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986d140b-168a-4b7c-a330-7c2c3d71fbe40.0381570000000000TrueNewShipASINFeaturedBuyBoxMerchant10385528264OffersImagesVariationsVariationImagesItemAttributesSalesRankOfferFullTracksEditorialReviewReviewsListmaniaListsAccessories1-RankAll0385528264http://www.amazon.com/House-Cards-Hubris-Wretched-Excess/dp/0385528264%3FSubscriptionId%3D0310HZKZYGMCR6DD2HG2%26tag%3Djohnnyriches-20%26linkCode%3Dxm2%26camp%3D2025%26creative%3D165953%26creativeASIN%3D0385528264411http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/51W1qaZU0UL._SL125_.jpg7549http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/51W1qaZU0UL._SL125_.jpg160105http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/51W1qaZU0UL._SL125_.jpg500328http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/51W1qaZU0UL._SL125_.jpg3020http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/51W1qaZU0UL._SL125_.jpg7549http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/51W1qaZU0UL._SL125_.jpg7549http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/51W1qaZU0UL._SL125_.jpg11072http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/51W1qaZU0UL._SL125_.jpg160105http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/51W1qaZU0UL._SL125_.jpg500328William D. CohanHardcover332.6609739780385528269First EditionBook0385528264DoubledayEnglishOriginal LanguageEnglishUnknownEnglishPublished2795USD$27.95Doubleday1480130930170640Book2008-09-08ABIS_BOOK2009-03-10Doubleday2009-03-10DoubledayHouse of Cards: A Tale of Hubris and Wretched Excess on Wall Street1589USD$15.891699USD$16.993395USD$33.9547191011ATVPDKIKX0DERAmazon.comhttp://www.amazon.com/gp/help/seller/home.html?seller=ATVPDKIKX0DER0.00Newnew1QjCGOmBHGt8Mtd5u7%2Bq%2F3dZ0%2FSX1Md8jHXJd2BYCK0lSaj8RPdIzxDsS%2BmM6FrDiMnRElFKcwDdBYqwSJWFyg%3D%3D1845USD$18.45950USD$9.5034Usually ships in 24 hoursnow00-113.5571203855282643214A1CDLOTOKL9B14A1CDLOTOKL9B14T. TepeCalifornia2242009-03-21Very Vanity Fair in style, maybe half the storyI have been a banker for 20 years and have specific experience with asset backed securities so I think I am better prepared to read this book than most, but certainly not all, people. Cohan writes with great flair and a style best compared to celebrity profiles in Vanity Fair. He clearly had extraordinary access to former BSC execs, especially Paul Friedman and Jimmy Cayne. It seems like one of these two is speaking in verbatim quote most of the time. I learned a lot and thoroughly enjoyed reading the book. That said, I'm not comfortable with the book. It's half the story selected because the bits make for a dishy, dirt rich read. To me, Cohan was more concerned about writing a best-seller than he was about telling the whole story in some sort of reasonable context. I agree with the reviewer that said the book was rushed into print. The editing, especially in the second half is pretty bad. There are repeated references to antecedent events that must have ended up edited out, e.g. a reference to "the Tuesday 'Times' article" when there was no prior mention of any such article- stuff like that. There are many occasions where the events are conformed to the narrative and Cohan bounces around in time and sequence and new players come into the story seemingly out of nowhere. I also got the feeling Cohan wasn't a master of his subject matter at times and "blew through" an event or key concept. If I were in the audience and Cohan was presenting his book, my hand would have gone up and I would have said, "Wait a second, . . ." The first third of the book covers the last 10 days of the firm and spends a majority of its time talking about the repo market, without any explanation of how the market works or what its abundant jargon translates into English as. Without a Money & Banking text at their side, 98% of readers will be lost and left to focus only on personality clashes, amazingly foul language (even in the context of a trading floor) and petty intrigues. I think that is what Cohan wants. On the plus side, Cohan lets former BSC CEO Jimmy Cayne speak and speak and speak. Cohan doesn't need to hang Cayne, Cayne hangs himself. Cohan only quotes sources who blame the sub-prime debacle on lending to minorities and the poor. That contention has been thoroughly debunked with lots of hard data. Cohan ignores that and in doing so does a disservice to minorities, the poor and readers who want to understand what happened. The book is 30 or 40 hours of page turning reading pleasure. However, it is not the definitive historical text. Before you read the book spend 30 minutes on the net refreshing yourself on the repo market, its participants and mark to market accounting. 