Product Description

William E. Odom is the highest-ranking member of the United States Intelligence community ever to write a book outlining fundamental restructuring of this vast network of agencies, technology, and human agents. In the wake of 9/11, Odom has revised and updated a powerful critique he wrote several years ago for staffs of the U.S. congressional committee overseeing the vast American intelligence bureaucracy. His recommendations for revamping this essential component of American security are now available for general readers as well as for policymakers. While giving an unmatched overview of the world of U.S. intelligence, Odom persuasively shows that the failure of American intelligence on 9/11 had much to do with the complex bureaucratic relationships existing among the various components of the Intelligence Community. The sustained fragmentation within the Intelligence Community since World War II is part of the story; the blurring of security and intelligence duties is another. Odom describes the various components of American intelligence in order to give readers an understanding of how complex they are and what can be done to make them more effective in providing timely intelligence and more efficient in using their large budgets. He shows definitively that they cannot be remedied with quick fixes but require deep study of the entire bureaucracy and the commitment of the U.S. government to implement the necessary reforms.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #552901 in Books
• Published on: 2003-02-08
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Hardcover
• 272 pages

From Publishers Weekly
"The weakness of U.S. counterintelligence is difficult to exaggerate," says Odom, former director of the National Security Agency, and "patching and repairing here and there" won't solve the problem. Here he presents a far-reaching proposal for revamping the intelligence community, but it's no page-turner. Based on a report originally published in 1997 by a think tank, this book argues that intelligence gathering must be streamlined and cooperation increased among the many existing intelligence agencies. Perhaps Odom's most broad-ranging reform would be to create a national counterintelligence service, which he says would eliminate both competition among the various agencies and the gaps in knowledge that result from such competition. Elsewhere, he proposes broad changes in the makeup of both the FBI and the CIA. These ideas, while presented six years ago by the author, were rarely seriously discussed before September 11, and the author himself admits they are likely to meet resistance from the turf-protecting intelligence community. Odom makes a strong case that they are necessary to fight the changing threats to U.S. security. All too often, though, his language makes his points difficult to follow ("until greater resource management rationality is achieved, progress in integrating the tactical intelligence capabilities will be erratic and more by chance than design"). The book still reads too much like a report to command the wide readership its arguments warrant. It probably will, however, feed media discussions about intelligence reform and the new Homeland Security Department.
Copyright 2003 Reed Business Information, Inc.

Review
"[T]his is a forcefully and cogently argued book. . . . [A] necessary read for anyone concerned about the future of intelligence." -- Lawrence D. Freedman, Foreign Affairs

. . . . [A] formidable contribution to the difficult work ahead in re-aligning the intelligence agencies' Cold War-vintage structure. -- Lorraine Adams, Washington Post Book World

. . . . [N]ot only descriptive,. . . . but prescriptive. . . . [T]he general's ideas. . . . should be debated and not simply placed on a shelf. . . . -- (Roger Fontaine, Washington Times)

. . . . [S]ome of the best thinking on this topic today. . . .It teaches [many] important lessons. . . . -- Mark H. Beaudry, Security Management

Odom. . . a retired general in the Army, writes an insiders perspective. . . And his subject matter couldn't be more timely. -- New York Times Book Review, March 16, 2003

From the Back Cover
"Odom's important and thought-provoking book . . . couldn't be more timely."--Eric Lichtblau, New York Times Book Review; "Indispensable . . . a formidable contribution to the difficult work ahead in realigning the intelligence agencies' Cold War-vintage structure."-Lorraine Adams, Washington Post Book World; "A vital and extraordinarily timely contribution to our national debate."-Zbigniew Brzezinski; "This is a forcefully and cogently argued book. It is a necessary read for anyone concerned about the future of intelligence."--Lawrence D. Freedman, Foreign Affairs; "General Odom uses the unique insight gained from years of experience in the intelligence business to explain in plain language an issue that is critical to U.S. national security - intelligence community reform. A valuable resource to expert and novice alike." - Senator Richard C. Shelby; "By publishing the Odom study, Yale University Press establishes a benchmark, a guide for public debate on this vital issue." - David E. Murphy, retired National Intelligence Officer and CIA Soviet specialist

Customer Reviews

Useful Informed Opinion

There are two very important themes running through this book, and they earn the author a solid four stars and a "must read" recommendation. First, the author is correct and compellinging clear when he points out that even the most senior intelligence professionals, including DCIs, simply do not understand the full range of intelligence organizations, capabilities, and problems that exist--just about everyone has spent their entire career in a small niche with its own culture. Second, the author is unique for focusing on an area that is both vital and ignored today: that of creating joint and combined intelligence concepts and doctrine to ensure that minimal common understandings as well as training competency levels are reached across varied jurisdictions; and to enable competent community resource management, also non-existent today.

The author is positively instructive in this book, providing both trenchant indictments (for instance, of the National Reconnaisance Office for being oriented toward big budgets and inputs rather than missions and outputs), and many common sense observations that all need to be factored into whatever the Senate finally decides to do about intelligence reform.

