Product Description

Hopes for a new peaceful international order after the end of the Cold War have been dashed by sobering realities: Great powers are once again competing for honor and influence. Nation-states remain as strong as ever, as do the old, explosive forces of ambitious nationalism. The world remains “unipolar,” but international competition among the United States, Russia, China, Europe, Japan, India, and Iran raise new threats of regional conflict. Communism is dead, but a new contest between western liberalism and the great eastern autocracies of Russia and China has reinjected ideology into geopolitics. Finally, radical Islamists are waging a violent struggle against the modern secular cultures and powers that, in their view, have dominated, penetrated, and polluted their Islamic world. The grand expectation that after the Cold War the world would enter an era of international geopolitical convergence has proven wrong.

For the past few years, the liberal world has been internally divided and distracted by issues both profound and petty. Now, in The Return of History and the End of Dreams, Robert Kagan masterfully poses the most important questions facing the liberal democratic countries, challenging them to choose whether they want to shape history or let others shape it for them.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #1145 in Books
• Published on: 2008-04-29
• Released on: 2008-04-29
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Hardcover
• 128 pages

Review
Advance Praise for The Return of History and the End of Dreams


“In this important, timely, and superbly-written book, Robert Kagan shows that the ‘end of history’ was an illusion. Today’s global challenges pose a stern test for the world’s democracies. This book is a wake-up call and should be read by policymakers, politicians, pundits and all who want a guide to the dangerous waters of 21st century geopolitics.”
—Senator John McCain

“Robert Kagan has once again written a provocative, thoughtful, and vitally important book that will reshape the way we think about the world, the special purpose that America must play in it, and the principles that must guide us. The Return of History and the End of Dreams is a must-read for anyone interested in the future of American foreign policy–and a reminder of why Robert Kagan is one of our nation’s most indispensable strategists.”
—Senator Joseph Lieberman

“An eloquent, powerful, disturbing, but ultimately hopeful view of the emerging balance of power in the world–and America’s proper role in it. Kagan’s views will be an essential part of the debate that will shape our next president’s foreign policy.”
—Richard Holbrooke, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations

“Robert Kagan gives us a picture of the world today in all its complexity and its simplicity. This is a world where America is dominant but cannot dominate, where the struggle for power and prestige goes on as it always has. Power is at the service of ideas, but the key ideas are also ideas about power: democracy and autocracy. All this in a hundred pages, with style, energy and panache.”
—Robert Cooper, Director-General for External and Politico-Military Affairs at the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union

From the Publisher
Narrator Information: Holter Graham has recorded numerous audiobooks, and is a stage, television, and screen actor. Some film credits include Fly Away Home, Maximum Overdrive, and Hairspray, and on TV he has appeared on Law and Order and New York Undercover.

About the Author

Robert Kagan is senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, and a columnist for The Washington Post. He is also the author of A Twilight Struggle: American Power and Nicaragua, 1977–1990, and editor, with William Kristol, of Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy. Kagan served in the State Department from 1984 to 1988. He lives in Brussels with his family.

Customer Reviews

A great study
The author, Robert Kagan, is a brilliant writer, historian and political scientist, much too bright to be a part of the Dick Cheney staff, yet he conceals those prejudices in his writing. He has become one of my favorite authors, and this book is a wonderful study of the history of America's expansionist foreigh policy.

A blowhard with an extremely dishonest pal
One of Kaplan's pals is Parag Khanna, who has written a book titled The Second World, which is an astonishing display of intellectual dishonesty and disregard for facts.

Robert Kaplan describes this book as "a savvy, streetwise primer on dozens of individual countries that adds up to a coherent theory of global politics." Having been generously praised in book reviews in the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Financial Times, among other publications, I ordered the book with great interest. And as I began to read this book, I was at first shocked, and then increasingly appalled, at a systematic pattern of serious errors of fact, ludicrous assertions that jarred with reality, fundamental misunderstandings of basic economics or history, cheap clichés, and recorded conversations which struck me as obviously fabricated. Every chapter is riddled with astonishing flaws, but here I will simply address those dealing with the Balkans and the former Soviet Union.

Khanna's basic thesis is three-fold. He states the United States, the European Union, and China are the three dominant geo-political powers in the world today. He proceeds to argue that there is a "second world" of countries, belonging neither to the developed "first world" nor to the chronically underdeveloped "third world." And, Khanna writes, the big three global powers compete against one another for geo-political and economic advantage in this "second world," even as they themselves form regional alliances and seek to play the superpowers against one another.