03855282645100A22RY8N8CNDF3AA22RY8N8CNDF3ALoyd E. EskildsonPragmatistPhoenix, AZ.1122009-03-10Well Told Story of Serious Financial Mismanagement"House of Cards" reports on the collapse of the investment banking house Bear Stearns (America's fifth-largest investment bank), and the beginning of the worst banking crisis since the Great Depression. Cohan's background as an investment banker allows him to cut through the complexity to explain what happened in simple, clear terms. Bear Stearns had survived every crisis of the 20th century, including the Great Depression - without a single losing quarter - until the end of 2007. In 1997, Bear Stearns had helped pioneer the subprime mortgage-backed security by serving as co-underwriter on a $385 million offering. By the mid-2000s, it was the market leader in this segment. The focus of the book is the last ten days of Bear Stearns, leading up to its absorption by J.P. Morgan at a fire-sale price ($10/share, down from $167; less than the value of its $1.5 billion office building), greased by $30 billion in Federal Reserve funds. (The Fed was worried that a bankruptcy of Bear Stearns could wreak fiscal havoc around the world.) Just a year earlier it had been identified as "America's most admired securities firm" by Fortune magazine; in 2006 its Asset Management fees had reached $335 million. Bonuses were in the 8-figure range. Unfortunately, it was also the most heavily invested in mortgage-backed securities. Bear Stearns, like its competitors, financed itself with oversight sources (the cheapest source). However, when analysts began questioning Bear's viability, given its shaky mix of assets, continued financing for Bear dried up, and it toppled. Amazingly, its chairman was too buy playing bridge and golf to get involved until too late; earlier he had forced out the only many who understood what was going on. The firm even turned down a last-minute offer from a Saudi Arabian for substantial financing ("not needed"). Its leadership then blamed the media and short-sellers for Bear's demise. True, Bear's fall was quite rapid. However, there had been warning signs - problems at smaller firms with similar asset structures, rising risk premiums for its mortgage bond holdings ($50,000 for $10 million during the first half of 2007, rising to $350,000 on 3/5/08), its first quarterly loss at the end of 2008, and the downgrading of some of its bond holdings. Worse yet, Cohan also alluded to failing to conserve cash by reducing dividends and ceasing stock buybacks, as well as increasing leverage - unfortunately, it is not clear whether he was referring to Lehman, Bear, or both. The bad news - the 468 pages, complete with endless interviews and accounts of bridge games, is a bit much. The even worse news - Bear Stearns' and others playing for billions has left American taxpayers with a debt of trillions. And we still haven't heard "the rest of the story."0385528264549A2IPC51HL9UUYFA2IPC51HL9UUYFAmy Y.Tell me, what is it you plan to do with your one wild and precious life?-- Mary OliverFREMONT, CA USA572009-03-11Way juicier but sort of like watching dominoes fallCohan details the bursting of the bubble in a book that reads like part gossip columnist, part financial thriller. Talk about making your average Jane feel smart, Cohan makes the big names of Wall Street look like a bunch of rats scurrying about thinking they have won the cheese when really they are about to get the big, gut-popping smack-down. I enjoyed this read because, aside from being mildly fascinated by economics, it does seem to answer the question that most American are now asking as they look at their 401Ks, retirement plan statements, and now-empty stock portfolios: "What the hell were they thinking?" Calling it a 'House of Cards' is quite apt as Cohan shows us how multi-million, er, make it billion, dollar empires were built on quicksand: stuff backed by things backed by more stuff, sorta. This is some seriously fascinating stuff- many of the chapters read like a financial drama cum thriller. Cohan puts the reader in the middle of the action: the "Wehrmacht" SWAT team of Bank of America 'parachuting into the downtown offices of Sullivan & Cromwell' to review Lehman's books, an edge-of-your-seat account of the weekend that the Fed, specifically, Geithner and Paulson- try to anticipate the consequences of the scenarios (which includes some pretty candid quotes right from the source), you can almost hear the jaws drop as Wall Street is informed there will have to be a "private sector solution" i.e. no bailout for Lehman Bros., the scramble to broker a deal with Barclays to take on the bulk of Lehman, the refusal of the FSA(the UK's version of the SEC who needed to okay the deal) to accept the deal, the back-room conversations exuding palpable fear as CEOs from some of the largest firms considered who might be the next to fall, the thirteenth hour desperation of Lehman execs trying to make a case for a federal bailout, and finally the reality of bankruptcy and no calvary riding in... and, of course, Lehman's was sold to Barclays under the supervision of the bankruptcy court. While Cohan's book is both entertaining and enlightening, the real value I see here is he does a pretty good job of shoowing us how we got here... why