Product Description

As it celebrated its fiftieth anniversary, the State of Israel could count many important successes, but its conflict with the Palestinians and the Arab world at large casts a long shadow over its history. What was promulgated as an "iron-wall" strategy--dealing with the Arabs from a position of unassailable strength--was meant to yield to a further stage where Israel would be strong enough to negotiate a satisfactory peace with its neighbors. The goal remains elusive. In this penetrating study, Avi Shlaim examines how variations of the iron-wall philosophy have guided Israel's leaders; he finds that, while the strategy has been successful, opportunities have been lost to progress from military security to broader peace. The Iron Wall brilliantly illuminates past progress and future prospects for peace in the Middle East.Maps, 18 pages of photographs.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #106073 in Books
• Published on: 2001-01
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 704 pages

Features

• ISBN13: 9780393321128
• Condition: NEW
• Notes: Brand New from Publisher. No Remainder Mark.

Amazon.com Review
In 1897, under order of First Zionist Congress president Theodor Herzl, two Austrian rabbis traveled to Palestine to explore the possibility of locating a Jewish state there. "The bride is beautiful," the rabbis cabled Herzl, "but she is married to another man." That "other man" was the Palestinian Arab nation, long established in the region as a political entity. Undeterred, Herzl pressed on with his program of emigration, ignoring Palestine's existing occupants and creating in the process what came to be known as the "Arab question."

In this far-ranging history, Avi Shlaim analyzes that question in remarkable detail, tracing the shifting policies of Israel toward the Palestinians and the Arab world at large. Herzl, he writes, followed a policy that consciously sought to enlist the great powers--principally Britain and later the United States--while dismissing indigenous claims to sovereignty; after all, Herzl argued, "the Arab problem paled in significance compared with the Jewish problem because the Arabs had vast spaces outside Palestine, whereas for the Jews, who were being persecuted in Europe, Palestine constituted the only possible haven." This policy later changed to a stance of confrontation against the admittedly hostile surrounding Arab powers, especially Syria, Jordan, and Egypt; this militant stance was a source of controversy in the international community, and it also divided Israelis into hawk and dove factions. The intransigence of those hawks, Shlaim shows, served to alienate Israel and made it possible for the Palestine Liberation Organization and other Arab nationalist groups to enlist the support of the great powers that Herzl had long before courted. Both sides, in turn, had eventually to face the "historic compromise" that led to the present peace in the Middle East--a peace that, the author suggests, may not endure. --Gregory McNamee

From Publishers Weekly
Optimism about the prospects for a Middle East peace agreement has accompanied the recent election of Ehud Barak as Israel's prime minister, but if this book is any indication, the war over Israel's history is likely to rage on. Shlaim (War and Peace in the Middle East, etc.) is a leader among revisionist historians who are challenging Israel's most cherished myths about itself: that it has been a peaceful nation forced into war by bellicose Arab neighbors incapable of accepting its existence. A professor of history at Oxford, he covers relations between Israel and the Arabs from Israel's 1948 War of Independence to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's electoral defeat this past May. Rarely have as many fresh details been presented together about Israel's inner political scene and the Jewish state's contacts with the Arab world in its early years. Shlaim ably sets out the belief, shared by Israeli leaders of all political stripes, that the country had to build up an "iron wall" of strength and security in order to bring Arab leaders to the negotiating table (Shlaim himself thinks the iron wall was a mistake). But Shlaim's revisionist enthusiasm too often gets the better of him: he fails to marshal the necessary evidence to support his contention that Arab rulers were "prepared to recognize Israel, to negotiate directly with it, and even to make peace with it." Shlaim's explanations of Arab political constraints, especially the pragmatism of Arab rulers relative to the extreme anti-Israel sentiment of the Arab street, is illuminating. But his view of Palestinian terrorism as a reaction to Israeli militarism is far too simplistic. Revisionism is one thing, but Shlaim employs a double standard: while he tends to view Israeli leaders, most notably Israel's first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, as villains, he heaps praise on the "realism" of Arab leaders. A comprehensive, balanced history of Israel's history with its Arab neighbors needs to be written, but this is not it. Photos not seen by PW. (Sept.)
Copyright 1999 Reed Business Information, Inc.

