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Judging on a Collegial Court: Influences on Federal Appellate Decision Making (Constitutionalism and Democracy)

Judging on a Collegial Court: Influences on Federal Appellate Decision Making (Constitutionalism and Democracy)
By Professor Virginia A. Hettinger, Professor Stefanie A. Lindquist, Professor Wendy L. Martinek

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  • Amazon Sales Rank: #1308200 in Books
  • Published on: 2006-03-13
  • Original language: English
  • Number of items: 1
  • Binding: Hardcover
  • 168 pages

Customer Reviews

A Valuable Study of the U.S. Courts of Appeals5
During the last several years, important books studying various facets of the U.S. Courts of Appeals have appeared by Cass Sunstein (also reviewed on Amazon) and David E. Klein, to mention just two. This volume, co-authored by three political scientists, is a significant addition to this literature. The Courts of Appeals are so vital because for nearly all federal litigation, they are the ultimate court of decision, as they oversee the district courts. While this book employs statistical models and charts, it is quite digestible by the general reader. This is because the book is written with such clarity of exposition and explanation that its method of analysis and conclusions come through quite nicely. One only wishes that IRS materials could match this level of clarity.

The focus of the study is the concurring and dissenting behavior of appellate judges, and how they interact with district courts. Or, as the authors put it, "horizonal dissensus" (or disagreement within the court) and "vertical dissensus" (disagreements between the courts of appeals and the district courts whose decisions they review). While the authors place primary reliance upon an attitudinal model (i.e., judges vote their personal policy preferences), they balance this approach with consideration of other factors such as circuit norms, case characteristics, and institutional roles such as chief judge, senior judge or designated district court panel member. On each such topic, the authors skillfully integrate references to other studies that have been done; the bibliography on its own is a rich resource for those interested in judicial behavior. Among the most interesting findings are that ideology plays no role in reversals of district court decisions, and that unlike the Supreme Court, strategic considerations do not dictate dissenting behavior. The authors suggest that it is more accurate to think of the relationship between district and appellate courts as that of a team working together, rather than (as does much of the literature) as a principal-agent arrangement.

For political scientist students of judicial behavior, but also for the general reader, this is a valuable addition to the body of literature on these highly important courts.