Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #592339 in Books
• Published on: 2003-06
• Released on: 2003-06-03
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 112 pages

Customer Reviews

Good rhetorical argument, but sketchy on detail.
I am one who has always been critical of our reasons for going into Iraq and, further, how we've conducted the Iraq 'war.' But I am equally uncomfortable when around my anti-war friends who, to me, always seem to oversimplify the issue by suggesting absuridities like (a) we should have given Iraq more time (as the UN has for 10 years, to no appreciable avail); (b) Saddam Hussein posed little threat to the international community (ignoring that even Clinton knew this wasn't true); or worst of all (c) that the war in Iraq will encourage Islamic anti-americanism even more (as if this wouldn't have happened anyway).

So as an opposer of the Iraq war, I appreciate reading books like Hitchens' that at very least gives some meaty considerations of the 'pro-Iraq-war' type. I agree with other reviewers that as the book is a short collection of short essays, Hitchens does more by way of rhetoric than analysis. I also agree that the lack of citations was a problem. But I vehemently disagree with those who feel that Hitchens does not know what he is talking about, that he simply has a 'neo-con' bias (Hitchens has always been and continues to be on the far left), or that his arguments are not eye-opening or persuasive.

Hitchens focuses on two things in particular: rebutting those overly simplistic slogans of what he calls (yes, a bit unfairly) the 'peaceniks'; and ruminating on Hussein's human rights violations and the overly-bravado way he openly (arrogantly) defies UN stipulations. He even goes so far as to point out (what we all kind of thought, but tried to suppress) that an international clash with Saddam was something of an inevitability. Was it best now or later? Since Hitchens doesn't put much faith in the UN, whose known Hussein was a problem, but dragged its feat for ten years, Hitchens answers that now is better than later in dealing with Saddam.

The 'peaceniks' bear much of the brunt of Hitchens' wrath. Slogans like "no war for oil" and "But Hussein wasn't the worst of the bad guys," really get Hitchens' juice flowing. On the first, Hitchens asks us whether or not what the peaceniks are suggesting is to leave Iraq's oil resources in the hands of the self-same man who showed no hesitation in burning Kuwait's oil fields in the process of 'surrendering' them back to Kuwait? Is such a man not a huge danger to Iraq's oil fields as well? AS to whether we should treat Hussein with kids gloves simply because he is not the 'worst of the bad guys' here is Hitchens himself:

"Did the people who said this have any idea what they were saying? How many bad guys could they name who had violated the Genocide Convention on their own territory, invaded two neighboring states, openly financed suicide bombing, sought and nearly acquired numclear capacity and were within easy reach of 9 percent of the world's energy reserves...A man that not only murdered his mildest critics but has also murdered members of his own government...[?]" [p.9]

This should at very least whet people's appetite to learn more. And despite the lack of citations or extended essays, a book like this should at very least be read by the war's critics (myself included, of course) to remind them that, if anything, arguments - good arguments - can be made on all sides. Reading this book confirmed much of what I've long suspected. Yes, I am still a critic of the war, but despite what all too many people say, neither 'side' on this issue seems to have a so desperately wanted monopoly on the truth.

compassion and insight in place of thoughtless rhetoric
Christopher Hitchens lays out the case for the liberation of Iraq as a moral imperative, on behalf of its own citizens as much as for the rest of the world, who were similarly terrorized by Saddam Hussein.

Most of the book takes the form of a series of articles penned by Mr. Hitchens throughout the run-up to the invasion through to its immediate aftermath. Particularly interesting are Hitchens's accounts of visiting Iraq both before and after the invasion, as much as a friend to its people as an investigative reporter.

On every side he levels his frank and insightful assessment of the actors involved, which is not at all flattering in cases such as Jacques Chirac, Dominique de Villepin, Colin Powell, and Dubya himself - Hitchens is no cheerleader for the White House. But among Hitchens's charms is that he is not one of the great mass of partisan critics with a ready slander for anyone in his sights. Paul Wolfowitz and Gerhard Schroeder, each in his own way, both emerge from Hitchens's close inspection as fairly heroic figures.

On the other hand, the most scathing indictments are reserved for those knee-jerk protesters and critics who equated the overthrow of our generation's Stalin with a war of aggression. Hitchens might be applauded for how reserved he reviews the telling account of the "human shields" who had a sudden change of heart after actually experiencing for just a few days the conditions in Iraq that its people have endured for decades.

And there is Hitchens's great lament, as implied in the title: what a terrible decision it was not to carry out this completion of the Iraqi war in 1991, when instead we inexplicably quit an ideal opportunity to end the despotism. That delay led quickly to the abandonment and massive defeat of the internal Iraqi dissenters who had looked to us for support, reminiscent of our similar let-down of the anti-Castro Cubans thirty years earlier; and it led to the onset of far worse poverty and oppression of the entire Iraqi populace over the past twelve years than they had experienced under the pre-Kuwait Saddam. The outlandish costs now being sought for reconstruction are also due in large part to the steady twelve year collapse of the Iraqi economy and infrastructure.

With controversy continuing on how finally to create an Iraq that is free and prosperous, it is invaluable to understand the mistakes made in the past. Amid so much of the same few simple-minded lines of rhetoric dominating public discourse, the piercing observations and original insights of Christopher Hitchens, wrapped in eloquent and eminently readable use of language, are a most welcome window on that understanding.

The case Bush should have made
While he'd never be mistaken for a Bush sympathizer, Christopher Hitchens in this collection of essays articulates the case for the liberation of Iraq far more eloquently, effectively -- and with an eye for what's really important -- than anyone in the Bush Administration seems able to, even at this late date. While I don't agree with everything in this book, I have a great deal of respect for Hitchens' articulate rationality. It's a refreshing change from both the hysteric emotionalism and nitwit slogans of much of the antiwar crowd, and the chest-thumping militarism of a great deal of the pro-war element.

Especially useful ... or would be if anyone besides Hitchens, me, and the specter of George Orwell still cared about precision and clarity in the language ... is the author's dissection of many of the key terms in this debate, including "terrorism," "multi-" versus "bi-" in lateralism and partisanship, "regime change," "imperialism," and much more. The article titled "'Cowboy' -- Bush challenged by bovines" did, I think, a better job of identifying the political context of President Bush's "Texanness" and its impact on his actions in office than Michael Lind did in all 224 pages of his book "Made in Texas."

In our modern democratic culture, of course, rational thought actually counts for very little -- not when shallow slogans like "No blood for oil!" are considered the last word in persuasive arguments (the author gives that one the deconstruction it deserves too). But for those who do value intelligent political debate, or just simple intellectual honesty, Hitchens' are the pro-war arguments that need to be answered.