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Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (California Series on Social Choice and Political Economy)

Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (California Series on Social Choice and Political Economy)
By Robert H. Bates

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Most Africans live in rural areas and derive their incomes from farming; but because African governments follow policies that are adverse to most farmers' interests, these countries fail to produce enough food to feed their populations. Markets and States in Tropical Africa analyzes these and other paradoxical features of development in modern Africa and explores how governments have intervened and diverted resources from farmers to other sectors of society. A classic of the field since its publication in 1981, this edition includes a new preface by the author.


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  • Amazon Sales Rank: #211281 in Books
  • Published on: 2005-03-04
  • Number of items: 1
  • Binding: Paperback
  • 195 pages

Editorial Reviews

From the Inside Flap
"Interested and well-meaning people in the United States wonder, 'What's the matter with Africa?' Robert Bates's book manages the difficult task of speaking to the specialist and non-specialist alike. It explains the historical, political, and economic roots of Africa's challenges. Best of all, it gives context to why easy prescriptions haven't worked in the past, and some hope for what might work in the future."--Ray Suarez, Senior Correspondent, The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer

"Ever since its original publication in 1981, this elegant study has been a clarion call for agrarian reform predicated on market incentives. Bates's perspective transcends the lingering ideological nostrums that still impede progress toward the construction of modern economies in Africa. Based largely on his personal empirical research, this lasting work continues to guide the quest for realistic approaches to the problem of poverty in Africa and other agrarian regions of the world."--Richard L. Sklar, author of African Politics in Postimperial Times

PRAISE FOR THE FIRST EDITION:

"[An] analysis of how public policy has fostered Africa's agricultural decline.... [The] description of how that policy has worked--the interests and mechanisms discriminating against the rural sector--is incomparable."--Foreign Affairs

About the Author
Robert H. Bates is currently the Eaton Professor of the Science of Government at Harvard University, where he has studied and provided consulting assistance in the areas of governmental reform, economic policy reform, and political economy for many countries throughout the world. He is the author of several books, including Open-Economy Politics (1998).


Customer Reviews

Straightforward, seminal - - if perhaps too simple5
This book examines a simple and important puzzle: why do African governments choose such terrible economic policies? These policies are especially bad for agriculture, even though most Africans are farmers.

The answer is simple: African governments systematically favor urban interests. That means that they provide cheap food for urban workers, which means cheap labor for urban businesses (capital). These groups are outnumbered, but they live in the cities. This means that labor and capital can mobilize politically against the government in the capital city, while farmers - - who are scattered all over a large countryside with poor transportation links - - find it very difficult to pressure the government.

Bates' basic claim has much to recommend it. It is simple, yet it served as a productive research agenda for other studies - - such as Michael Lofchie's comparison of Kenya and Tanzania, among others. It is no wonder that this book made Bates' reputation, and was a seminal contribution to political economy in its day.

Its simplicity also makes the argument incomplete. Though he does discuss colonial legacies, Bates doesn't consider the wider international context. African countries would find it difficult to pursue pro-farmer policies because the rich world, especially in Europe and Japan, closes its markets to many African food products. Certainly this fact deserves to play an important role when we consider the poor choices that African governments make.

A Testimony to Dependent Development5
The decolonization of Africa was espoused by two ideals of the African people: political independence and economic development. The African nationalists attributed their economic backwardness to their colonial heritage and believed that `independence' would pave the way to prosperity. Yet facing the dilemmas of economic development and the limitations of the international system, they eventually ended up with inefficient industrial firms, impoverished peasantry, and increased economic inequality.

Robert Bates' Markets and States in Tropical Africa analyzes the reasons for and the mechanism of state intervention in market in African states. Like every other country who has attempted to develop so far, independent African countries too faced the dilemmas of economic development, namely capital accumulation and market creation. The economies of Africa have been overwhelmingly rural in nature and the governing elites in Africa aimed to change this situation by through industrialization. The scarcity of capital led national elites to extract resources from agriculture and channel them into manufacture and industry. What is important here, as Bates emphasize, is that all nations seeking to industrialize have done this: "The African policies are thus notable not as exceptions but as examples of a larger class," (p. 119). The forms of economic manipulation were compatible with the prevailing economic doctrines: industry is the engine of growth, savings come from the profits of industry, rural sector should be squeezed for development, etc. (p. 97).