this bubble was different from the others. It's all well and good to say that hindsight is 20/20 but ultimately we're all living with the consequences of the decisions made by a very elite few. I got through this in one day- the writing is excellent. Very straightforward with the facts without waving around the blame stick too much- it's there in the title, though. Definately, if you are going to read even one book about how we arrived at this financial crisis- this would be a great choice.0385528264236A2FP3VT0KZGUA8A2FP3VT0KZGUA8B. Jacobsenwhsy82Seattle, WA USA442009-03-14A couple drafts away, perhaps solely for Wall Street insidersAfter having much enjoyed books like Liar's Poker and Barbarians at the Gate, I had high hopes for this book, and was much disappointed. It seems like a very good book is lurking within. I had a summer job on a trading desk and have an MBA, so I have some sense of how the relevant parts of a firm like Bear function. I did not learn more and I think any one with less background would learn less. To list some things that I think I (and others) might want to know: 1. If Bear Stearns has $17 billion in cash (liquid assets), why is it borrowing about $30 billion every *day*? From whom? Why? What does a firm like Bear do with $30 (or 20 or 40) billion of cash? The author reports how firms like Bear and Goldman do this, but never explains why. He lists the names of firms that supply said cash, but just explains that some banks have deposits (e.g. a B of A type firm) but others like Bear doesn't. Even this explanation doesn't hold much water -- why are Citi and B of A in such trouble then? 2. There is no back story about Bear. It was known as a bare knuckles firm. It's such a contrast to Liar's Poker and Barbarians. I'd argue that it's pretty hard to understand what happened at Bear, etc., if you don't have some sense of what traders do and what a trading desk like. He just tosses in parenthetical conversations with "hey, how are we doing" or "I know things are bad when traders start lying to me", but it would be like trying to understand Mick Jagger without understanding what it's like to be a Rolling Stone. (I'm not saying traders are rock stars, but to cite another example, consider Bonfire of the Vanities -- they do live a different reality than most of us, when they may gamble $500 million or the like, or take home $25 million in salary one year). 3. There are interesting characters floating about who seem to merit no examination. He off-and-on again cites one portfolio manager with a multi-billion portfolio who works out of a "strip mall". Really? Why? In contrast, Bear has a lavish new headquarters. Yes, the strip-mall guy comes from Drexel (a failed firm) but so did some Bear folks, of course. In contrast, the woman who blew the whistle on Citi is having lunch at Nobu after getting her hair done at salon which I assume is an elite one. Do folks know how elite of a restaurant that is? Similarly, he has Cramer of Mad Money touting Bear as something to hold onto as it tanks. It seems either of these characters would have made good stories, but like so much, it feels like details are thrown out about them simply to supply details, not with any sense of providing true foils to other players. Jonathan Stewart obviously got a bit more thoughtful about Mad Money. Folks like Lewis wrote far superior books. You got a sense of how these firms work; how the personalities of the characters merge with the identities of the firms; how the prior successes of these individuals and firms lead to the types of mistakes they make. You also learn about what a trader does or what a private equity firm does. If you know what these firms do and what Nobu is, etc., then this book provides more details about individuals. If not, I don't think you learn much. It's too bad; the information is all there, and Bear continues to be relevant. 0385528264219A2S58S6FFEK7NOA2S58S6FFEK7NOVivian BergerNew York, NY222009-03-21Insider BaseballI am a lawyer but not very knowledgeable about securities or finance. This book did not enlighten me more than the newspapers about the fundamental reasons for Bear Stearns' breakdown. With respect to the surface events, however -- the "time line" -- the author provides mind-numbing detail. The book could have been half as long (and a much better read) had it been well edited. Time and time again, one reads the same anecdotes, often in almost the same words. It's one thing to provide multiple perspectives on the same events, quite another to have people with the same points of view quoted saying virtually the same things over and over. The 250 pages that could have been released by tight editing would have afforded an ample forum for explaining how things worked in this high-flying world for those, like myself, who were not a part of it. This book is an opportunity missed. I was very disappointed by it. Product DescriptionOn March 5, 2008, at 10:15 A.M., a hedge fund manager in Florida wrote