Product Description

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #1162105 in Books
• Published on: 2002-10-01
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Hardcover
• 699 pages

From Publishers Weekly
As the U.S. rather publicly contemplates a strike against Iraq, Kenneth M. Pollack, the Council on Foreign Relations' deputy director for National Security Studies, offers a frank and statistically based historical assessment of Iraq's performance in war, along with the performances of Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Audi Arabia and Syria. Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991 begins with the first of Egypt's engagements with Israel, and ends with the Gulf War, devoting a chapter each to the aforementioned nations (Iraq gets more than 100 pages), and focusing on everything from preparedness to unit cohesion. While it is often more technical than most readers will want, expect journalists to be combing the book (which includes 36 maps) in search of backstory.
Copyright 2002 Reed Business Information, Inc.

From Library Journal
In the March/April 2002 issue of Foreign Affairs, Pollack, who is deputy director of National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, bluntly addressed what should be done once the al Qaeda has been dealt with: "The United States should invade Iraq, eliminate the present regime, and pave the way for a successor prepared to abide by its international commitments and live in peace with its neighbors." This forthrightness is evident throughout Pollack's significant albeit highly specialized military history of the tactical and strategic performance of six key Arab states Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Syria during the post-World War II era. Each broad analysis covers the strategies and goals of both the various militaries and their adversaries to provide a full political context. Pollack achieves the dual purpose of analyzing the factors that have consistently hindered these armed forces and providing a robust assessment of their strengths and weaknesses during various battles. Since the experiences of these forces continue to shape military action around the world, this important overview belongs in all military research libraries and larger university libraries. Dale Farris, Groves, TX
Copyright 2002 Cahners Business Information, Inc.

Review
"An extremely valuable, compendious, and convincing military history of the contemporary Arab world, making this book a standard work of reference."-Foreign Affairs (Foreign Affairs )

"[A] classic study."-Newsweek (Newsweek )

"An outstanding analyses of Arab military fortunes in the modern world."-Paper Wars (Paper Wars )

Customer Reviews

What Went Wrong?
This is a superb and easily read treatise, of use both to the military professional and the interested lay reader. The book meticulously details strategic and tactical performance of each of the prinicple Arab states, not only with respect to their well-publicized conflicts with Israel, but it also investigates the lesser-known military endeavors (e.g., Egypt's war in Yemen, Libya's adventures in Chad). As a result, this is a comprehensive evaluation. Fortunately, it was not burdened with background details on Islam and it's baleful influences on the technical aspects of modern warfare: this material would constitute a separate treatise and has been detailed elsewhere. Nonetheless, the insights gained from Pollack's investigation of military performance transfer to Arab domestic politics and Islamic cultural influence on military doctrine.

Unfortunately, the cost of the book and it's length will deter many readers. In summary, this is an outstanding book and should be on the 'must read' list of readers of Middle Eastern affairs. It's only shortcomings were in the maps: symbols used throughout the text were only annotated in one map and never completely explained. Otherwise, a superb work.

The mismanagement of information - very relevant
The author of this book does an excellent job of analyzing the operational and tactical performance of Arabic Armies in the latter 20th Century. But, be forewarned, the book can be a slog to get through for the novice. Mr. Pollack examines the good, bad and ugly of the national performance of several armies (Iraqi, Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian) in a manner which is useful to any decision maker who might have to confront an Arab Military foe. The best part of this book and its most useful application is in detailing Arabic Armies 'mismanagement' of information. Yes, poor leadership has doomed many Arabic Military operations, but within Arab Military leadership the fatal mismanagement of information is at the heart of each defeat. As detailed by the author, Senior and Junior officers both lie. They lie to their troops, lie to their political masters and lie to each other. At times they seem incapable of any truth telling whatsoever. The author details Senior Officers describing "Great Victories" where battles are being lost. Junior officers repeatedly fail to provide timely analysis of opposing forces or give a true picture of ongoing operations (lest they be termed cowards?). This has caused missed opportunities to adjust deployments and often leads to catastrophic defeats. Another excellent point is that the author never dismisses the ability of the individual Arab foot soldier to display extreme bravery and tenacity often despite overwhelming odds.

Good political science, but then again, it's political science
This is a solid study. It is well written, well researched, solid on its data, and thorough in its scope.

The sections on inter-Arab/Muslim/African conflict give good looks at relatively obscure pieces of information -- the author's discussion of the Libyan-Chadian conflicts, for example, is outstanding.

A number of interesting conclusions are evident here, whether about Arabs' failure to maintain their weapons and equipment, their poor battlefield employment of intelligence, their horrendous logistical systems, or the failure of their junior leadership to execute, lead, and decide sua sponte.

My only real complaint is that often, I found myself thinking 'but what do you think?' The author is so thorough in the book that he often leaves his intermediary conclusions for the reader to absorb, and extrapolate. This makes the book something of a tool, as opposed to the pedantic thing you would expect given its girth. But I would figure that with all the author's knowledge (and his resume to boot), he would have more of his own things to say. He does offer, at the end, that this book is essentially a shortened version of his dissertation, and there is a follow-on work that looks more in depth, examines other aspects, and offers more analysis.

Bottom line is that this is a great piece of work. It should be seen as, essentially, an encyclopedia. If you're looking for anything else you'll be woefully disappointed. But if you're serious about the subject, this book is well worth the time.