Product Description

Applying recent advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, the author examines some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to model the effects on deterrence strategies of first-strike advantages, of limited retaliation, and of the number of nuclear superpowers involved in the international system. With the formalizations he develops, the author is able to demonstrate the fundamental similarity of the two seemingly disparate deterrence strategies that have evolved in response to the superpower arms buildup; the strategy that leaves something to chance and the strategy of limited retaliation.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #803192 in Books
• Published on: 2008-06-05
• Released on: 2008-08-21
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 240 pages

Review
"...the most serious and most productive application of the formal game theory to the study of deterrence and the outbreak of war...this is the first book-length treatment I have seen that makes successful use of game theory in exploring the most elusive aspects of this subject." Thomas Schelling, author of The Strategy of Conflict

Review
"...the most serious and most productive application of the formal game theory to the study of deterrence and the outbreak of war...this is the first book-length treatment I have seen that makes successful use of game theory in exploring the most elusive aspects of this subject." Thomas Schelling, author of The Strategy of Conflict

Customer Reviews

Too often overlooked
Nuclear Deterrence Theory is a very important work for students of strategy. Unfortunately, the book was published near the end of the Cold War when interest in nuclear strategy was waning. Consequently, it is not remembered as the important work that it is.

During in the Cold War, there was a very large debate amongst students of strategy and national security about how to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. Numerous books were published on topics like brinkmanship, MAD, limited retaliation, and first strikes. In many ways, Nuclear Deterrence Theory is the culmination of this literature and the answer to many of questions posed within it.

In Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Powell uses game theory to address the topics listed above. His analysis shows that there are widespread misconceptions regarding some of these topics. Moreover, the use of game theory provides insights into new dynamics within nuclear strategy. In general, although this may not be his aim, Powell causes the reader to appreciate how much warfare has changed since 1945 and how new ways of looking at strategy are needed.

Some readers might worry that the use of game theory, and the accompanying mathematical formulas, would be drawback to the book. However, Powell's writing is sufficiently explanatory to enforce his points and make the game theoretical analysis clear.