a post on his investing advice Web site that included a startling statement about Bear Stearns & Co., the nation’s fifth-largest investment bank: “In my book, they are insolvent.” This seemed a bold and risky statement. Bear Stearns was about to announce profits of $115 million for the first quarter of 2008, had $17.3 billion in cash on hand, and, as the company incessantly boasted, had been a colossally profitable enterprise in the eighty-five years since its founding. Ten days later, Bear Stearns no longer existed, and the calamitous financial meltdown of 2008 had begun. How this happened – and why – is the subject of William D. Cohan’s superb and shocking narrative that chronicles the fall of Bear Stearns and the end of the Second Gilded Age on Wall Street. Bear Stearns serves as the Rosetta Stone to explain how a combination of risky bets, corporate political infighting, lax government regulations and truly bad decision-making wrought havoc on the world financial system. Cohan’s minute-by-minute account of those ten days in March makes for breathless reading, as the bankers at Bear Stearns struggled to contain the cascading series of events that would doom the firm, and as Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, New York Federal Reserve Bank President Tim Geithner, and Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke began to realize the dire consequences for the world economy should the company go bankrupt. But HOUSE OF CARDS does more than recount the incredible panic of the first stages of the financial meltdown. William D. Cohan beautifully demonstrates why the seemingly invincible Wall Street money machine came crashing down. He chronicles the swashbuckling corporate culture of Bear Stearns, the strangely crucial role competitive bridge played in the company’s fortunes, the brutal internecine battles for power, and the deadly combination of greed and inattention that helps to explain why the company’s leaders ignored the danger lurking in Bear’s huge positions in mortgage-backed securities. The author deftly portrays larger-than-life personalities like Ace Greenberg, Bear Stearns’ miserly, take-no-prisoners chairman whose memos about re-using paper clips were legendary throughout Wall Street; his profane, colorful rival and eventual heir Jimmy Cayne, whose world-champion-level bridge skills were a lever in his corporate rise and became a symbol of the reasons for the firm’s demise; and Jamie Dimon, the blunt-talking CEO of JPMorgan Chase, who won the astonishing endgame of the saga (the Bear Stearns headquarters alone were worth more than JP Morgan paid for the whole company). Cohan’s explanation of seemingly arcane subjects like credit default swaps and fixed- income securities is masterful and crystal clear, but it is the high-end dish and powerful narrative drive that makes HOUSE OF CARDS an irresistible read on a par with classics such as LIAR’S POKER and BARBARIANS AT THE GATE. Written with the novelistic verve and insider knowledge that made THE LAST TYCOONS a bestseller and a prize-winner, HOUSE OF CARDS is a chilling cautionary tale about greed, arrogance, and stupidity in the financial world, and the consequences for all of us.0Review"Engrossing....[Cohan] gives us in these pages a chilling, almost minute-by-minute account of the 10, vertigo-inducing days that one year ago revealed Bear Stearns to be a flimsy house of cards in a perfect storm....He does a deft job of explicating the underlying reasons that put Bear Stearns in peril in the first place....turns complex Wall Street maneuverings into high drama that is gripping — and almost immediately comprehensible — to the lay reader....riveting, edge-of-the-seat reading" --Michiko Kakutani, The New York Times "Cohan vividly documents the mix of arrogance, greed, recklessness, and pettiness that took down the 86 year old brokerage house and then the entire economy. It's a page-turner in the tradition of the 1990 Barbarians at the Gate by Bryan Burrough and John Heylar, offering both a seemingly comprehensive understanding of the business and wide access to insiders....hard to put down, especially thanks to its dishy, often profane, quotes from insiders" --BusinessWeek "Masterfully reported....[Cohan] has turned into one of our most able financial journalists....he deploys not only his hands-on experience of this exotic corner of the financial industry but also a remarkable gift for plain-spoken explanation...the other great strength of this important book is the breadth and skill of the author's interviews...Cohan does a brilliant job of sketching in the eccentric, vulgar, greedy, profane and coarse individuals who ignored all these warnings to their own profit and the ruin of so many others. It's impossible to do justice to his reportorial detail in a brief review..." -- Los Angeles Times "A riveting blow-by-blow account of the days leading up to the government-backed shotgun wedding (to JPM)." -- The Economist "A masterly reconstruction