Product Description

Immense in scope, ferocious in nature, and epic in consequence, the Battle of Kursk witnessed (at Prokhorovka) one of the largest tank engagements in world history and led to staggering losses--including nearly 200,000 Soviet and 50,000 German casualties within the first ten days of fighting. Going well beyond all previous accounts, David Glantz and Jonathan House now offer the definitive work on arguably the greatest battle of World War II.

Drawing on both German and Soviet sources, Glantz and House separate myth from fact to show what really happened at Kursk and how it affected the outcome of the war. Their access to newly released Soviet archival material adds unprecedented detail to what is known about this legendary conflict, enabling them to reconstruct events from both perspectives and describe combat down to the tactical level.

The Battle of Kursk takes readers behind Soviet lines for the first time to reveal what the Red Army knew about the plans for Hitler's offensive (Operation Citadel), relive tank warfare and hand-to-hand combat, and tell how the tide of battle turned. Its vivid portrayals of fighting in all critical sectors places the famous tank battle in its proper context. Prokhorovka here is not a well-organized set piece but a confused series of engagements and hasty attacks, with each side committing its forces piecemeal.

Glantz and House's fresh interpretations demolish many of the myths that suggest Hitler might have triumphed if Operation Citadel had been conducted differently. Theirs is the first account to provide accurate figures of combat strengths and losses, and it includes 32 maps that clarify troop and tank movements.

Shrouded in obscurity and speculation for more than half a century, the Battle of Kursk finally gets its due in this dramatic retelling of the confrontation that marked the turning point of the war on the Eastern front and brought Hitler's blitzkrieg to a crashing halt.

This book is part of the Modern War Studies series.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #27374 in Books
• Published on: 2004-07
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 485 pages

Features

• ISBN13: 9780700613359
• Condition: NEW
• Notes: Brand New from Publisher. No Remainder Mark.
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Review
A good read. Looks at the traditional approach to Kursk and provides another well-founded interpretation of the battle. -- Parameters

An outstanding work on one of the most significant battles of World War II. -- Journal of Military History

The definitive analysis of Kursk. Ranks among the decade's most distinguished works of military history. -- Dennis Showalter, History Book Club Review

From the Back Cover
The most detailed, authoritative, and thorough analysis of the massive battle that led to the final victory of the Red Army over the Germans. This outstanding book deserves the highest praise.--Malcolm Mackintosh, author of Juggernaut: A History of Soviet Armed Forces

"The Battle of Kursk combines the authors' encyclopedic knowledge of their subject with a panoramic narrative of military operations to challenge the 'myths of Kursk.' Drawing heavily upon hitherto classified Soviet material, as well as German sources, the work is both original and revisionist, making it a major contribution to our understanding of one of the most important operations of the Second World War."--John Erickson, author of The Road to Stalingrad

"At last we have an account of the battle of Kursk from the Soviet perspective. And what an account! It is meticulously researched, persuasively argued, full of new and important findings, and written with verve and pathos. This is operational history at its best."--Joel S. A. Hayward, author of Stopped at Stalingrad

About the Author
David M. Glantz is the author of The Battle for Leningrad, 1941–1944, Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War, Zhukov's Greatest Defeat: The Red Army's Epic Disaster in Operation Mars, and When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler, all published by Kansas.

Jonathan M. House is professor of history at Gordon College and the author of Towards Combined Arms Warfare and Military Intelligence, 1870–1991. Glantz and House also coauthored When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler.

Customer Reviews

A must-read for all deeply interested in WWII Eastern Front
"The Battle of Kursk" is a must-read for anyone seriously interested in "operational" (i.e. batallion units and above) level warfare in the context of the pivotal 1943 World War II Eastern Front Battle of Kursk. If Stalingrad was the end of the beginning, Kursk was the beginning of the end for the Wehrmacht in Russia. What makes this book unique is the expert authors' access to and translations of crucial Soviet recently de-classified battle accounts. These provide an essential correlary (and, in some cases, corrective) to previously published German accounts of the battle. The mythical July 12 tank battle at Prokhorovka is critically examined and placed in a proper context. This book also does an excellent job of placing the entire Kursk battle in its larger context, from Manstein's early 1943 "Miracle" counteroffensive on the Don, to the subsequent Soviet summer offensive that resulted in the capture of Kharkov. The maps and index are excellent, and the many appendices contain a treasure trove of statistical information. The few minor errors re German forces (e.g. calling Rudolf von Ribbentrop a Tiger Company commander, when his 6th Company of the Leibstandarte division's Panzer Regiment actually consisted of less powerful Mark IVs) are trivial. No other book on the battle of Kursk presents so thorough and convincing an explanation of how and why Operation Zitadelle failed, especially pages 138-147 on the "fateful decisions" made on July 9. The technical information and tank photos provided by Steven Zaloga are the icing on the cake. At last, the battle of Kursk laid bare, with supreme diligence.

