Product Description

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #337987 in Books
• Published on: 1993-02-01
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 448 pages

From Publishers Weekly
In a broad, ambitious work of political philosophy, a three-week PW bestseller in cloth, Fukuyama asserts that history is directional and that its endpoint is capitalist liberal democracy.
Copyright 1993 Reed Business Information, Inc.

From Library Journal
Fukuyama, then deputy director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, first presented this thesis in the foreign policy journal National Interest (Summer 1989), where it attracted worldwide attention. He argues that there is a positive direction to current history, demonstrated by the collapse of authoritarian regimes of right and left and their replacement (in many but not all cases) by liberal governments. "A true global culture has emerged, centering around technologically driven economic growth and the capitalist social relations necessary to produce and sustain it." In the absence of viable alternatives to liberalism, history, conceived of as the clash of political ideologies, is at an end. We face instead the question of how to forge a rational global order that can accommodate humanity's restless desire for recognition without a return to chaos. Fukuyama's views conveniently present the international politics of the present administration. History disappears very early on in the narrative, to be replaced by abstract philosophy. This essay made into a book is pretentious and overblown, though it offers some grounds for speculation. Previewed in Prepub Alert, LJ 9/1/91.
- David Keymer, SUNY Inst. of Technology, Utica
Copyright 1992 Reed Business Information, Inc.

From Kirkus Reviews
In 1989, The National Interest published ``The End of History?'' by Fukuyama, then a senior official at the State Department. In that comparatively short but extremely controversial article, Fukuyama speculated that liberal democracy may constitute the ``end point of mankind's ideological evolution'' and hence the ``final form of human government.'' Now Fukuyama has produced a brilliant book that, its title notwithstanding, takes an almost entirely new tack. To begin with, he examines the problem of whether it makes sense to posit a coherent and directional history that would lead the greater part of humanity to liberal democracy. Having answered in the affirmative, he assesses the regulatory effect of modern natural science, a societal activity consensually deemed cumulative as well as directional in its impact. Turning next to a ``second, parallel account of the historical process,'' Fukuyama considers humanity's struggle for recognition, a concept articulated and borrowed (from Plato) by Hegel. In this context, he goes on to reinterpret culture, ethical codes, labor, nationalism, religion, war, and allied phenomena from the past, projecting ways in which the desire for acknowledgement could become manifest in the future. Eventually, the author addresses history's presumptive end and the so-called ``last man,'' an unheroic construct (drawn from Tocqueville and Nietzsche) who has traded prideful belief in individual worth for the civilized comforts of self-preservation. Assuming the prosperity promised by contemporary liberal democracy indeed come to pass, Fukuyama wonders whether or how the side of human personality that thrives on competition, danger, and risk can be fulfilled in the sterile ambiance of a brave new world. At the end, the author leaves tantalizingly open the matter of whether mankind's historical journey is approaching a close or another beginning; he even alludes to the likelihood that time travelers may well strike out in directions yet undreamt. An important work that affords significant returns on the investments of time and attention required to get the most from its elegantly structured theme. -- Copyright ©1991, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved.

Customer Reviews

A Misunderstood Masterpiece
After 9-11, it became easy to make fun of "The End of History and The Last Man". The book's title suggested to some a triumphant valedictory for liberal democracy, and yet the epitome of liberal democratic values -- the West -- was now mired in another seemingly endless struggle. Especially for those who never read the work, the phrase "the end of history" became something one only said with scorn. Cynics felt obligated to point out that one more philosophy of the world had fallen into the meat grinder of history, never to be seen again.

But this book still has relevance in the post 9-11 world. Despite the vulgarization of its title, Fukuyama did not predict an end to conflict. What's more, he also did not cast the future in an unremittingly optimistic light. In some ways his themes -- particularly in the second half of the book when he focuses on the Nietzschean concept of The Last Man -- are decidedly darker than even keen reviewers of the work have noted. Liberal democracy may have triumphed, but its victory had costs for the collective psyche of its denizens.

"The End of History and The Last Man" came out in the wake of the fall and breakup of the Soviet Union. With the collapse of global communism, Fukuyama claimed the fundamental values of liberal democracy and market capitalism were now unchallenged. What's more, no other ideologies on the horizon appeared attractive or effective enough to usurp them -- ever. Yes, some countries or regions might fall under the sway of an ideology (Islamic fundamentalism) or a cultural conceit (Asian values), but too much of the globe now accepted that societies should be organized under the principles of liberal democracy and market capitalism for there ever to be a major reversal in its fortunes around the world. Thus, ideological conflict on a global scale was over. And so history -- in the Hegelian sense of the clash of competing ideologies -- was over as well.