of Bear Stearns implosion--a tumultuous episode in Wall Street history that still reverberates throughout our economy today....meticulous reporting.....first drafts of history don't get much better than this" --Bloomberg0Product DescriptionOn March 5, 2008, at 10:15 A.M., a hedge fund manager in Florida wrote a post on his investing advice Web site that included a startling statement about Bear Stearns & Co., the nation’s fifth-largest investment bank: “In my book, they are insolvent.” This seemed a bold and risky statement. Bear Stearns was about to announce profits of $115 million for the first quarter of 2008, had $17.3 billion in cash on hand, and, as the company incessantly boasted, had been a colossally profitable enterprise in the eighty-five years since its founding. Ten days later, Bear Stearns no longer existed, and the calamitous financial meltdown of 2008 had begun. How this happened – and why – is the subject of William D. Cohan’s superb and shocking narrative that chronicles the fall of Bear Stearns and the end of the Second Gilded Age on Wall Street. Bear Stearns serves as the Rosetta Stone to explain how a combination of risky bets, corporate political infighting, lax government regulations and truly bad decision-making wrought havoc on the world financial system. Cohan’s minute-by-minute account of those ten days in March makes for breathless reading, as the bankers at Bear Stearns struggled to contain the cascading series of events that would doom the firm, and as Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, New York Federal Reserve Bank President Tim Geithner, and Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke began to realize the dire consequences for the world economy should the company go bankrupt. But HOUSE OF CARDS does more than recount the incredible panic of the first stages of the financial meltdown. William D. Cohan beautifully demonstrates why the seemingly invincible Wall Street money machine came crashing down. He chronicles the swashbuckling corporate culture of Bear Stearns, the strangely crucial role competitive bridge played in the company’s fortunes, the brutal internecine battles for power, and the deadly combination of greed and inattention that helps to explain why the company’s leaders ignored the danger lurking in Bear’s huge positions in mortgage-backed securities. The author deftly portrays larger-than-life personalities like Ace Greenberg, Bear Stearns’ miserly, take-no-prisoners chairman whose memos about re-using paper clips were legendary throughout Wall Street; his profane, colorful rival and eventual heir Jimmy Cayne, whose world-champion-level bridge skills were a lever in his corporate rise and became a symbol of the reasons for the firm’s demise; and Jamie Dimon, the blunt-talking CEO of JPMorgan Chase, who won the astonishing endgame of the saga (the Bear Stearns headquarters alone were worth more than JP Morgan paid for the whole company). Cohan’s explanation of seemingly arcane subjects like credit default swaps and fixed- income securities is masterful and crystal clear, but it is the high-end dish and powerful narrative drive that makes HOUSE OF CARDS an irresistible read on a par with classics such as LIAR’S POKER and BARBARIANS AT THE GATE. Written with the novelistic verve and insider knowledge that made THE LAST TYCOONS a bestseller and a prize-winner, HOUSE OF CARDS is a chilling cautionary tale about greed, arrogance, and stupidity in the financial world, and the consequences for all of us.0About the AuthorWILLIAM D. COHAN, a former senior Wall Street investment banker, is the bestselling author of The Last Tycoons and the winner of the 2007 FT/Goldman Sachs Business Book of the Year Award. He writes for The Financial Times, Fortune, the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Daily Beast, and appears frequently on CNBC.0Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.The first murmurings of impending doom for the financial world originated 2,500 miles from Wall Street in an unassuming office suite just north of Orlando, Florida. There, hard by the train tracks, Bennet Sedacca announced to the world at 10:15 on the morning of March 5, 2008, that venerable Bear Stearns & Co., the nation’s fifth--largest investment bank, was in trouble, big trouble. “Yep,” Sedacca wrote on the Minyanville Web site, which is dedicated to helping investors comprehend the financial world. “The great credit unwind is upon us. Credit default swaps on all brokers, particularly Lehman and Bear Stearns, are blowing out, big time.” Sedacca, the forty--eight--year--old president of Atlantic Advisors, a $3.5 billion investment management company and hedge fund, had been watching his Bloomberg screens on a daily basis as the cost of insuring the short--term obligations–known in Wall Street argot as “credit default swaps”–of both Lehman and Bear Stearns had increased steadily since the summer of 2007 and then more rapidly in February 2008. Now he was calling