Product Description

In The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan, New York Times bestselling author James Mann directs his keen analysis to Ronald Reagan’s role in ending the Cold War. Drawing on new interviews and previously unavailable documents, Mann offers a fresh and compelling narrative—a new history assessing what Reagan did, and did not do, to help bring America’s four-decade conflict with the Soviet Union to a close.

As he did so masterfully in Rise of the Vulcans, Mann sheds new light on the hidden aspects of American foreign policy. He reveals previously undisclosed secret messages between Reagan and Moscow; internal White House intrigues; and battles with leading figures such as Nixon and Kissinger, who repeatedly questioned Reagan’s unfolding diplomacy with Mikhail Gorbachev. He details the background and fierce debate over Reagan’s famous Berlin Wall speech and shows how it fit into Reagan’s policies. Ultimately, Mann dispels the facile stereotypes of Reagan in favor of a levelheaded, cogent understanding of a determined president and his strategy.

This book finally answers the troubling questions about Reagan’s actual role in the crumbling of Soviet power; and concludes that by recognizing the significance of Gorbachev, Reagan helped bring the Cold War to a close.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #18536 in Books
• Published on: 2009-03-05
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Hardcover
• 416 pages

Features

• ISBN13: 9780670020546
• Condition: NEW
• Notes: Brand New from Publisher. No Remainder Mark.
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From The Washington Post
From The Washington Post's Book World/washingtonpost.com Reviewed by Ronald Steel Are the great questions of war and peace, victory and failure, too important to be left to the experts? This is the question posed decades ago by David Halberstam in "The Best and the Brightest," his landmark study of the Vietnam War. And it is one provocatively raised by James Mann in this revealing inquiry into the role played by Ronald Reagan in the fall of communism and the end of the Cold War. In his previous book, "Rise of the Vulcans," Mann subjected George W. Bush's inner circle of war planners to critical scrutiny. Here he turns back the page to an earlier Republican president, elected as a fierce opponent of communism, who in his second term challenged "the forces and ideas that had made the Cold War seem endless and intractable." Reagan's rebellion, in Mann's engrossing account, entailed viewing with guarded hope, rather than with cynicism, the efforts of Mikhail Gorbachev to liberalize the internal structure of the Soviet state and transform Moscow's relations with its empire and its adversaries. Responding to Gorbachev's initiatives, Reagan found himself, Mann relates, at odds with his political base within the Republican party, with much of his own national security bureaucracy and with both Richard Nixon and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. In Reagan's "rebellion," two schools of foreign policy struggled for dominance. On one side were the "realists," who believed that the behavior of states was dominated by the struggle for power and that the contest would continue interminably and without quarter until one side or the other accepted total defeat. Reagan, however, in Mann's view, believed that the Cold War rested less on the weight of armies and weapons than on the struggle of ideas and political values. In the relatively youthful Gorbachev, who came to power in 1985 after the death in office of four Soviet leaders in as many years, he found a different kind of adversary -- one who spoke of social reform at home and of reversing the decades-long arms race with the United States. During their first summit encounter -- at Reykjavik, Iceland, in October 1986 -- the two leaders came remarkably close to an accord not merely to reduce, but actually to scrap much of their missile forces. This astonishing proposal failed largely because Reagan insisted on pursuing his effort to build an anti-missile arsenal known to skeptics as "Star Wars." Today, more than 20 years and billions of dollars later, that project remains more dream than reality -- but a lucrative one, still producing juicy pork for what Dwight Eisenhower labeled the "military-industrial complex." The intriguing question is why Reagan, who had won the presidency twice by denouncing communism as a force of evil, was so receptive to Gorbachev. Mann attributes this largely to the influence of an American cultural historian named Suzanne Massie. Enamored of the "soul" of ancient Russia rather than with machinations in the Kremlin, she became Reagan's unofficial adviser. To the dismay of his foreign policy team, Reagan met with her more than 20 times in the White House and used her as his personal messenger to Gorbachev, bypassing his own official advisers. In the face of intense opposition to his overtures to Moscow from Nixon and Kissinger, as well as the Republican punditry, Reagan employed political rhetoric to secure his base. A generation after JFK stood at the Brandenburg Gate, Reagan went there in June 1987 with a message of his own: "Tear down this wall." In fact, by that time the wall was already being undermined by Gorbachev himself, who had made clear to Russia's satellite regimes in Eastern Europe that they could not count on the Red Army to protect them against their own people. Reagan's speech, which Mann follows in considerable detail, was pure theater. But it fortified his position with Senate Republicans, whose support he and Secretary of State George Shultz needed to push through a treaty with Moscow banning medium-range nuclear missiles. Two years later, on Nov. 11, 1989, the Berlin Wall came down as Gorbachev allowed the East German regime to collapse. Soon the two Germanies were united. And in 1991 the Soviet Communist Party disintegrated and with it ultimately the Soviet Union itself. Did Reagan make it happen? This would be too strong, Mann insists. The Cold War ended largely because Gorbachev "had abandoned the field." But by supporting Gorbachev at the right time, even in the face of intense opposition from within his own party, Reagan had "helped create the climate in which the Cold War could end." Mann is wise not to overdo Reagan's role. In addition to whatever contribution Reagan may have made, the Soviet Union was brought down by the immense economic strain of the Cold War and the futile and demoralizing war in Afghanistan. (This is a lesson that Barack Obama, prodded increasingly by key advisers into his own Afghan morass, would do well to ponder.) In fashioning a compelling and historically significant story, Mann has cast new light both on Reagan and on the strange ending of a decades-long conflict between two great imperial powers that somehow, through skill and fear and plain dumb luck, never degenerated into a war that would have destroyed them both. With this book, following John Patrick Diggins's landmark study "Ronald Reagan: Fate, Freedom, and the Making of History" (2007), Reagan revisionism has truly begun in earnest.
Copyright 2009, The Washington Post. All Rights Reserved.