From Library Journal
In the last two decades, Shlaim (international relations, St. Anthony's Coll., Oxford Univ.) has emerged as a leading figure among the Israeli historians challenging the Zionist account of the birth of the Jewish state and the country's policies toward the Arabs. In this path-breaking book, he presents a detailed account of Israel's failed relationship with the Arab world over the past 50 years and offers a sophisticated critique of Israel's "Iron Wall" strategy. The author relies on a variety of primary sources, including documents in the Israel State Archives and Britain's Public Record Office, as well as interviews with key personalities to provide readers with a highly original and objective account of Israel's foreign policy toward the Arab world. Highly recommended for academic and public libraries.ANader Entessar, Spring Hill Coll., Mobile, AL
Copyright 1999 Reed Business Information, Inc.

Customer Reviews

The Iron Wall
The Iron Wall will be sure to provoke strong reactions. If you are the type of person to view an objective and accurate history of Israel as somehow "pro-Arab" or "revisionist at its worst" then this book will surely anger you. But if you are a fan of accuracy and objectivity, like myself, then you will applaud Schlaim's work.

Schlaim presents the basic argument that throughout Israel's history, its leaders have enacted an "Iron Wall" of military strength to counter first Arab infiltrators and then PLO "terrorists." He traces the history of the debate in Israeli government between Hawks and Doves, or Moderates and Activists, as he refers to them. Consistently, the Activists (that is, those advocating active military excursions to prevent Arab opposition) won these debates, and the "Iron Wall" has dominated Israeli political scene.

I read one review that said that Schlaim is purely objective and doesn't give his own conclusions. I disagree. While his research and presentation are both convincing and objective, he definately does draw conclusions about what should be done. Just reread the last sentence of the book. He is saying "Look guys, you've been trying this 'Iron Wall' idea of active military pressure since the birth of your nation, and it obviously does NOT work. Try something new!" I wholeheartedly agree.

I highly recomend this book. In addition, please take a look at some of the good books out there on the period of time prior to the birth of Israel -- the conflict did not start in 1948!

By far, the best account of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
I have searched over and over for an objective non-prejudiced book recollecting the events and issues that shaped the Mideast conflict.The only book I have found that is characterized as such is The Iron Wall by Avi Shlaim. Given the fact that this issue is so complex, and since the factors affecting the conflict include-among others-sensitive issues like religious beliefs, racism and roots; often with an emotional dimension, most writers tend to be on one side or the other, almost always biased. This book is not only accurate, but more importantly very interesting as it reveals the most intriguing details about the people who shaped this history and events of the said conflict. Most books I read are either written by Arabs and so clearly overlooking the emotional value of the land to the Jews, or by Westerners, who always seem to neglect the basic Arab side of the story. I am very impressed by the comprehensiveness of the book. Although Shlaim does not draw conclusions (he only accounts for the background and tells the facts), the book is very 'intelligent' as it helps analyze the problem in a way different from all the other accounts of the Arab Israeli conflict. I wish everyone who holds a biased opinion as regards the Middle East-especially out of ignorance of the complete story-reads this book.

Avi's use of primary sources makes this a compelling book
Avi Shlaim has painstakingly gone through the Israeli state archives as well as the public record office in London and interviewed many prominent notables including Abba Eban, King Hussein, Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and many other major players for this massive history of modern Israel and its relations with the Arab world. All of this massive research and inquiry has culminated in what is one of the most complete and compelling history books written about Israel. Uncompromising in his inquiries, Shlaim addresses the problems that both sides faced during their struggles for supremacy in British Palestine.

