Product Description

Was Lt. Gen. James Longstreet a lackluster, indecisive leader or a victim of political circumstances?

Though traditionally saddled with much of the blame for the Confederate loss at Gettysburg, Longstreet was actually a capable, resourceful, and brave commander, argues historian Alexander Mendoza. Confederate Struggle for Command offers a comprehensive analysis of Longstreet's leadership during his seven-month assignment in the Tennessee theater of operations. Mendoza concludes that the obstacles to effective command faced by Longstreet had at least as much to do with longstanding grievances and politically motivated prejudices as they did with any personal or military shortcomings of Longstreet's.

Longstreet's First Corps parted company with Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia in September 1863. Subsequently, the First Corps contributed decisively to the Confederate victory at Chickamauga. But when Longstreet then joined a group of disaffected generals in denouncing Braxton Bragg, the commanding general of the Army of Tennessee, the resulting imbroglio hampered the effectiveness of the entire First Corps.

Confederate Struggle for Command adds an important layer of nuanced understanding to the career and legacy of Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, and will be an enjoyable and informative source for Civil War buffs, military historians, and interested general readers.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #416227 in Books
• Published on: 2008-09-01
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Hardcover
• 304 pages

Review
"Confederate Struggle for Command adds an important layer of nuanced understanding to the career and legacy of Lt. Gen. James Longstreet." -McCormick Messenger (McCormick Messenger 20090212)

About the Author
ALEXANDER MENDOZA, assistant professor of history at the University of Texas at Tyler, holds a Ph.D. from Texas Tech University.

Customer Reviews

The responsibility rests with Longstreet
An author's first book presents many problems for the reading public. Since histories do not populate bookstores, we make our buying decision based on title, cover art and the press release, not the best of guides. Winners are rare; losers are more common with OK being the majority. Having spent twenty to forty dollars for OK is not the nicest of feeling. I purchased this book based on the title and deep interest in James Longstreet. Expecting an OK, I am very happy to report this is a winner!
James Longstreet is one of the more controversial Southern generals. Very few are neutral when talking about the man. Both his actions during and after the war-generated controversy. The passage of time has done nothing to diminish the controversy surrounding him. Longstreet's actions in the West are an important part of the controversy, with both sides finding reasons to applaud or condemned him. The author, without talking sides, has written a comprehensive history of this period that is intelligent, accurate and very readable.
First, we are shown Longstreet's association with JE Johnston, Louis Wigfall and Jefferson Davis impact the western campaign. This foundation is vital in understand Longstreet's role in the anti-Bragg faction and in Davis' mishandling of these problems. This is put into context with the readiness of army officers to bypass the chain of command and the use of important political figures. Longstreet was used to this and was no different than his contemporizes when he took part in this.
Second, we have a very good history of I Corps operations in Chattooga and East Tennessee. This is an under reported area which the author places in both a military and political context. The reasons these operations failed are complex, interconnected and not limited to James Longstreet.
Last, are the Jenkins/Law/Robertson/McLaws problems. Longstreet is not the innocent victim here. Much of the Jenkins Law fiasco is of his making. His role in the problem with McLaws is less clear and Braxton Bragg's action in Richmond muddies the waters. Robertson is less detailed than the others are but was settled with fewer problems. Braxton Bragg's influence with Jefferson Davies made these problems worse and required the intervention of Robert E. Lee.
This is a balanced and fair account of this period. The author is very careful not to take sides giving the reader the information and allowing them to decide. This excellent informative and readable book is a valuable addition to my library.
A word about the book's physical appearance and maps. I found the book's presentation to be mediocre. I am not sure if they had printing problems or a decided to try for an antiquated look. However, title pages appear poorly printed. The binding is not up to most current history books. It is not poorly done but could be much better. Maps are very basic and at the campaign level, meaning engagements do not have maps. While the maps are sufficient, it requires work to use them. I did not reduce my rating of the book because of this. This is a problem for Texas A&M University Press not the author.

Low Confidence Weighs on Longstreet
Alexander Mendoza strikes a much clearer and even-handed course in this most recent addition to the historiography of General Longstreet in the West. This is a much needed addition to the subject, which lays out (better than most books) the complicated and often Lost Cause biased works about Longstreet and his part in Chickamauga, Chattanooga, and Knoxville. The style of this piece of writing keeps the important personalities nicely in focus at the right points, with the right amount of necessary detail, and without becoming longwinded. Style is a key strength to this book, as the Chattanooga Campaign is a multi-facetted event that is difficult to package.
While Mendoza is not shy to state Longstreet acted with pettiness regarding the politics and squabbles that occurred in the Army of Tennessee commanded by the fractious General Bragg, he points out such behavior was widespread if not commonplace in this army. As Longstreet had his faults and shortcomings like any other human being, his mistakes of politics in the Confederate Army were no more than the many other generals who were fed up with Braxton Bragg.
Longstreet's shaken confidence through the Chattanooga Campaign and in the Knoxville Campaign is really the key argument of Mendoza's thesis as to why Knoxville turned out so disappointingly for Longstreet and the First Corps. Certainly Bragg, poor logistics, a good performance by Union General Burnside, and a host of other headaches that all happened at the same time hampered Longstreet. But perhaps the clearest statement Mendoza makes that sums up what his low confidence did to his decision making process at Ft. Sanders is: "If possessed of his usual self assurance, Longstreet probably would have cancelled the plan altogether." Normally, trying to storm well prepared defenses was something Longstreet had a keen understanding as foolhardy. In this case he erred on the side of risk taking, with Bragg's hopeless position at Chattanooga in need of some sort of remedy. He went against his better judgment and rolled the dice; behavior hugely out of character for him.
In all, a very good explanation of this part of Civil War history, that is as equally controversial as Gettysburg regarding the role of General James Longstreet. This work deserves high marks.