About the Author
James Mann is the author of the New York Times bestseller Rise of the Vulcans and The China Fantasy, among others. Author-in-residence at John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, he is an award-winning former Washington reporter, columnist, and foreign correspondent for the Los Angeles Times.

Customer Reviews

A Well Researched Thesis
I found the thesis of this book to ring true. The idea that Reagan on his own, came to conclusions at variance, with both his conservative base, and the "realist" school that included Nixon, Kissinger, and Snowcroft, has been repressed on both sides of the American political divide, for different reasons.

Some like to think of Ronald Reagan as either a rigid and narrow-minded, ideological Cold Warrior, in the school of Joe McCarthy...or, a conservative, neo-con, cowboy-saint, who single-handedly, won the Cold War by forcing the Soviets to capitulate in the face of our arms build-up, our Pershing missile deployment, and our moral vigor.

James Mann explodes both these misconceptions. His thesis is that eventually, Reagan saw in Mikhail Gorbachev...as good hearted man of flexible mind...and crucially, as man with whom he could negotiate. Reagan was aided in this effort by an extraordinary woman...a writer, with good contacts within the Soviet Union, and whom Reagan personally trusted to send and receive messages and overtures...as well as report her observations. In fact, he trusted this woman more than his conservative political base, and more than George Schultz and his own State Department.

It's an extraordinary story of the personal diplomacy of "trusting, but verifying". Mann documents that Reagan's real role was, in first understanding Gorbachev's internal political position, and responding to it in such as way as not to undermine the Kremlin politics that kept him on top. The fact that Reagan's arms build-up, in a way, actually helped to propel Gorbachev into power, is intriguing, for as Andropov's intelligence protege, he was trusted on security issues by the Soviet military and political establishment. This was particularly important for progress on the IMF treaty, so vehemently opposed by Reagan's right wing...the up-and-coming American neo-cons.

Mann sees Reagan deftly acting in ways to respect and support his "enemy"...who eventually became his colleague in ending the Cold War. I even see an element of Gandhi's non-violent opposition, in this highly counter-intuitive idea of supporting one's opponent.