What kind of man would this post-historical world create? Fukuyama explores this in the second half of the book - a section I feel is neglected by too many readers. Here, Fukuyama shifts his conceptual lens from the philosophy of Hegel and its focus on ideological conflict as the motor of history to the psychological insights of Friedrich Nietzsche. Having used Hegel to show how history might be ending, he now uses Nietzsche to show how empty and meaningless this ending might become. We have reached the end of the history, Fukuyama claims, but Nietzsche shows how unsatisfying that endpoint is. What happens when men are all recognized as equal and the struggle for everything except the accumulation of more material goods is over? What will they value?

"The End of History and The Last Man" and its themes will outlast its critics. 9-11 did not restart history, because Islamic fundamentalism does not represent the same serious ideological competitor that was once represented by communism. (It's highly doubtful that even a majority of Muslims desire it, and whatever the case in the Muslim countries, it's certainly true that its attractiveness is strictly limited to those of the Islamic faith.) This beautifully written book weaves different strands of philosophy, international relations, and political science into a brilliant argument that overwhelms simplistic criticisms of it. There are weak points to Fukuyama's arguments in the book - some of which he addressed himself later in his career - but few recognize them. The book still deserves a careful reading. Serious political and social commentators will be dealing with its arguments for some time.

A philosophical work about the world around us
"The End of History and the Last Man" by Francis Fukuyama has an apocalyptic-looking cover and a title that needs explication. But the book is not a doomsday scenario, quite the contrary, as the explanation of the title will show.

Fukuyama, who is Bernard Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, published this work of political philosophy in 1992, and in it, he explains in a logical, well-considered progression why he believes that liberal democracy is the final resting point of progressive history, but that that very liberal democracy can render humanity as less than what it could be - comfort seeking, self-involved, "men without chests."

The book, which could be subtitled "I Love Hegel and Why You Should, Too," builds on Hegel's idea that there is a Universal, progressive History. This is to what Fukuyama is referring when he says that History has reached its end; he doesn't mean that nothing else will happen, but that the progression of History toward a universally beneficial system of government has culminated in liberal democracy. He defines liberalism - "Political liberalism can be defined simply as a rule of law that recognizes certain individual rights or freedoms from government control" and he defines those rights in three classes, civil rights, religious rights and political rights. He defines democracy as "the right held universally by all citizens to have a share of political power, that is, the right of all citizens to vote and participate in politics."

His concentration on Hegel arises from Fukuyama's contention that we've been very conditioned by Karl Marx's influence to believe that most social and political problems come from economic and class differences. Fukuyama disagrees, saying that conflict comes from Hegel's theory that some people will risk their lives for prestige, or recognition. He writes that the aristocracy was created by such people - people who risked their lives for prestige and were able to enslave others. He writes that liberal democracy resolves the tension between slave and master because it makes the slaves their own masters.

But he cautions that Nietzsche believed in war and conflict as a way for humanity to express its passions, and that without conflict (Fukuyama says that liberal democracies do not attack each other), humans will become soft, meaningless, passionless, "men without chests." Fukuyama does not advocate that people become "last men," even though in this volume, he believes the End of History is being reached.

I read this book because Thomas L. Friedman faulted it for "not going far enough" in "The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization," but I wouldn't agree with that. Friedman clearly owes a lot to Fukuyama, directly or indirectly, and the roots of many of Friedman's ideas are explicated very elegantly here.

I find this book difficult to write about because it contains so many interrelated and complex ideas that are truly fascinating, including Fukuyama's views on the role of science in reaching the End of History. (In fact, in a newer book, "Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution," he writes that the End of History may not have been reached because the End of Science hasn't been reached. So reads a review of this book on the Web.)

I highly recommend this book. It really stretched my mind in new directions and helped me to see the world and our current governmental systems in new ways. His integration of key philosophical work and thought with political history was fascinating and had a ring of truth.

Read it, don't abuse what many think it says.
One of the most thought provoking books I have read in a long time. Contrary to the claims of the right, Fukuyama does not conclude that western liberal democray and economic liberalism are the highest form of evolution. He explores this question and in doing so embarks on a fascinating journey though history and political philosophy. There is no airtight conclusion or doctrine being espoused here, which may trouble some. However, the questions raised are critical to understanding modern society, where we have come from and where we may or may not be going. Some have criticized the book for being wordy and repetitive. Though the same themes do appear over and over, they are always to look at new questions. On the contrary, I wish I could have read on.