None of these seem to be terribly original ideas. In his preface, Khanna states a wish to follow in the footsteps of English historian Toynbee, who in his retirement took a world tour. And in the second paragraph there is a foreboding of the tone of the book: Khanna states that a "leatherbound first edition of Toynbee's narrative" was his companion on his own world tour. Throughout, Khanna shows a predisposition for smarmy arrogance and condescension. And yet the book is shockingly empty of real insights, even as it boasts an index stretching to twenty-four pages, and an acknowledgment thanking some five hundred people. The impression is that Khanna wants you to know how many important people he knows and how many factoids he can fit into a 500 page book.

Some of the various, and numerous, factual errors that riddle the book are relatively trivial, but suggest serious sloppiness and disregard for getting facts right. For example, Yugoslavia was not part of Warsaw pact, as Khanna states. Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov was appointed to office in 1992 by Boris Yeltsin, and not by Vladimir Putin. Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia and Albania are not all smaller by population than Manhattan, and the death toll from the civil wars in former Yugoslavia was not greater than half a million. Other obviously wrong assertions seem to be made up simply to provide lurid background color to Khanna's travelogue: the former KGB headquarters in Moscow has not been turned into "a high-class disco," expensive Moscow malls do not charge entrance fees, and police road checkpoints in Uzbekistan do not stop and check all vehicles. And other gross misstatements of fact display a simple complete lack of understanding the history and culture of the countries of which he writes: the (Orthodox) Uspenky cave monastery in Crimea is not representative of Ukraine's "proud Catholic heritage," Zoran Djindjic was not the first democratically elected leader since World War II in former Yugoslavia , and in the 1980s Yugoslav republics like Bosnia and Macedonia were not richer than Spain. Many of Khanna's wildly wrong claims sound like local myths that he has taken at face value. I can easily imagine some misguided elderly Belgrade resident waxing nostalgically for the days "when every one of our republics was richer than Spain!"




Yet more of Khanna's assertions are not merely factually wrong, but far exceed the ludicrous. In the fast paced and dangerous Russian business world, "one is safe only in the sauna, where everyone is naked and no weapons are allowed." It was news to me to learn from Khanna that every winter "waves" of Russians and "thousands of Ukrainians" freeze to death in "crumbling heatless apartment blocks." And he employs gross mischaracterizations of fact to buttress his claims. For example, according to Khanna, in 2006 Greek GDP increased 25% when the government started to account for prostitution and cigarette smuggling in its figures. In fact, the government said it would include all unreported economic activity, mostly in construction and trade, but including a "small" amount for illegal activities such as smuggling. And this is merely a sampling of patently ridiculous claims.

And for a "foreign policy whiz-kid," Khanna makes numerous and serious analytical mistakes, showing a clear misunderstanding of economics, international institutions, and international relations. The unhedged statement, "Russia's diplomatic position is purely residual," will surely surprise diplomats from Brussels to Tokyo. Noting that Gazprom's market capitalization is $300 billion leads Khanna to the conclusion that Gazprom is one third of the Russian economy, confusing market capitalization with GDP. And his bald assertion that "[n]one of Central Asian legal systems have evolved beyond Kakfaaesque" is belied by the numerous successful legislative accomplishments of Kazakhstan and its quite sophisticated legal code, for example.

He has harsh words for the United States, bordering on hysteria. Likewise, he sees the European Union as a beacon of progress and a model for the future. And yet he betrays a clear lack of understanding of EU institutions. For example, Britain does not share with Turkey a similar status of "privileged partner" of the EU, converg[ing] with the EU only when it suits their interests." And while he manages to drop the names of hundreds of obscure statesmen and scholars, there is not one mention of Jean Monnet.

And this awful book is chock-a-block with cheap clichés. Vladimir Putin is a "steely former KGB official." A "Soviet era foreign ministry building" and "Soviet era apartment buildings" alike are "hulking." Here in Moscow, there is a "perpetually insecure business caste that lives each day like its last, partying with exotic lions and dominatrix dancers, complete with plenty of caviar." One must pity the "champagne-soaked, Hummer-driving scions" of Kiev, who must settle for "fancy nightclubs such as Decadence." And "Kiev, like Moscow, is a Potemkin village."

And many of the clichés regarding Russia and Ukraine are not merely examples of poor imagination and lack of writing skill, they are downright ugly. "From cars to construction, if something in Russia works it is probably European." Khanna obviously has not been to any modern Russian manufacturing facilities. He also writes that the Baltic states view "the formerly great Russian bear like an alcoholic uncle, with a mixture f pity and concern." In a stunning bit of cultural hubris, Khanna sneers "Georgians may be Christians, but they are not European in any meaningful sense - no matter how relentlessly they fly the EU flag across the capital city, Tbilisi."

