Product Description

Revises the idea that America won World War II through superior numbers and material predominance, arguing that temporizing by the government led to inferior weaponry and an outmanned infantry and only the bravery of soldiers and their families produced victory.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #142811 in Books
• Published on: 1998-07-21
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 512 pages

From Publishers Weekly
This account of the U.S. in WW II focuses on the waste and confusion that accompanied belated national mobilization. O'Neill argues the thesis that the U.S. never developed a coherent, integrated war effort, and that it should have attained a more total mobilization of people and resources, including the conscription of women. A history professor at Rutgers, he points out that the U.S. was able to fight a total war with a limited commitment because allies and geography shielded the country from direct military threats. An overview of the war effort and the home front details rationing restrictions, victory gardens and the increased importance of the media. O'Neill's argument about waste in war theaters overlooks the fact that for most of the war, limited shipping resources dictated the number of troops that could be moved to, and supported in, Europe and the Pacific. A comprehensive, well-documented chronicle.
Copyright 1993 Reed Business Information, Inc.

From Library Journal
This book might well be subtitled "How We Won the Second World War in Spite of Ourselves." O'Neill, a professor of history at Rutgers University and the author of American High (Free Pr., 1989), among other books, has produced a neat, readable volume on the numerous military errors, political shortcomings, and social blunders that marred the American war effort. The final victory was not really delayed much, but a great deal of efficiency was lost, and good people died unnecessarily. Little of this information is unknown to reasonably informed people or those who lived through the war, but the book nicely brings together all the anomalies and contradictions of that frenetic era. It is more comprehensive and less strident than John Ellis's Brute Force ( LJ 10/15/90). A solid and readable popular history; recommended for public libraries.
- Raymond L. Puffer, U.S. Air Force History Prog., Los Angeles
Copyright 1993 Reed Business Information, Inc.

From Booklist
By nature, war is an authoritarian venture requiring fast, efficient marshaling of human and material resources; thus, it has generally been assumed that free and democratic societies are at a distinct disadvantage in waging large-scale warfare. As O'Neill demonstrates, democratic constraints certainly did adversely affect America's ability to prepare for war and to respond effectively when hostilities first began. Paradoxically, the public was often ahead of politicians in demands for increased spending on the military. Of course, support for actual military intervention in Europe or the Pacific was something quite different. Despite the public ambivalence and dithering, O'Neill convincingly maintains that democratic societies also bring certain advantages to the battlefield, among them innovation, flexibility, and an ability to adapt to changing circumstances without the constraints of ideology or dogmatism. O'Neill has provided a highly readable and valuable portrait of a society that met a great challenge and emerged with its democratic institutions intact and vibrant. Jay Freeman

Customer Reviews

A genuinely brilliant treatise on America in World War II
"A Democracy at War" is absolutely remarkable. Exceptional breadth and depth - from the military to the geopolitical, from tactics and warfighting to grand strategy, from the human to the technological, from the soldier to the civilian and the statesman, from American democracy to foreign dictatorships. Spellbinding and absorbing. No wonder Stephen E. Ambrose calls it "the best single volume on the American experience in World War II that I have read." That is also my reaction.

Worthwhile book, with a lot of Monday morning quarterbacking
This was a worthwhile book for those trying to understand the politics, economics, and organization going on behind the war effort. However, O'Neill often makes the cardinal sin of historians and forgets the context of the moment when passing judgement on decisions and strategy by both Rooesevelt and his military leaders. His assessment of Iwo Jima as being unworthy of the effort expended to capture it overlooks the fact that, at the time, the U.S. didn't know the war was going to end so soon. Should be read in conjunction with David Brinkley's "Washington Goes to War."

Fails to meet expectations
Objectivity, or a shot at it, is, admittedly, not something one should always expect to find in a historical work, especially if it is aimed at a broad audience. But if a book is opinionated, it should at least be an fun read. O'Neil's volume fails on both counts - it is blatantly subjective and painfully boring, in addition to being rambly. The author includes a lot of detail where a brief summary would surfice, and brushes over important issues, leaving a reader with pages of generalities. The chapter on minority discrimination, for exapmle, is perfunctory, and shot through with anachronic assumptions, providing little insight into the issue beyond the (selective) listing of facts. The technicalities of descriptions of military operations will quickly put you to sleep. Frustrating reading!