the end of the credit party that had been raging on Wall Street for six years. “I’ve been talking about it for years,” Sedacca said later. “But I started to notice it that fall. Because if you think about it, if you have all this nuclear waste on your balance sheet, what are you supposed to do? You’re supposed to cut your dividends, you’re supposed to raise equity, and you’re supposed to shrink your balance sheet. And they did just the opposite. They took on more leverage. Lehman went from twenty--five to thirty--five times leveraged in one year. And then they announce a big stock buyback at $65 a share and they sell stock at $38 a share. I mean, they don’t know what they’re doing. And yet they get rewarded for doing that. It makes me sick.” Sedacca had witnessed firsthand a few blowups in his day. He worked at the investment bank Drexel Burnham Lambert–the former home of junk--bond king Michael Milken–when it was liquidated in 1990 and lost virtually overnight the stock he had in the firm as it plunged from $110 per share to zero (Drexel was a private company but the stock had been valued for internal purposes). “It was enough that it stunned,” he explained. “It was more than a twenty--nine--year--old would want to lose.” Many of his Drexel colleagues had taken out loans from Citibank to buy the Drexel stock and were left with their bank loans and worthless stock. “I know people with millions and millions of dollars of debt and the stock was at zero,” he said. They either paid off the loans or declared personal bankruptcy. “That’s what happens when everyone turns off your funding,” he added. He then moved on to Kidder Peabody and watched that 130--year--old firm disintegrate, too. As a result of these experiences and those at other Wall Street firms, he had developed a healthy skepticism of both debt and the ways of Wall Street. Starting in the summer of 2007, he began to feel certain that the mountain of debt building across many sectors of the American economy would not come to a good end. He started betting against credit. “I’ve watched enough screens long enough to know something was wrong,” he said. The problem at Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, Sedacca informed his clients and Minyanville readers, was that both firms had huge inventories on their balance sheets of securities backed by home mortgages. The rate of default on these mortgages, while still small, was growing at the same time that the value of the underlying collateral for the mortgage–people’s homes–was falling rapidly. Sedacca could not help noticing that the effects of this double whammy were beginning to show up in other, smaller companies involved in the mortgage industry. He could watch the noose tighten in the credit markets. “Look at what is happening to Thornburg Mortgage,” he wrote, referring to the publicly traded home mortgage lender, which specialized in making what were known as “Alt--A” mortgages, those greater than $417,000, to wealthy borrowers. Thornburg had been “overwhelmed” by margin calls from its lenders. “It supposedly only has a 0.44% default rate on its [$24.7 billion] mortgage portfolio that it services but the bonds it owns are getting pounded. Result? Margin call. The worst part is that the company went to sell some bonds to settle the margin calls but couldn’t. The ultimate Roach Motel.” That Thornburg, based in Sante Fe, New Mexico, appeared to be hitting the wall was somewhat surprising considering its customers’ low default rate and high credit quality. The problem at Thornburg was not that its customers could no longer pay the interest and principal on their mortgages; the problem was that the company could no longer fund its business on a day--to--day basis. Thornburg had a liquidity problem because its lenders no longer liked the collateral–those jumbo mortgages–Thornburg used to obtain financing. Unlike a bank, which is able to use the cash from its depositors to fund most of its operations, financial institutions such as Thornburg as well as pure investment banks such as Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns had no depositors’ money to use. Instead they funded their operations in a few ways: either by occasionally issuing long--term securities, such as debt or preferred stock, or most often by obtaining short--term, often overnight, borrowings in the unsecured commercial paper market or in the overnight “repo” market, where the borrowings are secured by the various securities and other assets on their balance sheets. These fairly routine borrowings have been repeated day after day for some thirty years and worked splendidly–until there was perceived to be a problem with either the securities or the institutions backing them up, and then the funding evaporated like rain in the Sahara. The dirty little secret of what used to be known as Wall Street securities firms–Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns–was that every one of them funded their business in this way