The African governments had both economic and political incentives to channel resources from the rural agricultural sector to the urban industrial enterprises. On the one side they regarded this as necessary for the industrialization and economic development of their countries; on the other side, "the politicization of the electorate" in the nationalist era pushed the governing elite to follow clientalist policies to maintain their political status. As Bates put is, the resources allocated through governmental programs have been channeled to those "whose support is politically useful or economically rewarding to the state - that is, to members of the elite," (p. 56).

As for the instruments of state intervention in the market, African governments mostly exploited taxes, tariffs, and subsidies to transfer resources from rural areas to urban ones. Government in Africa subsidized fertilizers, seeds, mechanical equipments, land, and credit for commercial farming (p. 50). The taxes collected from the rural areas constituted the bulk of these subsidies given to the urban and rural elites. Also, to promote industrial development, African governments constructed protective barriers between the world and domestic markets which sheltered local industries from foreign competition (p. 66). Apparently, the peasantry has been the victim of both policies.

The history of African economic development in the post-independence era in general and Robert Bates' book in particular demonstrate the inevitability of the sacrifices and burden that at least one class should undertake. Historically speaking, these classes have usually been peasantry and workers. A capitalist economic development necessitates the accumulation of capital in the hands of a capitalist entrepreneur class, which forces the state to intervene in the market and to channel resources from the lower strata to the upper ones. Neither the developed Western countries nor the East Asian NICs escaped this necessity of economic development. Yet what made these countries `overcome' the aforementioned dilemma and eventually become a `success story' were the availability of `external resources and market' at their disposal. While in the Western case the cheap labor, food, and market of what is now called the Third World made possible the redemption of the agonies of the peasantry and the eventual establishment of `welfare states', in the `Asian miracle' case, their privileged access to the Western markets provided the `fuel' to keep their economic growth and to gradually relieve the burden of the peasantry and working class in these countries. It was not the intervention of the state in the market that differed the African case from the `success' stories, rather it was the unavailability of external means that determined the eventual fates of African countries.

Rational Choice Approcah to African Agricultural Crisis4
In this work, Bates moves away from dependency theory in explaining the financial discrepancies between the Center and Periphery. Rather than concentrating on external catalysts to stalled development, Bates rational-actor model concentrates on the internal problems facing African development, particularly the pursuit of interests on the part of political and urban elites.

Much of Africa is facing an agricultural crisis. Although generally populated by small farmers, many nations in Africa face food shortages. Bates argues that these crises are the result of inefficient policies (which intervene in, and distort markets) implemented by political and economic elites. The question becomes, why are these policies being pursued? Bates explains the implementation of these inefficient agricultural policies through a rational choice model. Bates suggests that these policies are developed and implemented by rational political and economic elites seeking to maximize their own utility - particularly in regards to garnering political support - rather than pursing the collective good. This often occurs at the expense of many small farmers. He writes, "Policies are designed to secure the advantages of particular interests, to appease powerful political forces, and to enhance the capacity of political regimes to remain in power" (5-6).

The political and urban elites work in tandem to harvest economic resources garnered from the agricultural sector to promote industrialization. This is often done through the manipulation of market forces, particularly in keeping food prices low for urban interests. Doing so keeps the urban masses content, and allows industrialists to maintain low wages. In turn, the policy making elites garner political support. Bates spells out the beneficiaries of such policies clearly. "Owners and workers in industrial firms, economic and political elites, privileged farmers and the mangers of public bureaucracies - these constitute the development coalition in contemporary Africa" and hence benefit from the inefficient policies.

In regards to production, such policies skew the incentive structure of smaller agricultural producers. When receiving below world market prices, farmers will lower production, in turn limiting food supply. Or farmers may pursue a policy of "out-migration" and moved to the urban areas in pursuit of jobs. In this regard, the peasants are too acting rationally according to Bates model. Bates also discusses the problems of mass organization in order to oppose these policies. The small farmers are so dispersed and politically weak that the collective action problems ensue. The government expands on these collective action problems by offering preferential disbursements of subsidies, etc. to those who tow the party line. This divide and conquer technique has limited the power of the rural masses to organize a coherent oppostion.