Product Description

Award-winning combat reporter Sean Naylor reveals how close American forces came to disaster in Afghanistan against Al Qaida—after easily defeating the ragtag Taliban that had sheltered the terrorist organization behind the 9/11 attacks.

At dawn on March 2, 2002, over two hundred soldiers of the 101st Airborne and 10th Mountain Divisions flew into the mouth of a buzz saw in Afghanistan's Shahikot Valley. Believing the war all but over, U.S. military leaders refused to commit the extra infantry, artillery, and attack helicopters required to fight the war's biggest battle— a missed opportunity to crush hundreds of Al Qaida's fighters and some of its most senior leaders.

Eyewitness Naylor vividly portrays the heroism of the young, untested soldiers, the fanaticism of their ferocious enemy, the mistakes that led to a hellish mountaintop firefight, and how thirteen American commandos embodied "Patton's three principles of war"—audacity, audacity, and audacity—by creeping unseen over frozen mountains into the heart of an enemy stronghold to prevent a U.S. military catastrophe.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #9168 in Books
• Published on: 2006-03-07
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 448 pages

Features

• ISBN13: 9780425207871
• Condition: NEW
• Notes: Brand New from Publisher. No Remainder Mark.
• Click here to view our Condition Guide and Shipping Prices

From Bookmarks Magazine
Reviewers lauded Naylor’s "meticulously reported" account (Oregonian). It includes in-person observations during the operation (Naylor was imbedded with the 101st Airborne Division troops who fought in the battle), and scores of after-the-fact interviews, many with sources who wouldn’t allow themselves to be identified. His two-year undertaking to bring those 17 days to life yields an extraordinarily detailed account of the fateful mission. While a few critics felt that some aspects of the book were unbalanced, all agreed that Naylor did a good job in portraying the drama, heroism, and blunders that defined Anaconda while raising broader issues of warfare and its ultimate purpose.

Copyright © 2004 Phillips & Nelson Media, Inc.

From Booklist
In March 2002, U.S. forces moved into the Shahikot Mountains, hoping to trap and eliminate a substantial number of Al Qaeda fighters. They were handicapped almost fatally by their own lack of numbers, substandard logistics support, the highest altitudes at which Americans had ever fought, and the frigid weather of the mountains. Victory eluded them, although considerable damage was done to the enemy; and disaster may have been averted by the actions of special operations teams drawn from Delta Force and Seal Team 6. These operatives put on a very convincing demonstration of how much of the future of warfare may lie in the hands of small bands of experts engaging the enemy by stealth, with heavy firepower on call, firepower that wasn't always available in Operation Anaconda. Prizewinning Army Times reporter Naylor has written the best full-scale history of Operation Anaconda to date. Roland Green
Copyright © American Library Association. All rights reserved

About the Author
Sean Naylor, a senior writer for the Army Times, has covered the Afghan mujahideen's war against the Soviets, and American military operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. His coverage of Operation Anaconda earned him the White House Correspondents' Association's prestigious Edgar A. Poe Award. Naylor was named one of the twenty-two most influential "unsung" print reporters in Washington by American Journalism Review in May 2002.

Customer Reviews

Superb
Mr. Naylor is a reporter with Army Times who has covered the military for many years. He displays an insider's understanding as to how military organizations plan and fight. This book is unique in the degree to which the author was able to get the participants to be interviewed; there are a great many details here you won't find anywhere else. He does a great job on the account of Anaconda, a large raid into a mountain stronghold in southeast Afghanistan, conducted in early 2002.

The author covers the planning for Anaconda, the infighting among different organizations, and the significant impact the Secretary of Defense's office had as the numbers of conventional forces were limited due to political considerations. Special operators, generals, infantrymen, apache gunship pilots, all have their voices heard. What happens when plans fall apart and soldiers have to pick up the pieces? It's all in here.

This is the best account of the Army post 9/11 that has been written, and it is highly unlikely you'll find one better anytime soon. A must read. If you have any interest in the military or national security, pick this up.

Best Insight into the current American wars
Not a Good Day to Die is a must read for anyone who wants to understand what we should really be focusing on to change in our current military if we want to stay relevant in a future that will almost certainly be marked by uncertainty. I am a Reserve Officer who just returned from Iraq and I couldn't believe how many of the lessons I had highlighted in Naylor's book, were still relevant on the ground in Iraq. My son sent me a blog from an unknown author who I would love to thank because he sums up what I believe to be the seminal lesson from Not a Good Day to Die, and the key point we should focus on to improve our military in the future.

A brief discussion about the decisionmaking structure of U.S. land forces. The most remarkable examination of this topic is Sean Naylor's recent book on Operation Anaconda, an American effort in 2002 to trap and destroy a force of hundreds of al Qaeda warriors in a valley in Afghanistan. Naylor's book, Not a Good Day to Die, is far too detailed to come close to summarizing here. But two themes reappear throughout Naylor's narrative.

