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Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #399484 in Books
• Published on: 2008-01-16
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 432 pages

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• ISBN13: 9780618919819
• Condition: USED - VERY GOOD
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From Publishers Weekly
Bell combines his roles as professor of history at Johns Hopkins and contributing editor for the New Republic in this interpretive study arguing that history's first total war was waged during the Napoleonic era. Scholars have increasingly stressed the global aspects of the network of conflicts extending across North America, South Asia and Europe during that time. Bell goes further, presenting a fundamental transformation of war from an ordinary aspect of human existence to an apocalyptic experience whose "terrible sublimity" tested societies and individuals to their limits and ultimately became a redemptive experience. Total war developed not in the context of nationalism or revolutionary zeal, but in the fundamental sense of a "culture of war" driving participants in the direction of complete engagement and total abandonment of restraint. Ironically, the intellectual roots of this modern militarism are in the Enlightenment belief in the coming of perpetual peace. Revolutionary France transformed a moral concept into a practical one: war to emancipate humanity from its past. Bell's conclusion that this mentality survived two world wars is open to challenge, yet his appeal for the rediscovery of restraint and limitation is particularly relevant at a time of nuclear proliferation and apocalyptic rhetoric. (Jan. 12)
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From Booklist
The wars of the French Revolution acquired a pitiless character and an unprecedented scale for which historians have groped for explanations: ideology and French nationalism are most commonly cited. Bell elaborates an alternate viewpoint without dismissing traditional analyses. The author of two books on the ancien regime, Bell roots his thesis in Enlightenment theorizers of progress and, less philosophically, in the eighteenth-century aristocratic attitude toward war. Bell effectively personifies his case in a nobleman favorable to the Revolution but ultimately consumed by it, titled the Duke of Lauzun. The boudoir and the battlefield were all the same to him, stages for stylized and restrained performances of honor. When Lauzun was sent to western France to quell royalist revolt in 1793-94, his scruples doomed him as radicals demanded the annihilation of rebels. In this shocking civil war of the Vendee, Bell observes the seeds of the "total war" methods that grew apace in ensuing wars and established dark precedents for the future. Astute and fluid, Bell's study has ramifications beyond his historical specificity. Gilbert Taylor
Copyright © American Library Association. All rights reserved

Review
"A fascinating and brilliant work of history." (Paul berman, author of Terror and Liberalism )

"Masterly...an essential book." (San Francisco Chronicle )

Customer Reviews

An Intellectual History of the Napoleonic Wars
We have grown accustomed to viewing the World Wars of the 20th century as the first total wars in modern history, for they required the total mobilization and militarization of the societies involved. Their accompanying ideologies, fascism and communism, were appropriately called totalitarian since they left no aspect of society unaffected. Now historian David A Bell has written a new and different history of the Napoleonic Wars (1792 - 1815) arguing that they were in fact the first total wars.

In his introduction, Bell tells us that he is borrowing techniques from intellectual history to write a military history. Traditionally military historians have restricted themselves to accounts of battlefield tactics and weapon systems. Bell is attempting to go further in showing that the ideals of the Enlightenment played a role in what he calls the first total war. He believes that the French Revolution - the apotheosis of the Enlightenment - radicalized people's ideas about how and why wars should be fought.

During the time of the ancien regime - which is Bell's main standard of comparison - wars were limited and short-lived. They were fought according to established rules and usually to defend the honor of this or that aristocrat; in fact, many times the armies were made up of mercenaries. The philosophes of the Enlightenment such as Kant, Diderot, d'Alembert, and the Marquis de Condorcet were certain that with the advent of reason wars would be a thing of the past. As late as 1790 Robespierre was declaring in the Assembly that the French nation had no desire to engage in war, that to invade another country and make it adopt their laws and constitution was the furthest thing from their minds.

Much changed in two years. By 1792 there was growing opposition to the revolutionary government in Paris, especially in Vendee. The government decided to put down this rebellion with a degree of brutality not seen before. They conducted a scorched-earth policy that spared no one. They made no distinction between combattants and non-combattants. The dogs of war had been unleashed to save the revolution and to obliterate any dissent.

Bell explores the nature of total war and how it feeds on itself. Once the military becomes front and center of the government, war becomes unstoppable. All of the nations resources and efforts went to the Grand Armee to create an empire in places as far as Egypt and Russia.

In his retelling of the Spanish campaign, Bell attempts to draw a parallel with America's intervention in Iraq. To an extent there are some parallels. Napoleon claimed to be bringing Enlightenment ideals and reform to Spain, yet the insurgency would have none of it. This, however, is a distraction from Bell's thesis; whatever else it is doing in Iraq, America is not conducting a total war. This is a very restrained and cautious use of military power. In fact, Napoleon's excursion into Spain was somewhat cautious to be called total war.

When contrasted with what transpired in the preceding century and what the philosophes predicted, the Napoleonic Wars were barbaric and total, but it is still not clear how they were different from, say, the Mongol invasions of the Middle Ages or the military expeditions of Alexander the Great. Its seems that the so-called total wars of Napoleon have been done before. The total mobilization of people and resources is as old as human history. Mutual and absolute hatred for the enemy is a timeless emotion. Bell's argument that hell hath no fury like a citzen's army is reminiscent of Victor Davis Hanson's thesis in Carnage and Culture, and it is as unconvincing.