Excellent Account of the Political, Intrigues and Command Failures in Longstreet's Little Known East Tennessee Campaign
What is fascinating about Mendoza's book, in my view, is his writings and excellent research for the period after the battle of Chickamauga. Most of the history relating to Chickamauga is well known and Mendoza covers that period quickly on the First Corps' history and the initial transfer to the west. The most interesting parts of the book starts with the much covered telling of the Army of the Tennessee's general staff attempt to rid themselves of Braxton Bragg with President Davis' odd, embarrassing and damaging attempt to stymie Bragg's removal by sustaining Bragg, leading to the fracture of the army's command structure and morale. The book contains relatively even critiques of Longstreet but highlights what appears to be gross errors in retrospect, the worst being the promotion of senior officer Jenkins over Law that causes bitterness within Hood's division that Law never gets over and later seems to include Robertson, also in Hood's division. The loss of Lookout Valley was a major loss in Longstreet's sector contributed to by the conflict between Jenkins and Law but the author's critique of Longstreet I think is a little harsh. The union movement, floating men down the Tennessee on pontoon rafts around Moccasin Point in the middle of the night was quite a feat, allowing a bridgehead and a prompt shuttling of force. I have been to the site and find it incredulous that this movement was undetected by confederate pickets, but recognition has to be given to the Union's audacity and brilliant success. Mendoza shines with his description and documentation of Longstreet's movement to Knoxville ordered by Bragg as Bragg apparently divorces himself from Longstreet. The movement to Knoxville, appreciated by Grant who encourages Burnside to lightly engage and fall back to Knoxville, is difficult due to limited transportation for the First Corps, questionable reinforcements and the intrigues of Bragg who writes very negative letters to Richmond about Longstreet's movements and cooperation, which are not completely accurate. The other command issue that comes to head is Longstreet's brewing conflict with old friend Lafayette McLaws, who held a low opinion of Longstreet since Gettysburg as noted in his infamous letter "Longstreet is a great big humbug" often quoted by historian Robert Krick. And, as the author points out, Longstreet appears unaware of this earlier separation of support until it manifests itself in the campaign. What Mendoza brings out that I also found very fascinating is the level of intrigue that Bragg was involved in while in his position as Davis' military advisor. Bragg, under the radar, coaches Longstreet's disenfranchised generals to Longstreet's detriment and certainly is not acting as an appropriate military advisor encouraging Longstreet's command problems and eroding his already weak political support. In addition, Davis' constant interfering with the First Corps command is quite damaging and evident of his micromanagement, not allowing Longstreet a freer hand in removing officers or selecting replacements. A case in point, Longstreet prefers to transfer his old friend McLaws out of the First Corps just as Bragg had several officers transferred but Mendoza points out Davis and Cooper disallow Longstreet the same option, forcing him to prefer charges against his old friend. If the command difficulties and lack of political support were not enough, the low point is the desperate attack on Fort Sanders, certainly not the best decision by Longstreet. However, Longstreet was sent to Knoxville to dislodge Burnside, who performed well during his mission to keep Longstreet entertained, and with the presence of Bragg's engineering officer, the need to try something may have been overwhelming. The problems within the Army of Tennessee that spreads to the First Corps reminds me of the early period of the Army of the Potomac (see historian Stephen Sears). Repeated failures appear to cause contempt in any organization.

Even if you have read Thomas Connelly's great 2 volume study of the Army of Tennessee, his "The Politics of Command" and Piston's "Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant, you will find Mendoza's study of Longstreet's east Tennessee campaign fascinating and Bragg's ability to continue vendetta's in a position of high responsibility fascinating. As trying as it was for Longstreet to rid himself of unsupportive staff, Mendoza makes a great point in his conclusion, what would Stonewall Jackson have done if a corps commander and a division commander stopped an attack to wait for their supply trains? As I recall reading about the battle of Kernstown, Stonewall tried to court martial General Richard Garrett for retiring from the field after running out of ammunition ("Why not give them the bayonet?").