Product Description

The image of the famous "last stand" of the Seventh U.S. Cavalry under General George Armstrong Custer has transmogrified into myth. We imagine the solitary Custer standing upright to the end, his troops formed into groups of wounded and dying men around him. In "To Hell with Honor," Larry Sklenar analyzes and interprets the widely accepted facts underlying the popular depiction of Custer’s defeat. Approaching the subject with a fresh perspective, he offers wholly new conclusions about one of the most enduring puzzles in United States history--the 1876 Battle of the Little Bighorn.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #980498 in Books
• Published on: 2003-03
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 416 pages

From Library Journal
Authors analyzing the Little Bighorn battle must take into account John Shapley Gray's time-and-motion study in Custer's Last Campaign (LJ 6/1/91) and Richard Allan Fox's archaeological analysis, Archaeology, History, and Custer's Last Battle (LJ 3/15/93). Sklenar, a retired government employee, ignores Gray in favor of his own unexplained time line and makes scant use of Fox. While his stated aim is to discredit the already discredited "last stand" myth, his primary purpose is to present a battle plan, not clearly delineated, that differs from any previously advanced. What he does do is concentrate on Reno and Benteen, showing in some detail how they and others lied during the 1879 court of inquiry, and future writers on the battle will have to take this into account. What is still needed is a clear narrative suitable for scholars and lay readers alike that embraces all of the recent research and sets forth the most likely sequence of events. This well-written analysis will be of interest primarily to specialists and others with some background in Custer studies.
-Stephen H. Peters, Northern Michigan Univ. Lib., Marquette
Copyright 2000 Reed Business Information, Inc.

From Kirkus Reviews
A remarkably detailed and reconstructed account of the era and events surrounding the Seventh Cavalrys infamous loss under General George Armstrong Custer that largely succeeds in ameliorating the Generals equally infamous culpability by exploring the gray areas and forgotten facts of this archetypical American disaster. Sklenar spent six years researching the subject of his debut, and his efforts result in a singular, if dense, verisimilitude. He begins by sketching Custers curious origins, in which his rapid postCivil War rise as a boy general sharply contrasts with the eras downsized, spiritually degraded military. In seeming retreat from Reconstruction, Custers army pursued an increasingly draining series of wars of attrition against various tribes (primarily Sioux and Apache) in the Western territories. Sklenar demonstrates that Custers glory-hungry nature (also depicted as alternatively plucky and foolhardy) meshed badly with a largely weary and resentful officer corps: herein lay the circumstances for the disaster of the Little Bighorn. Sklenar plausibly argues that, while Custer applied strategy according to then-current military doctrine, when faced with a drastically underestimated enemy force of warriors anxious to protect tribal noncombatants, his fate was sealed by an unlucky combination of logistical mishaps and the negligence of officers. Specifically, he explores how Major Reno and Captain Benteen, leading Custers supporting cavalry wings, were motivated respectively by drunken cowardice and long-simmering bitterness in their failure to act after repeated alerts which insured the loss of Custer and his command. They later provided testimony which damned Custer and obfuscated their roles for decades. Sklenar conducts this reappraisal with an admirable depth of factual research, but this, coupled with an often dry prose style, ensures a leisurely pace to his narrative that may prove tedious to casual enquirers into Western lore. However, committed lay readers and serious students of the event and the surrounding Victorian-expansionist milieu will probably find this an engaging, convincing, and fully informative account, one which will stand out in the crowded field of Custer-related books. -- Copyright ©2000, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved.

Review
"A bold, well-researched, and strongly-reasoned study." -- --Paper Wars

"Rich in detail, this book will stand out in the crowded field of Custer-related books." -- --Arthur Shoemaker, Tulsa World

Customer Reviews

A bold narrative about a controversial battle
Larry Sklenar's "To Hell with Honor: Custer and the Little Bighorn" is a boldly presented picture of the most famous battle of America's Indian Wars. As might be expected after more than 35 years of study of the subject myself, I have more than a few ideas about the battle. I concur with much of what Sklenar writes, but disagree with other parts. He has come up with some definitely new twists on the old story, and for this reason his book should be read by anyone seriously interested in the Little Bighorn.

Sklenar's basic stance can be characterized as strongly pro-Custer, and he sharply criticizes Custer's two principal subordinates, Major Marcus Reno and Captain Frederick Benteen. And I personally won't disagree with that view. His analyses of Reno's and Benteen's actions (or inactions) are arguably the strongest portions of the entire book.

Sklenar has reached some quite startling conclusions regarding Custer's initial battle plan and the position occupied by the rest of the regiment during their abortive effort to locate Custer late in the day. Frankly, I do not think that the primary evidence supports Sklenar's deductions about these points, but I would encourage Little Bighorn students to read what he has to say, then evaluate the questions for themselves. His reconstruction of the fight by Custer's battalion, on the other hand, does not break much new ground, and is in good agreement with a number of books in recent years.

All in all, it is a Little Bighorn analysis worth adding to the bookshelf, but I would urge the reader to go beyond the book to read the actual evidence before deciding whether all of Sklenar's conclusions are valid. People have been writing about this battle for nearly 125 years, and no one ever has the last word.

A revolutionnary book of the 1876 battle
Those who doubt about Sklenar's book value may see the comments from Robert Utley, considered as the best historian of the American West, and Brian Dippie, also a famous historian of Custer. Both praised Sklenar's work and wrote it was "a revolutionnary book about the battle of the Little Bighorn".

Also consider that Robert Utley changed parts of his own view of Little Bighorn in his famous "Cavalier in buckskin" to stick to Sklenar's analysis.

When a life-long scholar of Custer and Little Bighorn like Utley edit his best writings to include Sklenar's view, it could show you the value of "To Hell with Honor". You must read it !

Flawed
One reviewer mentions that "Custer haters will not like this book." Well, I am not a Custer hater, I feel that he had legitimate military reason to launch an attack on June 25, 1876 and what he did followed generally accepted tactics of frontier warfare. Furthermore, popular "history" (we can not dignify that with the actual word history) has gone far beyond raising legitimate questions about him and has actually attacked his sanity, which is utterly ludicrous.

I do not like this book though since it deals as unfairly with many of Custer's subordinate officers (especially Lt. George D. Wallace) as some books have dealt with Custer himself. After studying this battle for many years and even writing a biography of Wallace (self-published and now out of print), I can only conclude that Robert Utley has, in general terms, explained the outcome better than most--the 7th Cavalry lost because the Sioux won. Yes, there were mistakes but even without those mistakes I can not help but feel that the results would have been the same, as the Lakota victory the week before on the Rosebud underscores the fact that they had both sufficient numbers and ability to handle any of the three army comnponents in the field (their numbers had actually increased by June 25). The columns of Terry, Gibbon, and Crook were all operating under the assumption that their most difficult task would be preventing the Indian villages from breaking/fleeing long enough to bring them to a decisive battle. Such flights were a normal occurence in light of Indians conducting warfare with no line of demarcation between combatants/non-combatants; in other words, warriors, women and children were normally always together in the same camp or on the march, unless the warriors were on the rare offensive, as at the Rosebud battle.

Beyond these flaws, the apparently undiscovered true objective of Reno's charge (a small satellite village on the east banks of the Little Big Horn) just doesn't stand up as being that militarily important. If it was, the fact of its significance would have been discovered, disclosed and analysed long before this year 2000 book.