A Little Bit of New Wine in Old Bottle
The crux of this volume is new Soviet archival material on STAVKA decision-making but there is actually little new here. At less than 300 pages, this is somewhat short-shrift to a major battle. There is no discussion of air operations or partisans. Very limited profile of commanders and their forces, but excellent order of battle information. The Germans placed their faith in the 407 heavy tanks available (102 Tigers, 200 Panther and 105 Ferdinands) but they split them up too much; they should have massed their best weaponry in one sector. It is no surprise that ArmeeGruppe South made much better progress; they had much more artillery support (Center relied mostly on assault guns in direct fire mode), and much better engineer support (South had about eight corps-level engineer battalions but Center had no corps-level engineers). Glantz asks and answers several key questions: did Hitler really push Zitadelle (no, Zeitzler, Kluge and others pushed it beforehand but then blamed Hitler later), could the attack have succeeded in May (unlikely, given the weather and the disparity in forces) and what if the Germans had eschewed the attack and opted for a mobile defense (this would have bought them time, but there was no consensus for this strategy so it was highly unlikely to be adopted. It would also have required Hitler to relinquish command in the east to a CinC). Maps ok but uses cumbersome abbreviations. No terrain analysis.

Almost definitive
David Glantz writing the definitive assessment of the Battle for Kursk? Sounded like a dream come true. After all, colonel Glantz is the leading authority (along with the now much less active John Erickson) on the Eastern Front topic. After all, he wrote such amazing in-depth analysis on several EF campaign (from a much needed Soviet perspective) like "From Don To Donets" or "When Titans Clashed" - this one probably the best one-volume general history of the Russia's war. After all, Glantz did a wonderful job on demolishing (hard numbers at hand) a lot of Cold War fabricated myths on how good (and unlucky) were Nazi Generals, and how dumb (and lucky and faceless) where the Soviets. So, when "The Battle of Kursk" landed in my hands, I felt a comprehensible shiver of anticipation. The first thing I must say consider is that - probably following many complaints for the very dry style (someone called it a "syntactical slog") of his previous work - col. Glantz finally decided to team with someone providing him with a much needed editing work. Not to say that Mr. House's collaboration solved all the problems: we're treated here and there with repetitions and convoluted passages, and, yes, the style is still a bit on the dry side. For instance, nearly every quote from a primary source describing the actual firefight is preceded by the same "A quote for a (German/Soviet) account vividly depict the intensity of the battle", or a variation of the same. And the maps - ok, a bit more time spent on polishing and editing them would have helped immensely. But these are really minor issues. As far as the content goes, "The Battle Of Kursk" is (nearly) the definitive thing. Glantz manages to put order in the former chaos, and gives us a perspective that, if not new as the dust jacket's notes would make us believe, is possibily the current state-of-art on the subject. Ten years ago, the battle for the Kursk salient (fought between July 5th and 16th 1943) was, thank to the then mandatory uncritical reading of German literature on the subject and a complete disregard for Soviet sources, alternatively known as a footnote at the Stalingrad campaign, as the last significant German offensive effort in the East, as the largest tank battle ever fought, as another evidence of Hitler's strategical ineptitude, the demonstration that if Germany's military brains had free hands they could have won., an Herculean effort almost doomed from the beginning by Soviet espionage, bad timing and many other things. So, Kursk became another lost opportunity for the ubermenshen to revert the Stalingrad disaster and win the war. Also, the whole battle ended up focused on the Prokorovkha maelstrom, giving to that single episode a bigger importance of what was in reality. Not really a battle, but rather a confused collation of events that historians seemed uneasy to define as the turning point of WWII or just another "big" battle.. "The Battle Of Kursk" convincingly demonstrates that Kursk was a Soviet victory AND a German defeat - because Soviet strategy was more sound (even if their execution of the same was often flawed) and German strategy was wrong - based on a very rigid framework of incorrect assumptions, and leading to some big operational mistakes. It shows also that, if the southern portion of the German assault pushed deep in the Soviet defensive belt, its management was faulty at least, especially after the crucial 10th July decision to shift the axis of the attack from North (towards Oboyan) to NE (towards Prokorovkha), a huge mistake that was NOT a pre-planned move (as German memoirs made us believe in the past), but the result of an incorrect assessment of Soviet forces position and conditions. Also, it somehow manages to de-emphasizes the importance of Prokorovkha itself: if the 12th July battle was indecisive (Soviet Guards 5th Tank Army failed its mission to destroy the II SS Pzkrp, but made any further German dream of "operational freedom" unrealistic), continuous combat on the 13th, 14th and 15th show us that Manstein was 1) overestimating the real effect the 12th July battle had on the Soviets and 2) continuing operations in spite of Hitler (correct) belief that Citadel had failed. So - here goes the big deal - Hitler DIDN'T called off Citadel prematurely against Manstein's will (another much discussed myth), but the 16th July ends of the southern offensive was inevitable, facing mounting losses, Soviet pressure on the flanks and Soviet operations in the north. Just a couple of days more, and 4th Pz Army would have been crushed beyond recovery. The bottom line is that German generals lost Kursk most in their own - and not because of Hitler's meddling. It must be said that, beyond this, Glantz simply confirm what was known in the past by anyone serious in the subject, and there's no shocking revelation based on some untapped primary source. Even the "numbers" issue it's a bit of an anticlimax: Glantz chooses a conservative approach taking for granted archival numbers for both sides. But, if we're now confident about Soviet initial numbers and losses, the same cannot be said for the Germany's, especially as far as the SS corps is concerned. In my humble opinion, the numbers here should be drastically increased, but, as they said, who am I to contradict colonel Glantz? Also, a bit more courage underlining German troubles at the command level would have been welcome..

So - how's "The Battle Of Kursk"? An absolute must for any WWII enthusiast, an enjoyable work of scholarship even if somehow flawed style-wise, and a much needed ray of light in a still confused topics. Buy it!