to varying degress, and every one of them was always just twenty--four hours away from a funding crisis. The key to day--to--day survival was the skill with which Wall Street executives managed their firms’ ongoing reputation in the marketplace. Thornburg financed its operations very similarly to the way investment banks did. But in mid--February 2008, Thornburg was having a very difficult time managing its perception in the marketplace because its short--term borrowings were backed by the mortgages it held on its balance sheet. Some of these mortgages were prime mortgages, money lent to the lowest--risk borrowers, and some were those Alt--A mortgages, which were marginally riskier than prime mortgages and offered investors higher yields. At Thornburg, 99.56 percent of these mortgages were performing just fine. But that did not matter. What mattered was that the perception of these mortgage--related assets in the market was deteriorating rapidly. That perception spelled potential doom for firms such as Thornburg, Bear Stearns, and Lehman Brothers, which financed their businesses in the overnight repo market using mortgage--related assets as collateral. For Thornburg the trouble began on February 14, halfway around the world, when UBS, the largest Swiss bank, reported a fourth--quarter 2007 loss of $11.3 billion after writing off $13.7 billion of investments in U.S. mortgages. Amid this huge write--off, UBS said it had lost $2 billion on Alt--A mortgages and, worse, that it had an additional exposure of $26.6 billion to them. In a letter to shareholders before he lost his job on April 1, Marcel Ospel, UBS’s longtime chairman, wrote that the year 2007 had been “one of the most difficult in our history” because of “the sudden and serious deterioration in the U.S. housing market.” UBS’s sneeze meant that Thornburg, among others, caught a major cold. By writing down the value of its Alt--A mortgages, UBS forced other players in the market to begin to revalue the Alt--A mortgages on their books. Since these were the very assets that Thornburg (and Bear Stearns) used as collateral for its short--term borrowings, soon after February 14 the company’s creditors made margin calls “in excess of $300 million” on its short--term borrowings. At first, Thornburg used what cash it had to meet the margin calls. But that did not stop the worries of its creditors. “After meeting all of its margin calls as of February 27, 2008, Thornburg Mortgage saw further continued deterioration in the market prices of its high quality, primarily AAA--rated mortgage securities,” the company wrote in a March 3 filing with the SEC. This new deterioration of the value of its prime mortgages resulted in new margin calls of $270 million–among them $49 million from Morgan Stanley, $28 million from JPMorgan on February 28, and $54 million from Goldman Sachs. This time, though, Thornburg was “left with limited available liquidity” to meet the new margin calls or any future margin calls. From December 31, 2007, to March 3, 2008, Thornburg received margin calls totaling $1.777 billion and was able to satisfy only $1.167 billion of them, or about 65 percent–a dismal performance. The balance of $610 million “significantly exceeded its available liquidity,” the company announced on March 7. “These events have raised substantial doubt about the Company’s ability to continue as a going concern without significant restructuring and the addition of new capital.” The company’s stock, which had traded for more than $28 per share in May 2007, closed at $4.32 on March 3, 2008, down 51 percent ...0From <a href="/gp/feature.html/?docId=1000027671">AudioFile</a>CNBC financial reporter Cohan's account of the sudden collapse of the Wall Street firm Bear Stearns last March is largely interview based. This fine production is undoubtedly only the first of many books on the current market crisis, and Alan Sklar is the perfect narrator for conveying the tough vernacularism of these (almost-entirely) male voices. The cast is large, hard to keep track of, and through the book's long first part--a "minute-by-minute" reconstruction of the collapse--each voice recounts a variation on the same basic epiphany: "We're finished." The voices merge into one, and what comes across most distinctly is Sklar's rendition of the Wall Street personality: brusque, cynical, assured to the point of arrogance--the voice of hubris. D.A.W. © AudioFile 2009, Portland, Maine0R2JE4N95UK2HQ2Books on the global economic crisis of 2008RLYQDDR13K8J4Explaining the subprime mortgage crisisR1TOY2YJQD5DJA2008-2009 Financial CrisisR2HQKZUTZXW40Y"The Magnificent Seven in the Current Global Financial Crisis"R2OATRTBNEGCT9Novels that Capture Real-Life... The Good and the Bad!R3KHKFNIZPG15TGreat Book Buys!R3JMZKE1QVAH05C.R.I.H. Club (The Garden Leave Period)R2QO7WCQ3HGK8CBooks to read before you dieR2RSAYO8NAV6UFClassicsR2VQHN3RWI1XQHIt's Summertime and the Reading Is Easy!

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