Product Description

A former director of the CIA discusses the inside story of the hidden wars that the U.S. waged against communism, examining the roles of the CIA and the government in the collapse of communism over the course of five presidential administrations. Reprint. 20,000 first printing."

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #730078 in Books
• Published on: 1997-05-07
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 608 pages

Amazon.com Review
Gates, director of the Central Intelligence Agency from 1991 to 1993, began in an entry level position and rose to the top. His insider's account of the Cold War, CIA operations and the unraveling of the Soviet Union is sprinkled with revelations including the fact that 1983 was the most dangerous year in U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations and that both the CIA and KGB sponsored countless "black operations" designed to embarrass and discredit the other side. Gates also reveals that he secretly met with KGB foreign operations chief Vladimir Kryuchkov on two separate occasions and how the CIA often acted in contempt of Congress. While none of this may come as a huge surprise, it never fails to shock when it's laid out in black and white by someone who was on the inside.

From Publishers Weekly
Gates, director of the Central Intelligence Agency from 1991 to 1993, rose from entry level to the top. His insider's account of the Cold War, CIA operations and the unraveling of the Soviet Union is sprinkled with revelations. We learn that 1983 was "the most dangerous year in U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations"; that President Bush telephoned Boris Yeltsin in the Russian parliament building during the 1991 attempted coup; that for months the CIA predicted a coup attempt against Gorbachev-a warning that he ignored. Gates characterizes former CIA director William Casey as coming to the CIA "primarily to wage war against the Soviet Union." Both the KGB and the CIA, Gates divulges, sponsored countless "black operations"-forgeries, lies, dirty tricks and other covert propaganda activities designed to embarrass and discredit the other side. We also learn that during Gorbachev's 1987 visit to Washington, a collateral secret summit took place-Gates, then CIA deputy director, met with KGB foreign operations chief Vladimir Kryuchkov; they secretly met again in Moscow in 1989 when Kryuchkov was head of the KGB. Gates also candidly discusses how the agency's contemptuous treatment of Congress, evasive briefings and deceptions eroded public confidence.
Copyright 1996 Reed Business Information, Inc.

From Kirkus Reviews
A career undercover man who reached the top of his furtive profession (as director of the CIA from late 1991 through early 1993), Gates sheds considerable light in this wide-angle memoir on the ways in which the craft of intelligence influenced government policy during the height of the Cold War. Focusing on the undeclared conflict that pitted the US against the USSR and its client states in venues ranging from Afghanistan to Poland, the author offers a notably candid chronological evaluation of what his agency contributed (or did not contribute) to the last 25 years of America's war against Communism. He also provides telling detail on the homefront hostilities in which CIA officials battled their counterparts at other agencies, justifiably wary lawmakers, and investigative reporters to remain in the good graces of the White House. Gates also explains that d‚tente was the Nixon administration's pragmatic response to the CIA's failure to foresee the Soviet military buildup that began during the late 1960s, producing a singular shift in the global balance of power. He goes on to show that there was appreciably more continuity than is generally perceived between the Carter and Reagan eras, as far as effective challenges to Moscow's zeal for geopolitical adventurism were concerned. Covered as well are the CIA's prescient take on Mikhail Gorbachev's ouster, the agency's surprise at the overnight success of the Velvet Revolution that signalled the end of the Warsaw Pact, the cost of institutional lapses (including the treachery of Aldrich Ames), and the several secret CIA-KGB summits. The vetted text delivers a surprising measure of jocose particulars and tricks-of-the-trade disclosures. Nor does Gates neglect to settle some scores with out-of-office mandarins (George Schultz and others) who beat him into print. A silent-service veteran's genuinely engrossing from-the- inside-out appraisal of an eventful period in the history of the US and the wider world. (Author tour) -- Copyright ©1996, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved.