I think Mann convinces the reader that, in the end, it was Gorbachev's central role, in desiring a European Russia...who ABANDONED the Cold War...not Reagan who FORCED its ending. But Mann is most clear that Reagan was quite instrumental in making it politically possible for him to do so. This was, without doubt, a HUGE contribution to the success of peace, and the nearly bloodless transformation and normalization of Europe.

Ronald Reagan deserves the credit he's accorded as a first class diplomat..but Mann's script for how he achieved this, is different from the usual dogma of either the American right, or the American left...or, for that matter, the genetically critical Euro left.

Mann's thesis is quite believable to me....and I think this well documented history should have nothing but a beneficial effect, upon the highly contentious partisanship we've seen in America, since Reagan and Gorbachev left the world stage.

An important new study
The importance of Ronald Reagan is often being debated with books on both his greatness, sort of hagiographies, and those opposing places to much credit in him (Tear Down This Myth: How the Reagan Legacy Has Distorted Our Politics and Haunts Our Future). This book attepts to examine Reagan from he standpoint of his 'rebellion' against the consensus on the right and left that the Soviet Union was a fact of life. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger and other powerful voices in the Republican and Democratic parties believed the USSR was part of the status quo of the world, something that would always exist.

This book posits that Reagan and those around him imagined a world without the USSR and they sought to bring it about. This 'revolutionary' ideology meant that the State Department's current policies had to be pushed aside and instead of accomidating the USSR the U.S had to push against it, rather thanc containing, it had to be done away with.

Suprisingly Reagan found a sort of soul mate in Michael Gorbachev, who also sought radical reform in the USSR. In a freindship forged in ideological combat they together helped tear down the myth of Soviet invincibility. This book examines such famous incidents as the 'tear down this wall' speech. It shows that Reagan had a very real ideology that he pursued with vigor.

An important work. It doesn't highlight the role of the Afghan war at all and this is a major dificiency, but one filled by such books as Charlie Wilson's War: The Extraordinary Story of How the Wildest Man in Congress and a Rogue CIA Agent Changed the History of Our Times. For those interested in the Cold War and Reagan this is an important study from a master writer.

Seth J. Frantzman

A nuanced look at Ronald Reagan
James Mann mantains that Ronald Reagan was able to look beyond both the Realist and Neoconservative tradtions of the Republican Party and developed a working relationship with Gorbachev. In the first part of the book, Mann discusses Nixon's troubled relationship with Reagan when it came to the Soviet Union. Nixon, had a Realist emphasis on balance of power and military might when it came to dealing with the Soviet Union while Reagan thought that the Cold War was a war over ideas in which the Russians would embrace American ideals. In the first part of Reagan's term Nixon felt that Reagan should at least talk to the Soviets and then criticized Reagan for being too close to the Soviets in the second term. Reagan disargeed with Nixon because he thought that the Russian people had abandoned Communism. The second part of the book describes how Suzanne Massie persuaded Reagan that the Russians hated Communism and that Gorbachev was a new kind of Soviet leader , who would embrace Western values. The third part of the book is about how this new vision of Gorbachev allowed Reagan to give the "tear down the wall," speech despite protests from Realist in the state department. The fourth part of the book Mann tells how Reagan infuriated both Realists and Neoconservatives alike by signing the INF treaty with Gorbachev. Mann contends that only Reagan could have signed that deal with Gorbachev since most other Republicans opposed that deal and a Democrat would have had a tough time passing that treaty through the senate.
Mann concludes by stating that Gorbachev was the main reason that Communism fell in Europe. Gorbachev tried to refrom the Communist Party and security services through reconciliation with the West. Since the Party and the security services were built around hositility towards the West, they lost any legitimacy once Gorbachev's reforms were enacted. Reagan played his part in the Cold War's ending by talking to Gorbachev and signing the INF treaty which gave Gorbachev enough political capital to launch his reforms which eventually resulted in the demise of Communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. I wished that Mann would described in greater detail the Euromissile debate in Europe and SDI and how they poisoned realtions with Soviets in the early eighties. Despite this failing, Mann gives an accurate picture of how the Cold War ended.