Product Description

A controversial evaluation, Custer Vindicated challenges the historical views on the Battle of the Little Big Horn that depict Lt. Colonel George Armstrong Custer as an incompetent leader.

In this his fourth book on Custer, Jack L. Pennington presents the results of his most recent research and the evidence that proves Custer was not at fault for the loss of his five companies or the defeat suffered by the 7th Cavalry. He critiques three well-known writers’ views as he lays the groundwork for reassessment of the long-time inference that the decisions Lt. Colonel Custer made until he reached Medicine Tail Coulee were not militarily sound. Pennington also explores the roles played by the Reno Court of Inquiry and the 7th Cavalry officers in making Custer a historic scapegoat.

Whatever you have read about or heard from other experts on the Battle of the Little Big Horn, Pennington encourages you to consider questions that have never been asked regarding a famous battle that, to this day, still remains one of the greatest conflicts in U.S. history.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #366389 in Books
• Published on: 2007-09-12
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 234 pages

About the Author
Born and raised in South Dakota, Jack L. Pennington is a World War II veteran and a retired schoolteacher. He holds a master of arts degree from Northern Colorado University and is the author of three books and numerous articles on Custer and the Battle of the Little Big Horn.

Customer Reviews

Largely Compelling
I found this book quite compelling, and a good summary of the opinions that I have held for years. While it could have done with a stiff editing job and some of the stridency and tone of the book undermine its otherwise sound logic, if you can overlook those faults, it does present a very supportable theory about the fiasco of the Little Big Horn battle.

Any serious and thoughtful student of George Custer and the battle itself (and I might add that to express any reasonable theory on what happened that day, you must spend considerable time on the battlefield as well) should be completely mystified by what happened once the Custer column turned away from Ford B. None of it makes any sense whatsoever, and I firmly believe that the only explanation is that Custer was an early casualty of the battle, lost at the ford. While the author doesn't press the issue as well as he could, there was no reason to leave that relatively simple ford and the flat terrain beyond it to head off to the north over impossibly rugged terrain in hopes of finding a better ford. If wanting to get ahead of retreating noncombatants was the issue (which I doubt), that could have been achieved much quicker on the flat land to the west of the river rather than the broken land to the east. The quarry would have just gotten that much further ahead had Custer gone further north over the slower country.

If Custer had, for whatever reason, determined to move to the defensive, there is no reason I can think of why he would go north, rather than back to the south where his support was. And, if Reno and Benteen could establish and hold an effective defensive position I have no doubt that Custer could have done so as well. Again, strong support for the theory that Custer was not exercising any command over his troops after Ford B.

A couple of flaws exist in his theory, I think. First, the argument that with the "come quick" message Custer was ordering Benteen to follow on the Custer trail is unconvincing. Further, you are left wondering why, if Custer was so sure of the size and location of the village, his ambiguous, short message had to say "big village." I also think he missed an opportunity to clear up some of the obfuscation created by Benteen and Reno by pointing out that neither Kanipe nor Martin appeared to have any difficulty at all in finding Benteen, whereas Benteen would have it as if he were off in various gullies, far off the beaten track the whole time.

A couple more good points made in this book--the timing the author proposes is pretty sound and it was good to see some of the contrary myths debunked. It was also interesting to me to see the conclusion that the pack train was trailing by metres, not kilometres. I look forward to other thoughtful students addressing the major points made by the author.