Among the many important points that he makes, I especially agree with his pointing out the need to fully integrate the management of inputs and outputs within each of the major collection disciplines--as he notes, disconnecting the building of satellites, or aerial imagery vehicles, or unmanned aerial drones, from the actual needs of the end-user and the actual responsibility to produce imagery intelligence, leads to precisely what the National Imagery and Mapping Agency Commission Report of December 1999 noted as the major shortfall in national intelligence--close to a trillion spent on secret satellite collection, and nothing spent on tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination (TPED). The author specifically identifies $6 billion in savings being achievable from the NRO budget over five years--savings that could be applied to enhancing analysis, creating competent clandestine collection capabilities, establishing global open source collection activities in each of the theaters, and creating a new national counterintelligence and homeland security intelligence program.

In passing, on page 146 the author "blows the whistle" on the deception imposed on the public by the CIA's clandestine service, which was actually largely incapable in Afghanistan in 2001, and was saved secretly by Russian sources & methods. My own sources tell me that there are some very ugly stories yet to be made public, and the author--whose access and credibility cannot be questioned--is helpful in sharing what he knows on this--America needs a competent clandestine service, not one that pretends that clerks mixed with cowboys, all working from official installations, are anything other than a joke.

The author demonstrates a very deep understanding of the shortfalls of the intelligence bureaucracy, the intelligence culture, intelligence leadership, and the policymakers that fail to direct or exploit intelligence on behalf of the Nation.

There are a few weaknesses in this book, costing the author one star, and they are mentioned to correct the record, as it were--in no way do these weaknesses reduce the value of the book or the importance of the author's views when we finally get around to fixing U.S. intelligence.

First, he is limited in his understanding of the importance of Global Coverage of lower tier issues that can be addessed by open source intelligence (OSINT), including commercial imagery and Russian military combat charts; and he is equally limited in his understanding of both OSINT, and the urgency of finding new means of supporting multilateral peacekeeping operations that mix both government militaries and government law enforcement missions with non-governmental and other private sector actors.

Second, he continues to have a modest obsession with technical solutions, and neglects to properly address the shortfalls in inter-agency information sharing and processing that could be partially resolved by enhancing the National Security Agency's considerable computational power to that it can become an all-source processing manager--at the same time, the author seriously over-states the availability of both bandwidth and tactical processing, while under-stating the enormous flood of unclassified information, including geospatial information, that must be processed if commanders are to be able to understand their combat environments in near real time.

Lastly, the author comes close to spasms of fury when referring to the Central Intelligence Agency, and to a lesser extent, to the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Department of State. His anger and disdain with regard to these organizations are recurring He is clear in his view that the "all source analyst" cannot and should not be centralized, that analysts must work for the end-users, and that both CIA and DIA should be abolished. While I disagree with this viewpoint, it is a mature informed viewpoint that CIA and DIA managers must address--they ignore General Odom's concerns at their peril.

The book is based on the 1997 study by the National Institute for Public Policy that was chaired by the author and included such other thoughtful executives as LtGen James Clapper, today the head of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. The author has made his own statement in this book, and it is perhaps the most practical and the most focused on the public statements on the need for intelligence reform. This book has been added to the OSS.NET listing of the top books on intelligence reform.

An Expert Opinion...
William Odom was a longserving Army intelligence officer who finished his uniformed career as Director of the National Security Agency. He has a reputation as a clear-eyed, plain-spoken observer of the intelligence community whether in or out of uniform. His 2003 "Fixing Intelligence" capitalizes on the tidal wave of interest in reform of the US intelligence community triggered by the 9/11 attacks.

"Fixing Intelligence" is a reworking of a 1997 study produced by one of the many groups tasked with intelligence reform. Odom breaks down the intelligence community and the need for reform for the general reader. His introduction and conclusion alone are worth the price of the book. In between, Odom provides chapters on terminology, the costs of doing business, military intelligence, signals intelligence, human intelligence, and counterintelligence. His discussion is generally a balanced one, although counterintelligence comes in for considerable criticism for its failures against the Soviet Union.

Most of Odom's recommendations were subsequently adopted in one form or another through Congressional Law and executive branch directives. In that sense, this book is now slightly out of date. On the other hand, few writers on the intelligence community have offered such a clear, concise, and understandable look at how it works. For that reason, "Fixing Intelligence" is still highly recommended to the general reader interested in the US intelligence community.

A Must Read for anyone interested in Intelligence
General Odom has written an outstanding book, combining a careful explanation of the nature and mission of intelligence with a well-thought out set of suggested reforms. Although the reading can be somewhat dry, General Odom's description of the relationships between different agencies and bureaucracies is succinct and delivered with clarity. Working methodically through the terminology and methods of the intelligence field, he provides necessary background and understanding to enable people to comprehend the need for reform and to assess the suggestions he offers.

General Odom writes from the perspective of an insider, a very smart insider, but manages to keep a degree of detachment and objectivity in the process. His thoughtful suggestions regarding how we might go about reforming and improving our intelligence capabilities to cope with 21st century threats should be read carefully by anyone with an interest in these issues.

Even if one disagrees with some of the reforms he proposes, this book provides a solid starting point for understanding the complexities of intelligence collection and analysis in the modern world, as well as the problems we face by relying on an intelligence community created fifty years ago to deal with a threat (the Soviet Union) that is now long-gone from the scene.

HIGHLY RECOMMENDED.