Bell's book provides much food for thought on how quickly circumstances can change from permanent peace to permanent war without pinpointing exactly what triggers the change. Paranoia, perceived threat,and survival are all factors in the devolution of high ideals to base hostility. And why armies of citizens driven by Enlightenment ideals fight more effectively than previous armies is still unanswered. However, Bell makes a robust effort with this original work.

Interesting, But with the Usual Academic Flaws
Mr VanGaalen's review is pretty much on point, but I rated this book somewhat lower due to several flaws.

First, Total War of any definition is not a modern concept, whether it developed first under Napoleon or not. The Greeks of Ionia certainly fought multiple total wars against the Persians, as did many tribes and states in ancient history. One should remember the Jews against the Assyrians and Babylonians and the disappearance of the "Lost Tribes." In more modern times, the Thirty Years War was a "Total War" for Germany in which the population fell by over three-quarters. In all of these conflicts politics and warfare were integrated and the populace was fully mobilized for war.

Our modern conception of Total War, like most of our narcissistic attitudes, tends to enhance the importance of our time in history. In a similar vein, one could argue that the creation of a national holiday for Martin Luther King Jr was not to honor King, but to honor someone (anyone) from our own time -- we knew him, and were therefore more important as a result. With respect to a "militaristic" society, it can be argued that Sparta, Imperial Rome, Turkist and Mongol tribes were all highly militaristic societies that far eclipsed modern societies with the possible exception of Nazi Germany.

Secondly, the interspersing of titillating events such as the atrocities during the Napoleonic wars like castration, Napoleon's love life, and the like in the text were obviously ploys to attract a wider readership and not welcome. The author has apparently never experienced combat, otherwise he would know that dead and captured French soldiers routinely suffered having their genitals cut off and put in their mouths during their campaigns in Mexico, North Africa and Vietnam as did Americans troops in Vietnam. But even the venal American media decided to omit those details from their reporting as not adding anything to their presentations.

Lastly, the left-wing author felt compelled to follow many of his politically allied academics into comparing whatever his discourse was covering to the actions of President Bush and his conservative base. All of this author's silly excursions into this polemic were off-base, and they added nothing to the discussion of the Napoleonic times versus the formal and limited warfare of the 18th century in Europe.

Clearly the author feels that the French Revolution was the most important event in history, a viewpoint often found in European historical works. The American Revolution meant little or nothing in the course of history which is dominated by Europe and its political evolution under civil (Roman) law for the writers of such works. Bell seems oblivious to the formation and role of militias since the Middle Ages, and overlooks the fact that most leaders in history have developed through military feats. Instead he subscribes to militarism as being a new feature now common in Western culture. Spare me the far-left propaganda! Bacevich's treatise is totally wrong, and yes, "...no one who has not been in combat can ever really understand 'what it is like' or how it changes a person." Obviously the author disagrees, but I fear he limits his disagreement to intellectual elites in academia (with tenure) like himself.

On the positive side, the book was very readable and his flowing treatment of the times for developing nation states, "enlightenment" and citizen involvement is excellent. I would have given Bell a "4" for this book for the historical treatment of 1770-1815 if he had been able to keep his political preaching out of the text.

Flawed but fascinating
As a brief history of the late Enlightenment and the French Revolution: 4 stars
As a brief history of the Napoleonic Wars (only 3 of 8 chapters): 3 stars
As a coherent political theory: 2 stars

On average, this amounts to 3 stars and makes for a light readable history accompanied by some often interesting theory. However, if you're getting the book based on its title, 2.5 stars might be more accurate.

The history itself is fine, making for a broad overview with a few good insights, so my critique will focus on the theory and the parallels Bell draws.

Bell is not an idiot and seems to have a good grasp of general history, capable of soberly pointing out that the total American casualties in the War on Terror have so far amounted to less than what the Russians would have suffered in an average 6 hours during WWII. Yet he will often come up with the most inane comments to keep the book contemporary. For instance, he repeatedly states how "uncannily similar" the guerrilla war in Spain is to the current Iraq insurgency. "Uncannily similar" in what sense? The answer seems to be that they're both insurgencies - just like Afghanistan, Somalia, Vietnam, Lebanon, and thousands of other historical insurgencies. Arguably Iraq has more in common with the Jewish revolt against the Romans than with the Peninsula War. But then, of course, if he argued that, he would be admitting that fanatical insurgency predates the French Revolution by a long margin.

What he terms "Total War" is also problematic. The West has only fought a handful of total wars since Napoleonic times. Instead, less technologically advanced societies have tended to be the ones to most fully mobilize their populations in war. But is this really a modern phenomenon? Bell admits city states fought total wars in this [his] sense, but so too did tribal societies, nomadic pastoralists, and small colonies. Some of the religious wars of the 16th and 17th century seemed pretty total too. Perhaps he has things the wrong way around and it is "limited war" that needs explaining.

On the other hand, he is right to emphasise the role the French Revolution played in the military/civilian split, the advent of the literate soldier, and the rise of propaganda. He also brings up the birth of the philosophical concept of a War to End All Wars (in the non-Biblical sense, of course). Did these things lead to Total War though? He is unconvincing. Wars had already long been fought as much to eliminate other powers as for plunder or to keep a system of powers in balance. "Delenda Carthago/Carthage must be destroyed" is not a modern call to war.