Detailed and Revealing Study of the Little Big Horn Cover Up: For the Well Read LBH Historian
This book by Jack Pennington, who earlier wrote " Battle of Little Big Horn: A Comprehensive Study (Battle of Little Big Horn)", uses criticism of three hard study books on the Little Big Horn to substantiate his theory of a cover up by Major Reno and Captain Benteen (two wing commanders) to enhance their actions (or inactions) at the Little Big Horn (LBH) while also again restating his theory of why Custer's attack failed. This book is composed of serious anlysis of the failed cordination of the three attacking battalions at the LBH and it requires the reader to have a significant reading familiarity with the detailed controversies of the LBH battle. For those with limited reading on the subject, I recommend reading Utley's book on Custer as a primer, Gray's "Custer's Last Campaign: Mitch Boyer and the Little Bighorn Reconstructed" to understand some of the time analysis studies and to really crank up the controversial roles of Major Reno and Captain Benteen read "Abcs of Custer's Last Stand: Arrogance, Betrayal and Cowardice" by Arthur C. Unger. Essentially, Pennington challenges the testimonies of Reno and Benteen at Reno's court martial inquest held two years after the battle. The upper officer corp change the time sequences sinificfantly to place themselves in a better light and undermine the testimony of the enlisted couriers and other enlisted regarding the existence of attack orders. Pennington makes an excellent point that Custer was ahead of Reno in the attack phase echoing the well known fact that Custer was seen waving his hat from the bluffs above the LBH river before Reno made his attack and that Custer's attack across the ford at Medicine Coulee should have coincided with Reno's attack. The missing factor, Benteen's failed ability to support Reno, then Reno's dramtic giving away. By critiqing the other authors, it provides Pennington a platform, like an attorney, preseting his case through rebuttal. The final pages of the book are fascinating as Pennington expresses again his hypothesis that Custer was shot at the ford (Indian testimonies identify that an officer was shot) causing his battalion to lose funtional cohesion virtually losing the impetus to attack. This is a very challenging proposition but it is an interestig theory and a possible answer to what happened to Custer for at least 45 minutes where his attack seems to have stalled. Fox's great work "Archaeology, History, and Custer's Last Battle: The Little Big Horn Reexamined" theorizes that Custer was redirecting his attack to to another ford to chase the non-combatants and to take the energy out of the Indian's resistance. But Pennington makes a good point, why not keep the attack at Medicine Trail Coulee that was lightly defended and a direct route? Obviously, circumstances did change the plan, maybe not Custer's early loss but certianly a significant event. Greg Michno offers a theory of command consolidation that is very intriguing in his book "Lakota Moon". Indian testimony states that an officer was shot at the ford; the identity has not been exactly determined. Personally, I doubt that Custer was killed at the ford particularly since the command was seemingly structured for defensive (Calhoun Hill) and offensive action (Last Stand Hill) when the indians suddenly ruptured any plans in an abrupt and powerful attacking force. But this is a very interesting book particularly if one is willing to keep an open mind. The strength of the book is the detail on Benteen and Reno, two individuals who never completely spoke freely about what really happened. My only criticism is that a little more editting in the first part of the book may have made the reading a little more smoother as some points and statements seem to be repeated and a single chart showing the testified time conflicts between parties and what the more true estimated times were would have been a helpful reference to the arguments presented. It is quite fascinating if Reno and Benteen's junction was at least 2 hours sooner than they testified at the trial, then each had a vested interest to protect the other, not out of respect for each other but for survival.

It was about time someone wrote this kind of book... very good.
Was Custer a fool?
Was Custer overconfident?
and what's more... for all his faults... WAS THERE A COVER UP?

The author makes a very convincing thesis (specially for Custerophiles) about the incongruence's of Reno's Court of Inquiry... the main points he raises are:

Does anyone believe Custer HAD NO PLAN?
Does anyone believe Custer THOUGHT there was no village?
Does anyone believe the "OFFICIAL" version about HIS TACTICAL ORDERS that day?
What about THE TIME GAPS in the accounts...

really fascinating, as a result I had to buy the Liddic book he criticizes so well (damn expensive!)... but a must have counterpoint to check...

It is hard to believe such a cover-up was done... but in a way... if only he is half right... Reno and Benteen would have to been cashiered (or judged, sentenced and shot!... if you are really angry at them...).

Very difficult to say after so much time... but I was impressed...
Great book for readers interested on the facts (a bit "technical" in the sense much is taken for known... it did not personally bother me at all... but probably not the place to start... try Bob Snelson's DEATH OF A MYTH first or even the Panzeri CAMPAIGN OSPREY as a basis... and then compare.)

A worthy addition to any Custer aficionado library.

ADB

PS: And even if the possibility exists I do not think Custer was shot at the ford. This has nothing to do with the amazing quality of the book.