers this study of the post^-World War II debate within the U.S. about what the nation's world role should be and how our institutions should change to meet that role's demands. The debate pitted supporters of a new national security ideology (e.g., Acheson and Kennan) against representatives of an older political culture (e.g., Taft and Hoover) whose values were antistatist, antimilitarist, and isolationist. Tracing the face-off through many issues--from the National Security Act and universal military service to defense reorganization and budget priorities--Hogan sees both Truman and Eisenhower as figures of compromise. Like congressional Republicans, both presidents wanted to avoid turning the U.S. into a "garrison state," but they shared the national security proponents' conviction that that could be prevented only by a policy of internationalism. In the end, Hogan suggests, "the most important constraints on the national security state were those built into the country's democratic institutions and political culture." Mary Carroll

From Kirkus Reviews
In an important contribution to modern US government and policy studies, Hogan (History/Ohio State Univ.) traces the development of America's national security apparatus in the first decade of the Cold War. For much of its history, the US took to heart the advice of George Washington to avoid entangling alliances and involvement in foreign affairs. Accordingly, as it matured, America pursued a policy of nonintervention in foreign wars (except in Latin America), and enjoyed an antistatist and antimilitarist domestic culture. While America was becoming an active international power in the years prior to WWII, isolationism still characterized American policy on the eve of that war. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor transformed the domestic policy consensus: isolationism was no longer viewed as a practical policy, and America had to bear the burden of its own defense. Hogan argues that, in the first decade following the conclusion of WWII, advocates of the new ideology of military security came into conflict with proponents of the older values. He contends that the emerging national security state was largely the presidential creation of Harry Truman, who attempted to reconcile the two camps, and of Dwight Eisenhower, who feared the development of a garrison state but recognized the need to end the isolationist policy of the past. The tension between the two ideologies could play out within the same individual, as was the case with Truman and some others. Often, the tension carved out divisions along party and institutional lines (the national security ideology was associated more with the Democratic party and the executive branch, and the older culture more with the Republican party and the Congress). What resulted, Hogan concludes, was a compromise: while the political, military, and intelligence organs of the national security state proliferated, the nation's democratic values and principles of civilian control prevented the nation from becoming a total garrison state. An absorbing, provocative study. -- Copyright ©1998, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved.


Customer Reviews

A well-documented look at the politics of national security5
With a keen eye for historical significance, Kevin Hogan surveys the formation of the national security establishment in the Truman and Eisenhower years. A balanced account, this treatment emphasizes the human factor in the arduous negotiations and political conflicts which took place during the late 40's and 50's. A fresh look is taken at Truman, Eisenhower, and the lesser players at the time: Herbert Hoover, Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy, Hubert Humphrey, and Sen. John F. Kennedy. Those not thoroughly familiar with the events of the period will be moved at the story of the nation's top admirals in brazen defiance of Pres. Truman, or the nervous collapse of Truman's beleaguered war secretary. Requires a moderate attention span, but political buffs should enjoy it a great deal.