Product Description

In its 2004 report on 9/11, the Kean Commission criticized U.S. intelligence for having failed to anticipate the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. Basing its findings on the premise of absolute security, the commission faulted the FBI for not adopting a creative and aggressive approach to the terrorist threat, and both the FBI and the CIA for their inadequate cooperation. But, says distinguished historian Athan Theoharis in his new book, absolute security is an illusory quest that is certain to nurture disappointment-and worse. His compelling analysis traces the troubled history of relations among American intelligence agencies and points out the historical myopia that characterizes the Kean Commission's findings and recommendations.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #558531 in Books
• Published on: 2007-10-26
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Hardcover
• 320 pages

Features

• ISBN13: 9781566636971
• Condition: NEW
• Notes: Brand New from Publisher. No Remainder Mark.
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Review
"Any military or American history collection at the college level needs this astute analysis of disasters in the making." -- Midwest Book Review

"Provides expert history as an important context for understanding the lead-up to current debates and controversies on how to organize, operate, and protect homeland security in the wake of September 11." --Political Science Quarterly

"An important, provocative book, sure to be widely discussed." -- Kirkus Review

"Theoharis's compelling and timely book showcases the history of civil liberties in our society....a penetrating, persuasive assessment." -- Nadine Strossen

Convincingly demonstrates the dangers to liberty inherent in the...authority over intelligence activities and the need for aggressive congressional oversight. -- Geoffrey R. Stone in author of War and LIberty: An American Dilemma

The Quest for Absolute Security shows anew his mastery of the Bureau's history. -- John Prados

Customer Reviews

Mission Impossible
The unremarkable conclusion of this book is that the U.S. can never achieve a state of absolute security regardless of how much legal (and illegal) power is granted to the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) and its associate the FBI. According to the author, the perceived failure of the IC-FBI to identify the threat and prevent the tragedy of 9/11 has as much to do with systemic problems common to both as a lack of cooperation between agencies or a lack of information. As noted towards the end of the book, "Administrative reforms and centralization offer no solution to this intractable problem of intelligence analysis: the secrecy inherent in intelligence operations virtually ensure such errors in judgment and accountability."

This book also provides a pretty good overview of the development of the U.S. national security apparatus, especially in response to the repeated crises of the 20th Century. It also provides an excellent discussion of how the FBI since WWI has engaged in ill-legal activities such as break-ins and wire taps in the name of national security and often at the personal requests of U.S. Presidents. In the post WWII period the quest for greater national security against the Soviet threat led to the creation of a much more formal national security apparatus of which CIA was given primacy.

The original intention was to create CIA as a center for the analysis of all source intelligence to provide forewarning of threats to national security. But, as shown in this book, President Truman who sponsored its creation, almost immediately began to use CIA to carry out covert operations in support of the "Truman Doctrine", the predecessor of the "Containment Doctrine" which informed U.S. geopolitical thinking throughout the Cold War. Truman also continued the policy of his predecessor President Roosevelt of using the FBI not only as a law enforcement arm, but also as an intelligence arm. As the latter the FBI collected intelligence and conducted covert actions much like CIA except it concentrated primarily on domestic operations. This policy actually began during WWI under President Wilson and was continued because it was thought to be too useful to discontinue.

It is made abundantly clear that in spite of the extra constitutional not to say extra legal activities of the IC and FBI that continue to this day, the U.S. is not that much safer from either terrorist attack or any other threat. Indeed according to Theoharis, all the extra-constitutional acts involving egregious invasions of privacy in the name of counter terrorism have produced very little in the way either warning or preventive intelligence. Rather wistfully he recommends that the U.S. Congress might do well to take a proactive rather than their usual reactive oversight of the IC and FBI.

Any military or American history collections at the college level needs this astute analysis of disasters in the making.
Investigators who studied 9/11 faulted U.S. intelligence for not uncovering the terrorists' plans, but such absolute security, says historian Athan Theoharis, is an illusion certain to lead to disappointment and disaster. THE QUEST FOR ABSOLUTE SECURITY: THE FAILED RELATIONS AMONG U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES analyzes some of the sources of problems in American intelligence agencies and considers how such problems evolved. Any military or American history collections at the college level needs this astute analysis of disasters in the making.