Customer Reviews

A rare look inside, if a bit buttoned-down
Mr Gates' background in writing intelligence analysis is very apparent in his book, which covers the role of intelligence on policy and the figures that carried out the policy, from President Nixon to Bush Sr. Stylistically, ideas are introduced, expanded upon, and brought back together in sum and reflection in efficient essay form, yet in, one senses, what epitomizes intelligence directorate reporting at Langley. As such the recounting can be understandably dry (albeit with ready humor), but these ARE renderings of historical events; when I was patient, I found that his clarity and humility make the work readable and insightful. The DC cocktail crowd no doubt received ample fuel from Mr Gates' (decidedly fair) renderings of George Schultz and William Casey, both of whom Mr Gates spent much time with during the Reagan years. Other character sketches elucidate and emphasize Mr Gates' opinions about other high-ranking individuals in the various administrations, but his everyman-ish voice is an able mediator among the personalities.

The retelling of some events where Mr Gates plays up his role or access get a bit tedious; for example, when he and Larry Eagleburger hit the European circuit to sell arms reductions (somewhat to the effect of "we went to London, then Rome, then Bonn, then Amsterdam")-likewise, when Mr Gates would accompany other advisers and President Bush to Kennebunkport, and almost any private meetings Mr Gates would have with President Bush.

Mr Gates' own conservative bent comes through in several places, but most succinctly in his concluding remarks about the Soviet Union's demise. Here Mr Gates writes of a Soviet role in terrorist activity, yet a US role in aiding freedom fighters, which only extends a pervasive double standard in US government foreign policy. Of course Mr Gates' worked on a day-to-day basis to limit the Soviets' opportunities, and of course US hegemony is all the greater for it, but zeal can sometimes be confused for rationale: certainly the US has carried out its own "terrorist" activities, many through the CIA itself, and recent uncoverings of Kissinger's strong hand in Latin America are evidence of more glib and (many believe) illegal workings by the US executive branch.

Mr Gates has personally intrigued me since I read an article on him around the time of his confirmation as DCI in 1991. The article told of his early job as a bus driver, teaching Russian phrases to community riders, and his reference to many of the Easterners among the DC establishment ranks as "guys with last names as first names." Such an endearing portrait of himself is difficult to find in his narrative and made me a bit disappointed he didn't talk more about graduate school and Russian studies years, especially as the Sovietology schools were evolving in the 1960s, yet such topics would admittedly digress from the book's theme.

Aside from its occasional name-dropping and some opportune flag waving, Mr Gates' memoir is evenly told and offers a straightforward, insider view of executive policy during pivotal moments between 1970 and 1992. It is also well written, with helpful and sufficient background for the events recounted. I would look forward to reading anything he further publishes, especially concerning the direction or affairs of Russia and its former Soviet neighbors.

View from the inside
The CIA is probably the one institution that the US President controls the most; or so this book argues. Robert M. Gates spent over two decades working at the CIA, and is one of the few career officials who came in near the bottom and rose all the way to the top. This book is his memoir, and recollection of how the CIA served 5 consecutive presidents in the Cold War. Starting with Richard Nixon, and ending with the first George Bush, Gates shows how each president used, and sometimes abused, the CIA to further their policies with regard to the USSR and communist parties around the world.

The major points one gets from this book are as follows. First, Carter was no wimp with regard to the USSR. Second, the most dangerous years of the Cold War did not end with Vietnam; they included some years in the 1980's. Third, the CIA consistently disregards the laws of the US. Fourth, the CIA often gets suckered into doing thing at the whim of the president that it later regrets. Last, the first George Bush was probably one of the best diplomats the US has seen in recent times. Over all, this was a very good book and I am glad I read it.

Must reading for the Intelligence Professional
Bob Gates is the only person to begin working at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as a low-level analyst and then rise to the position of Director of Central Intelligence. His career spans over six presidential administrations. He worked in the National Security Council staff at the White House during the administrations of four Presidents. He offers a comprehensive, unique, and insightful look into the role of national intelligence and the continuity it brought to national policy in spite of the different Presidents and their distinct personalities. His book is essential reading for all intelligence professionals. The book is not an historical account of the CIA, but, rather, a personal account of the intricate personal relationships between national policymakers and national intelligence analysts during the Cold War. This is a story of how intelligence contributed to stabilizing national policy and ensured its continuity, at least with respect to the Soviet Union, from one administration to the next. Due to the author's deference to his former superiors, important lessons are hidden in the subtlety of his words; it is incumbent on the reader to find them. Gates also offers his own evaluation of recent Presidents and their advisors.