Starting with the Prologue, Shlaim begins with an interesting look at the early years of Zionism, which began as a nationalist movement in Europe. Shlaim makes some good points regarding its birth as a response to European anti-Semitism and the inability of some Jewish groups to fully integrate into European society (many exceptions to this existed however). We get insights into all the major Zionist figures including Birnbaum, Herzl, Weizmann, Jabotinsky, and the mastermind himself, Ben-Gurion. The problems faced by the early Zionist movement can be summed in an interesting early statement from a fact-finding mission sent by Herzl, which stated [about Palestine], "The bride is beautiful, but she is married to another man." Meaning that the proposed land coveted by the Zionists already had a population of predominantly Arabic speaking peoples. Here begins the conflict that Shlaim writes about.

Shlaim goes over the relentless and systematic approach of early Zionist leaders to court all the prominent leaders of the early 20th century by telling them what they wanted to hear. The Ottomans were offered money and investment for their cooperation, while the British were given promises that the new Jewish state would be a British colony, and so on. Two forces emerged from the early Zionists according to Shlaim. One group wanted a complete population transfer and a new Jewish majority state planted in the area, while another group sought a partition plan that would give them a state, while leaving some territory for the Arabs. Both camps varied in terms of how they viewed the natives of the area. Some like Jabotinsky, Shlaim contends, basically viewed the Arabs as savages who could be easily removed in order for the Jews to have a homeland. Others were more conciliatory towards the Arabs and sought some sort of co-existence.

Israel was born during the tumultuous events following the UN resolution 181 to partition the region. The new state of Israel had many anomalous problems such as an Arab population that was nearly half the population of Israel itself. After decades of selective political pressure, the new state of Israel emerged as the most powerful state in the region. Shlaim correctly points out that the new state of Israel was not a David battling the Goliath of the Arab world. On the contrary, the new state had a military that was twice the size of the ill-equipped Arab adversaries it faced. Shlaim does a great job in showing what was reality and was fiction. The Arabs were never told to leave by surrounding Arab nations, but fled after hearing about massacres like Deir Yassin and in some cases were expelled by Israeli forces in order to create a decisive Jewish majority in Israel. The result was the Palestinian refugee problem that came to be the biggest obstacle to peace during the subsequent peace talks at Lausanne. The views of both sides by this time had become uncompromising. Shlaim points out that the Arab states opposed the creation of Israel from the outset for the simple reason that it was based upon an undemocratic process that would give Jews dominant political power, while nearly half the population was still Arab. In addition, leaders like Menachem Begin (once a terrorist commander of the extreme nationalist Irgun) proclaimed that, "The partition of Palestine is illegal. It will never be recognized.... Jerusalem was and will forever be our capital. Eretz Israel (biblical Israel) will be restored to the people of Israel. All of it. And forever." So while the Arabs sought to extinguish the state of Israel in 1948 as something they had never agreed to, the Israeli view was that they too wanted all of British Palestine. Preferably without any Palestinians left to oppose them.

The details of the wars in 1956, 1967, 1973, and the invasion of Lebanon are quite interesting as well. Israeli leaders often had conflicting views as to how to pursue different goals that Shlaim correctly describes as Byzantine in complexity. We learn that France and Britain were Israel's main allies during the early years and in order to maintain its military advantage, the Israelis even turned to Germany only a decade after WWII and the tragedy of the Holocaust for arms. Effectively outmaneuvering the Arab states through smart diplomacy, the Israelis managed to maintain the upper hand over the years. Shlaim goes over the political process and interaction before and after the 1967 with great detail in a section entitled "Poor Little Samson." This is a reference to the Israeli leadership's attempt to depict Israel as an underdog, when in reality they had the military advantage from the beginning. The saber rattling of the Arab states is interesting to read about as well. Why did Nasser order the removal UN peacekeepers in the Sinai? To appease the Arab critics who complained that he was "hiding" behind the UN. From Israel perspective, this made war a possibility though. Both sides misinterpreted each other's moves and this led to war, according to Shlaim.

I have compared Shlaim's work with many other books I've read, and have found this book to be one of the more objective books about Israel. It is critical of all groups involved and presents an honest attempt to analyze the conflict using mostly primary sources. I would recommend reading Shlaim's work along with other similar works such as "Righteous Victims" by Benny Morris. Highly recommended.