But the worst moments of Khanna's book are when he quotes conversations that seem of such dubious authenticity as to make me believe they may be fabricated, or at best the result of very selective reporting, only relating those comments that fit within his pre-existing views. "'Our pride has suffered'" explains a "Moscow intellectual over a narrow glass of [of course] ice-chilled vodka, `but this only drives our nationalism further.'" In Kiev, the locals "give lifts to strangers for a token fare." Why? "We suffered enough together, so we still trust each other." There are just too many such (anonymous) quotations that fail to ring true to trust in the author's integrity. And he also reports statements by national leaders as if they were heard in personal conversation, yet in a curiously indirect fashion that suggests otherwise. "'To hell with the Russians!' fumed Saakashvili" sounds like reportage of a personal conversation between Khanna and the Georgian president, but I suspect a more honest account would read like "the President was quoted in the Financial Times as saying `to hell with the Russians.'"

And Khanna makes innumerable observations that he believes show particular insight, but are shocking banal if thought over for a mere moment. He notes dryly that Turkey is "a country that has fought wars with nearly all its neighbours." Well, so is France. And in fact just about every country which has been around for the 20th century, or earlier, has fought its neighbours at one time or another. (Actually, if you refer merely to the modern state of Turkey, and not with reference to its Ottoman predecessor, it has fought wars with none of its neighbors. Khanna is a kind of reverse-genius at getting facts 100% wrong.) He also notes with immense concern that "Russian and Chinese firms now control most of [Uzbekistan's] mineral deposits." It doesn't seem obvious to Khanna that Russia and China are quite natural trading partners and sources of foreign investment.

Overall, just about the worst book I've ever read, and exceedingly dishonest to boot.

Return of History: Power Politics and Nationalism Here To Stay
At barely over a hundred pages this book contains a wonderfully wise and judicious summary of the diplomatic, foreign policy conundrums facing the world today.

On the day I began reading Robert Kagan's Return of History I heard on the news that Russia had begun patrolling the Arctic region with nuclear submarines, something they had not done since the fall of the Soviet empire.

This datum ties in very nicely with Kagan's succinct, well-written book putting current-day foreign policy in its precise qualities: we're certainly not in an era that's "the end of history." Rather, it's a return to power politics and nationalism, when inhabitants of a country feel pride when their country is powerful.

It helps to explain, for example, the rise of Russia, which I hardly hesitate to call fascist, what with the murdering of dissident journalists and former spies, even those residing outside of Russia.

Just before I have written this, I listened to a BBC podcast, NewsPod of 30 July 2008, describing the launching of subs to delve the depths of Lake Baikal, where 20 percent of the world's freshwater is located. The lake I believe is 5,000 feet deep. The Russian sailors chanted "Glory to Russia!" when they emerged from the sub after the dive. Odd-sounding to Westerners, I think.

Kagan, whose previous book Dangerous Nation was very influential for me, changing my ideas of foreign policy--which had been more in line with Pat Buchanan and Ron Paul--is a wonderful, knowledgeable writer who impresses. People are interested in more than being reductionist homo economicus. Reminding me of my college reading of Plato, we possess a soul spiritedness, a thymos, "a spiritedness and ferocity in defense of clan, tribe, city, or state." (page 8) So actors, be they individuals or states, act in ways that may be irrational or counter-productive. That's not always the point.

This spiritedness often manifests itself as simple patriotism, nearly a dirty word to Europeans. Kagan agrees, calling it a "dirty word in the postmodern Enlightenment lexicon, but there is no shame in a government restoring a nation's honor." (30) Indeed. The naiveté of postmoderns will be their undoing.

Russia opposing the United States, even if they may lead to reaction contrary to Russia's immediate interests, is explained very well in The Return of History. Russia is determined to be accepted as a Great Power, even if its economy doesn't warrant it. It's what it once was, and it--led by Vladimir Putin--aims to be thought of once again.

Meanwhile, the European Union (EU) proves feckless and incompetent to contain this traditional ugly behavior (at least from their perspective): "Russia and the EU are neighbors geographically. But geopolitically they live in different centuries. A twenty-first-century EU, with its noble ambition to transcend power politics and lead the world into a new international order based on laws and institutions, now confronts a Russia that is very much a traditional, nineteenth-century power practicing the old power politics." (20) The result is that "Europe may be ill-equipped to respond to a problem that it never anticipated having to face." (22) You think? It's almost humorous watching Germany trying to be passively diplomatic, for example, to Russia's bullying over its natural gas supplies, while it arbitrarily cuts off certain countries like the Ukraine or Belarus.

In regards to China, Kagan asks a good question: "In the long run, rising prosperity may well produce political liberalism, but how long is the long run?" (57) The theory with China is first let it become a thoroughgoing capitalist country, and political liberalizations will follow. We may have to wait a long time on that.

"As China scholar Minxin Pei has pointed out, when Chinese leaders fact the choice between economic efficiency and the preservation of power, they choose power. That is their pragmatism." (61)

NATO is more benign to Russia than a few years earlier, yet is engendering much greater hostility. (61)

"The mistake of the 1990s was the hope that democracy was inevitable." (99)