First, the American military has grown higher headquarters like weeds in rich soil. Meetings over Operation Anaconda, a single operation planned for three days and thought to be aimed against 200 enemy, involved absurd numbers of competing organizations -- and, therefore, competing operational styles and agendas. Here's a typical laundry list for a single meeting: "Representatives from K-Bar, the CIA, Task Force 11, CFLCC, the Coalition and Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force, and Task Force Rakkasan had been invited." And this list is hardly a complete reflection of all the different headquarters involved in Anaconda. As Naylor summarizes: "For a battle that would involve perhaps 2,000 allied troops -- less than a brigade's worth -- in combat, CENTCOM had cobbled together a force that drew elements from eight countries, two U.S. Army divisions, two Special Forces groups, a hodgepodge of aviation units, and a variety of clandestine organizations." Each piece of that stew had its own leadership, with its own agenda and intent. A critical American military effort had become wildly and pointlessly complicated. Four-star generals reviewed plans down to the platoon level.

Second, the coordination of those many different elements and agendas meant that painfully negotiated plans became locked into place simply because they were painfully negotiated. After members of a Delta Force team pulled off the seemingly impossible feat of walking up the side of a mountain in the Afghan winter to get a firsthand look at the valley, operation leaders received reports that there were somewhere around 1000 enemy, not the 200 the American plans had called for -- and then they learned further that the enemy was not in the valley, where the plans put them, but were instead on the high ground around it. Leaders of the battle decided to go ahead with the plan as written, reluctant to throw out weeks of hard-fought staff work on the word of Lt. Col. Peter Blaber's Delta operators. The plans trumped reality, because the plans had come with political and institutional costs.

Finally, one of the ways that Army officers managed the problem of ignoring the Delta Force intelligence showing 1000 enemy on the high ground was to regard the special operators who delivered that intelligence as out-of-control and untrustworthy. Leaders ridiculed the Delta team reports, and "mocked the independent role that Blaber had carved out by calling him 'Peter the Great' and 'Colonel Kurtz.'" The enforcement of institutional orthodoxy allowed leaders to ignore realistic bad news. Today's U.S. Army in a nutshell, right there.

There's much more to Naylor's book, which is so far one of the very few critical pieces of insight into the current American wars. (The battle, by the way, went poorly.)

To summarize, then -- sorry about that -- a too-hierarchical, too-orthodox U.S. Army, and U.S. military in general, leans heavily on lumbering equipment, high technology, and major ground offensives against an enemy that relies on tactics that are often not even conventionally military in nature; we mass artillery against threatening letters and infrastructure sabotage. In equipment, doctrine, tactics, and leadership structure, we're organized for the wrong enemy, in ways that can't be easily or quickly changed.

Started off slow but finished strong
The book is broken into four sections: the leadup to the operation, the first contact, the ranger battle, then conclusion. The first section is about 180 pages and is a bit of snoozer. The author explains, what appears to be, every single aspect behind every decision made prior to Anaconda. He goes into excruciating detail about the "office politics" between the various military groups. At one point, it starts sounded like a soap opera as various loyalities and internal factions are explained. It was bad enough for me to skim a few pages. It feels like the author had to fill some pages and pad the book.

One thing that stuck out was how LONG the prep work for the operation took. The book starts off "in the first weeks of January." The operation kicked off on 2 March. That seems like a long time to this untrained observer.

I did like hearing about the local Delta operator and how he planned and ran the three recce teams. He was bold and daring.

Things start picking up during the second section, "Reaction to Contact." As the first troopers hit the ground, the author reeled me in with vivid details of landscape, battles, and the troopers. The insider report of the friendly-fire incidents boiled my blood. When the author talks about the Afghan trucks driving across the mountainside in the dark and WITHOUT lights, I was shocked. Descriptions of the landscape are detailed. At one point, I lost track of all the different units moving around.

The third section is the climax. It deals with the battle on Takur Ghar. That was the payoff. Once I reached that section, I couldn't put the book down. When the SEAL commander sent the first helo to an LZ on TOP of the mountain, I was stunned. The author communicates the troopers frustration with the poor communication clearly -- I actually got mad when the General Trebon took command of the battle on Takur Ghar. There are some details about that battle that didn't make it into the newspaper accounts I read. For that alone, it is worth the read. Gritty, gripping, and packed with suspense.

The author does great work explaining how the battle on the mountain unfolded and the actions of all the troopers. Reading how the SEALs dragged their wounded comrades down a mountain or how the second QRF had to scale a mountain with a 70 degree slope while wearing 100lbs of gear...wow. The Ranger commander should have gotten a couple of medals for his bravery.

The pictures in the book were brilliant. There are a couple from Takur Ghar that, when viewed after reading the corresponding section, are just stunning.

All in all, it was a good read, despite the first section.