Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #2654392 in Books
• Published on: 2002-03
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Hardcover
• 496 pages

From The New Yorker
In the popular imagination, the Soviet Union was always synonymous with Russia, but in the U.S.S.R.'s early days Soviet leaders had a very different idea in mind: they wanted to establish a true multinational, multi-ethnic empire. To that end, they attacked Russian nationalism as a vestige of Tsarism, and instituted a set of policies that looked very much like affirmative action, enforcing the use of local languages and fostering the development of ethnic leaders, even at the cost of discriminating against Russians. Yet, as Martin shows in this fascinating history, simply giving an order was not enough, even in the Stalin years, and the complex relationship between socialism and nationalism in places like Ukraine often frustrated Soviet intentions. More important, ethnicity, once fostered, was frequently a counterweight to, rather than a bulwark of, Communist ideology; although Stalin remained rhetorically committed to the multi-state idea, he ended up terrorizing those ethnic leaders he saw as threats.
Copyright © 2005 The New Yorker

Customer Reviews

An absolutely seminal work on the subject
This is a difficult book, but everyone must make the effort to read it. It is based on dozen of archives and several pages (in tiny print) of contemporary Soviet sources. It details a very important question. In recent years the "totalitarian" paradigm has returned, with a vengeance, to the study of Soviet history. And what could be a greater symbol of the "equivalence" of Stalinism and Nazism, than their mass use of ethnic cleansing? German atrocities need no introduction. But one can still be stunned by the brutalities involved in the acquistion of the other fourteen Soviet republics, the savage famine of 1932-33 that ravaged Ukraine and Kazhakstan, the mass deportations from the Baltic countries, and the manifold ethnic cleansing of Germans, Poles, Koreans and Chechyeans, among many others. The vital importance of this book is that whatever one might say about these cruelties, they emerged in a context radically different from that of Nazism, they had a different logic, and in the end radically different consequences.

The Soviet Union was always dominated by the Soviet Communist Party. The nominal independence of the 15 republics was an illusion until just before the end. But the desire to encourage the national consciousness of every group within the Union, that was not an illusion, that was not a lie. Indeed, far from being destroyed by the primordial nationality that it so viciously repressed, the Soviet Union did much to foster nationalities in the first place. Not only did it create the 15 republics, but it created dozens upon dozens of autonomous republics and national soviets all throughout the Soviet Union. For dozens of tribes and languages it created written scripts and then set about translating each others books into each others languages. In every corner of the Soviet Union it sought to increase the representation of the dominant nationality in the local branch of the party. It is often forgotten that in much of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the now dominant nationality was a minority in the cities. Prague was once a German city. Kiev and Minsk were dominated by Jews and Russians. Tiblisi, the capital of Georgia, once had an Armenian majority, while many times during its history Armenia's capital had a Muslim majority. Ensuring the demographic triumph of the dominant nationality was another Soviet policy.

The origins of this eccentric and vigorously pursued policy came from Stalin and Lenin who believed that encouraging national consciousness would limit local opposition to any "Russian" movement. Martin details the development of this policy from 1923 to 1939 where it modified in several important ways. In 1939 the Soviet Union no longer castigated Russian chauvinism as the most pernicious of evils. The other nationalities were expected to have some basic knowledge of Russia and its culture, and no longer would the tiniest of nationalities would be given its own soviet. The active opposition to allowing members of other nationalities to becoming Russian was dropped. However, the affirmative action programs would be continued, and indeed the beneficiaries would be the core of many post-Soviet regimes.

Martin writes important chapters on the especially complicated situation in the Far east, where the Soviet government had to deal with 99 separate nationalities. He discusses the efforts to encourage Ukrainization in Ukraine. Much to their disappointment, and contrary to what one might expect from Ukrainian nationalist historigoraphy, their support for a unilingual Ukrainian culture in the cities met with very limited success. The people there actually preferred a bilingual Russian-Ukrainian culture. Martin also provides a subtle account of the 1932-33 famine. This was not a famine designed against the Ukraine, but against grain "surplus" regions. However, a deadly "national interpretation" of the famine developed in Soviet ideology as the famine progressed. Martin is also useful on the Great purges later in the decades. Contrary to what one might think, nationalities like Ukrainians and Jews were not overrepresented. The one that were consisted of the "diasopora" ones, such as Poles, Germans, Koreans and other bordering countries that might be potential threats.

Finally there is the chapter on ethnic cleansing. Martin reminds us of the ideological and security origins of the cleansing. In certain situations even Russians could find themselves ethnically cleansed (such as former Russian workers on the Manchurian railroads). He reminds us of the broader context of ethnic cleansing, such as the extermination of the Armenians, the mass deportations following the Balkan Wars and the Greek-Turkish war, and the wartime deporation of 800,000 Jews from the Russian Front. He also reminds us of the local ethnic and popular hatreds that would have existed regardless of the Soviet Union's existence, such as in Kazhakstan and the North Caucasus. He also reminds us that the Soviet leadership understandly wanted to encourage ethnic concentration in order to form more viable national units. In the end most nationalities have claimed to be specially victimized by the former Soviet Union. And while this is true for some groups, like the Chechens, it should be remembered that for the Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, Georgians, Kazhaks, and many other groups, the Soviet Union was not the prisonhouse of nations. It did not kill countries, only people.

Soviet Multiculturalism
This book underscores the importance of ideology in historical development. The Soviet Union was a communist entity, and the often bizarre vagaries of communist ideology as they pertained to the Soviet Union's multi-ethnic make-up are the centrepiece of this important and original investigation. According to Terry Martin, the Soviet Union was not, at least in its pre-war manifestation, a chauvinistic entity, despite the evident suffering meted out to sundry ethnic groups in opposition to the implementation of Bolshevik policies. Indeed, Martin demonstrates that the Soviets embodied a qualified cosmopolitan tendency. Soviet authorities, although divided on the wisdom of this course of action, sought to undermine certain ("negative") aspects of nationalism or ethnic particularism by promoting other ("positive") aspects of the same phenomenon. They were, for a time, national internationalists. Russian nationalism, long excoriated and denigrated by the Party, did eventually emerge supreme after World War Two, for reasons outlined by Martin, but multiculturalism was not entirely eschewed. Martin's research is a seminal contribution to the field of Russian and Soviet studies. His book does, however, lack a certain fluency in composition and does seem quite cumbersome, if not repetitive, in certain places.