Product Description

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #184462 in Books
• Published on: 2008-02-05
• Released on: 2008-02-05
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 320 pages

From Publishers Weekly
Never mind the dramatic title and jacket: readers expecting fireworks from the former head of the Israeli secret service will be disappointed. Written with the dispassion of an intelligence report, Halevy's memoir turns out to be a 20-year political history that includes much secret maneuvering but little skullduggery. Born in London in 1934, Halevy joined the Mossad in 1961 and quickly moved up to become a deputy division chief. His book opens in 1988-89, when the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the invasion of Kuwait suddenly changed the terms of Mideastern politics. The U.S. increased pressure on Israel to settle its Palestinian problem, and the first intifada heated up. Diplomatic progress was glacial; most of it involved careful political negotiations, dully detailed. The text perks up when Halevy becomes head of Mossad in 1998 and al-Qaeda enters the world stage by blowing up two U.S. embassies in Africa. Halevy delivers insightful and often acerbic portraits of world leaders and shows a surprising sympathy toward the Arab point of view. He also describes several operational fiascoes that made the news, but he writes as a loyal Israeli bureaucrat, so secrets stay put. (Apr. 18)
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Review

“By filtering events through the unfamiliar lens of the spymaster, Mr. Halevy gives a fresh twist to the story...”—The Economist

“Spotlights the most pressing and controversial areas where foreign and defense policy making, intelligence gathering, and political ambitions collide….”—The New York Sun

“At a time when we face unprecedented demands on intelligence, Halevy’s insights…should be required reading.”
—Dennis Ross, former American envoy to the Middle East

About the Author

Efraim Halevy, the Mossad’s director from 1998-2002 and Israel’s ambassador to the E.U. from 1996-1998, is now the Head of the Center for Strategic and Policy Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Customer Reviews

A disappointment
I bought (or got) this book 'cause I've always liked spy stories (I'm a John LeCarre man myself)and I had some expectations of a "show and tell" book by a former head of the Mossad. I also had some respect, as a citizen consumer of the news, of this official who had,somehow, something more European and dignified than the "average" Israeli macho security hero. Halevy was also Israel's ambassador to Jordan and very instrumental in brokering the peace agreement with Jordan.

I found the book rather tiresome with a great deal of muted self-glorification and almost no revelations or juicy bits. Halevy comes across as a very loyal and careful technocrat with clear views (which I don't subscribe to) about the "War on Terror" being the central stuggle of our times.

An interesting book
This book consists of some interesting recollections from Efraim Halevy, who served as the director of Israel's Mossad.

We readers see how the First Gulf War, in 1991, Israel fared poorly. Yes, the United States helped defend Israel from Iraqi missile attacks. However, Halevy makes the point that most knowledgeable Israelis "did not believe that the United States was doing its best to apprehend the missile launchers" and for that reason, many Israelis are very suspicious of how much help the United States will ever give Israel should its survival be at stake.

Israel did indeed agree not to join in the attack on Iraq, which may have saved the coalition against Iraq but the author shows that this did Israel very little good. While Iraq, a serious enemy of Israel, was indeed weakened, Israel quickly came under severe pressure from its friends to appease its remaining enemies.

Israel has always needed peace, and this has made it susceptible to bogus offers of peace. Halevy explains how this affected negotiations that involved covert channels. As he says, rather than being a way to discuss issues regarding Israel's future, keeping Israel's interests in mind, the covert talks "evolved into a strategy designed to enable the devoted negotiators to engage in dreams of peace rather than to confront the true facts of life and to grapple with them."

There is a long and interesting section on how Israel and Jordan managed to sign a peace treaty. And we also see what Halevy thinks of several famous people of the region. One is the notorious Yassir Arafat, who Halevy mentions was a "compulsive liar" who "would never honor a commitment and rarely would have anything but contempt for his peers." I remember being flabbergasted by the fact that rather than arresting, trying, and executing this thug, leaders of Western nations often showed esteem for him. But Halevy says that Arafat did pay a political price in 2000 and 2001 for refusing to make a deal at Camp David and then for lying about the Karin A arms smuggling to the president of the United States. Once again, I'm shocked that it took all this to discredit such a horrible person.

We also see Halevy's puzzlement at Israel's acceptance, even under pressure, of the infamous "road map" proposed by the quartet of the United States, Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations. This document "was deemed a nonstarter and a real danger to Israel's interests for a variety of reasons." And these reasons included allowing the quartet to determine if the Arabs had fulfilled their obligations on issues such as ending terror. That would pretty much let the Arabs do what they pleased.

In this book Halevy often makes the point that one ought to honor one's word and build up one's credibility. I agree. And I think that means needing to resist pressure to make agreements that one can not or will not fulfill.

I enjoyed reading this book and I recommend it.

"My War Against Shimon Peres"
Efraim Halevy could as well had added the following subtitle to his book: "My War Against Shimon Peres". The leitmotif of the first part of the book is the constant popping up of Shimon Peres's name in every possible circumstance where Shimon obstructs, deceives and schemes against literally everybody to assuage his thirst for glory. There is little doubt that Shimon richly deserved the overt animosity coming from Efraim Halevy. One can only sympathize and empathize with Halevy since the object of his dislike continues to scheme to this day.

It is by no means easy to write a book on intelligence, especially so soon after leaving office. Everything you write may be used against your country. Therefore Halevy writes about people who are out of office or dead (the exception being Peres) , his contribution to the Israeli - Jordanian Peace Treaty and about general principles that are applicable at any time and therefore do not divulge anything of immediate value. His portraits of Israeli prime ministers are interesting in that he rehabilitates Shamir, is complimentary of Netanyahu, Rabin and Sharon, much less so of Barak and the premiership of his nemesis Peres does not even register. The ultimate snub.

Halevy's observations about the work in intelligence are logical : "On issues of life and death the intelligence officer must always err on the side of the threat and not on the side of the optimist".

To me the most significant part of the book are the last two chapters in which Halevy talks of WWIII, i.e. the war against Islamic terror. This is the part in which his weight as the ex head of the Mossad may have some impact on the `powers that be' of today. He correctly defines it as Islamic terror and not `war on terror' and warns that the West does not cooperate enough to confront the common threat. He is fully aware of the dangers of Al Qaeda and the way things may eventually turn: " Government and their senior executive officials will take action, the like of which has rarely ever been dreamed in the past." Halevy should be given credit for being one of the rare ex government officials who does not obfuscate in naming the enemy.

But two aspects of his recommendations are questionable. The first is to squeeze in anti- terror legislation as soon as possible while the country is recovering from a major terror attack. Would it not be more reasonable to be entirely frank with the population, stop avoiding the truth and minimizing the threat, and educate the population so that it can support anti- terror measures in full clarity of what is being done?

The second is his differentiation between Al Qaeda on the one hand and Hamas and Hezbolah on other. Hamas is, according to Halevy, different because "Hamas is not solely a terrorist group. It has political and social interest" "`In their own way, they aspire to be part of the system and not as Al Qaeda aspires, to destroy it ".

Yes, but part of what system does Hamas want to be a part of? Exactly the same one Al Qaeda is fighting for! Allegiance to Islam tops any local self interest. Efraim Halevy and the intelligence community in Israel should be well advised to read up on Islam in the works of Ibn Warraq, Bat Ye'or, Serge Trifkovic , Robert Spencer and Daniel Pipes.