Lawrence Freedman to MESH:

I was well aware, especially as a non-American, of the political minefield I was entering. These are issues that excite strong feelings. The polarization of opinion is often reflected in books that are seen as being for or against Israel, sympathetic to the Iraq war or unremittingly hostile, cynical or forgiving about official motives. Single, simplistic explanations are offered, pointing to the influence of the "Israel Lobby" or Big Oil or neo-conservatives. With such dramatic material it would be impossible to find a bland and inoffensive middle course, but I have sought to respect the evidence, interpret it with care, avoid polemics and try to do justice to this fascinating though frequently tragic story.

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Product Description

A renowned historian and security analyst sheds new light on America's quintessential foreign policy dilemma: our recent engagement in the Middle East.

It is in the Middle East that the U.S. has been made to confront its attitudes on the use of force, the role of allies, and international law. The history of the U.S. in the Middle East, then, becomes an especially revealing mirror on America's view of its role in the wider world.

In this wise, objective, and illuminating history, Lawrence Freedman shows how three key events in 1978-79 helped establish the foundations for U.S. involvement in the Middle East that would last for thirty years, without offering any straightforward or bloodless exit options: the Camp David summit leading to the Israel-Egypt Treaty; the Iranian Islamic revolution leading to the Shah's departure followed by the hostage crisis; and the socialist revolution in Afghanistan, resulting in the doomed Soviet intervention.

Freedman makes clear how America's strategic choices in those and subsequent crises led us to where we are today. A Choice of Enemies is essential reading for anyone concerned with the complex politics of the region or with the future of American foreign policy.

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Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #120496 in Books
• Published on: 2008-05-12
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Hardcover
• 640 pages

Features

• ISBN13: 9781586485184
• Condition: NEW
• Notes: Brand New from Publisher. No Remainder Mark.

Review

About the Author
Sir Lawrence Freedman is professor of war studies at King's College, London. In 2001 he was appointed head of the School of Social Sciences and Public Policy at King's and then in 2003 vice principal for research. Before joining King's he held research appointments at Nuffield College, Oxford, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and the Royal Institute of International Affairs. He is the author of several books of history, including Kennedy's Wars.

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Customer Reviews

The Uncertainty Principle
This book is a history of how the U.S. formulated and executed Middle Eastern Policy over a thirty year period from the Presidency of Jimmy Carter (1978-1982) through that of George W Bush (2000-2008). It also provides a useful, but concise summary of U.S - Middle East relations from the end of WWII to 1978. Essentially it provides an analysis not only of each presidential administration's Middle East Policy, but provides a description of how the policy formation process of each administration actually worked. Not surprisingly it was different for each president.

As the book makes clear, the U.S. has held two remarkably consistent strategic goals for this entire period: the security of the State of Israel; and the security of Middle Eastern oil production. Yet in a volatile region like the Middle East events well beyond U.S. control often erupt to disrupt the most carefully planned policy implementations. Freedman recounts for example how President Carter's tenure was defined by the Iranian Revolution and its subsequent hostage crises, even though Carter really wanted to be remembered for establishing peaceful and enduring relationship between the Israelis and Palestinians. Often the success or failure of U.S. policy in the region was a function of being able to cope with unexpected events or unintended consequences that suddenly threatened one or both of the strategic goals. Reading this book one is struck by how dicey even the best formulated policies are for this region.

Of course Freedman devotes a good deal of attention to the current administration and its involvement in Afghanistan (and Pakistan) and Iraq/Iran. He attempts to trace the thought processes that gradually coalesced into what was known as Operation Iraqi Freedom and its aftermath. In doing so he identifies the emergence of the doctrine of preventive war and concept of a Global War on Terror. He then tries to provide a balanced summary of U.S. operations in Iraq up to the current partially successful surge that has brought a measure of stability to that unhappy country.

In the end he suggests that the U.S. might be well advised to adopt a Middle East Policy similar to that suggested by Ken Pollock in his latest book, "A Path Out of the Desert", which the book reviewer of the UK Magazine, "The Economist" suggested should be read together with the Freedman book. Both by most standards are pretty good books.

Stumbling through history....
I've spent my adult life in the foreign affairs community and much of it in the middle-east, so have been directly involved in the events so eloquently presented in Mr. Freedman's excellent historical summary. I would divide the material presented in Choice of Enemies into two categories: One, the obvious historical presentation of facts and events that have so deeply effected not only the middle-east but the U.S. as well. Two, the more subtle but no-less profound exposure of ineptitude on the part of various U.S. presidents and their administrations (and other foreign leaders as well). It's the latter that I'd like to comment on.

Every 4-8 years we have elections in the United States to select a President, and every 4-8 years a new administration assumes power with its own agenda. The president is fully aware of the very limited time he/she has in office and is also acutely aware of how history treats success/failure. I find it intriguing that our nation's foreign policy and its immediate impact on the world and human lives can be so intertwined with the chief executives personality quirks and his administration's intellect (or lack thereof). I remember a line from All the Presidents Men when Deep Throat responds to Woodward's (Redford)rhetorical comment, "How can these guys do this" with the comment, "These guys (Nixon and company) aren't really all that bright." Example, a Baptist peanut farmer with near-fundamentalist views of right and wrong in power in 1979 during the Iranian revolution and hostage crisis. Completely incapable of viewing nuance in international relations or regional affairs, he often bases his initiatives on his own evaluations of other world leaders and his personal relationships with them. Fast forward to Bush the younger; a rehabilitated alcoholic and life-long slacker who assumes power at the outset of a shift in the global security paradigm with a dysfunctional foreign policy team at odds with one another from the outset. Colin Powell and the State Department were the only elements of government openly against the initiation of the war in Iraq, THE foreign policy establishment in the government yelling danger, danger. Completely ignoring the obvious historical issues, cultural elements in-country, and even the most basic elements of civil control...Iraq is invaded, the governing infrastructure is cast out in its entirety (we didn't even do that in Nazi Germany), and the Army and police are all fired. In sum, not only is the country defeated militarily, we have also removed its entire management and security force and put over a million working-aged men (most of whom are armed) into the streets with no means of economic support. The ignorance, no ...the stupidity of these actions reveal a critical flaw in our decision making process, controls on the use of force, and development and exercise of our foreign policy. In this case, by a group of well-placed amateurs led by an incompetent and disinterested president. The economic costs, the human losses on all sides, and the damage these actions have caused to the United States on a global scale are difficult to calculate and border on the criminal. On the other hand, Bush the elder was a superb professional who dealt with the region and its intrigue as a realist, always consulting and careful to draw in allies before acting and establishing clear goals/objectives before initiating action. And now - we have a new president - with yet another personal vision of the world and America's place in it, and it starts with an announcement to the world (and Taliban) that we'll be out of Afghanistan in 2011. Brilliant.

I found the book hard to put down as I raced through thirty years of American history in the middle-east, but repeatedly found myself questioning my country's wisdom and leadership as the steward of this massive military power we control but have so much difficulty in using wisely and effectively. Vietnam wasn't all that long ago, but we simply refuse to accept the historical lessons that have so often been taught and at such a high price. We continue to believe our vision is the only vision, and insist on imposing our system and values on a part of the world that simply doesn't play by those rules nor do they want to. Where's a realist when you need one!

well worth the effort
thoughtfull marvelously readable and timely written withut the angst and i saw it all tone of most of the current crop of personal reflections that masquarade as learned analyses provides important backgroumd context and history that helps to make some sense of the current state of affairs recommended to anyone who really wants to learn more