Product Description

The wars against terror have begun, but it will take some time before the nature and composition of these wars is widely understood. The objective of these wars is not the conquest of territory, or the silencing of any particular ideology, but rather to secure the necessary environment for states to operate according to principles of consent and make it impossible for our enemies to impose or induce states of terror. "Terror and Consent" argues that, like so many states and civilizations in the past that suffered defeat, we are fighting the last war, with weapons and concepts that were useful to us then but have now been superseded.Philip Bobbitt argues that we need to reforge links that previous societies have made between law and strategy; to realize how the evolution of modern states has now produced a globally networked terrorism that will change as fast as we can identify it; to combine humanitarian interests with strategies of intervention; and, above all, to rethink what 'victory' in such a war, if it is a war, might look like - no occupied capitals, no treaties, no victory parades, but the preservation, protection and defence of states of consent. This is one of the most challenging and wide-ranging books of any kind about our modern world.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #3880321 in Books
• Published on: 2008-05
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Hardcover
• 688 pages

From Publishers Weekly
Starred Review. Bobbitt follows his magisterial Shield of Achilles with an equally complex and provocative analysis of the West's ongoing struggle against terrorism. According to Bobbitt, the primary driver of terrorism is not Islam but the emergence of the market state. Market states (such as the U.S.) are characterized by their emphasis on deregulation, privatization (of prisons, pensions, armies), abdication of typical nation-state duties (providing welfare or health care) and adoption of corporate models of operational effectiveness. While market states are too militarily formidable to be challenged conventionally, they have allowed for the sale of weapons on the international market, thereby losing their monopoly on mass destruction; furthermore they are disproportionately vulnerable to destabilizing, delegitimating, demoralizing terror. Bobbitt asserts that this situation requires a shift from a strategy of deterrence and containment to one of preclusion. States must recast concepts of sovereignty and legitimacy to define what levels of force they may deploy in seeking and suppressing terrorists. Domestically, the shift involves accepting that in order to protect citizens, the state must strengthen its powers in sensitive areas like surveillance. International alliances can be a major advantage in a war waged not against terrorists, but terror itself. Terror and Consent, the first work to interpret terrorism in the context of political theory, merits wide circulation and serious consideration. (Apr.)
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

From The Washington Post

Reviewed by Daniel Byman

Philip Bobbitt thinks big. His latest book, Terror and Consent, even gently criticizes Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations and Francis Fukuyama's End of History as "not big enough." Bobbitt contends that the world is in transition from nation states to "market states" whose strategic reason for being "is the protection of civilians, not simply territory or national wealth or any particular dynasty, class, religion or ideology." This shift, he argues, has huge implications for counterterrorism, because future terrorists -- particularly if they possess nuclear or biological weapons -- may threaten the legitimacy of the market state. "Almost every widely held idea we currently entertain about twenty-first century terrorism and its relationship to the Wars against Terror," he says, "is wrong."

Bobbitt, a professor at Columbia University who previously wrote The Shield of Achilles, a monumental history of warfare, has held senior positions in several Democratic administrations. Despite his establishment pedigree, he is a thoroughgoing contrarian. Defying the nearly universal criticism among academics of the term "war on terror," Bobbitt embraces it, making a strong case -- better than the Bush administration has -- that the challenge can best be thought of as a series of wars.

His list of erroneous assumptions about terror goes on for two pages, beginning with the idea "that terrorism has always been with us, and though its weapons may change, it will remain fundamentally the same." In reality, he argues, al-Qaeda represents a new form of terrorism that seeks mass casualties, is highly decentralized and, like its market-state enemy, even uses outsourcing. Should Osama bin Laden be defeated tomorrow, Bobbitt says, the kind of terrorism he pioneered is here to stay.

In using the term "war" to describe its counterterrorist activities, the Bush administration has seemed at times to disdain legal constraints on the use of torture and electronic surveillance. But Bobbitt doesn't plead for a return to the status quo of the 1990s. Rather, he calls for public recognition of the need for new tools to fight terrorism and, at the same time, for ensuring their conformity to law. While readers may at first see this as another Democratic critique of Bush, in many ways it is just the opposite: an intelligent embrace of the Bush administration's strategic worldview but not its methods.

Yet some of Bobbitt's arguments fall flat. The very scope of the book detracts from its content, a stark contrast to Fukuyama and Huntington, who each presented one big thesis, tightly constructed and defended. In Terror and Consent, so many arguments are moving at any one time that it is easy to lose the logical thread through 600-plus pages. To liven things up, Bobbitt draws in examples from the Bible, ancient Greek city states, the French Resistance, the Habsburg-Valois wars and (perhaps it goes without saying) homosexual pirates. These historical parallels sometimes amuse and inform; too often they simply distract.

In his effort to show a world transformed, Bobbitt seems at times to contend that everything is new under the sun. He declares Israel's 2006 war in Lebanon to be "unique," despite many historical parallels, including past Israeli operations there. He claims that terrorism in the era of the market state is more theatrical than in the past. Yet one of the pioneering scholars of terrorism, Brian Jenkins, noted in 1975 that "terrorism is theatre." Who can forget the Black September organization's dramatic kidnapping of Israeli athletes during the Munich Olympics? History may not always repeat itself, but, as Mark Twain observed, it often rhymes.

Most interesting, and most arguable, is Bobbitt's assertion that "it hardly matters whether the forces of destruction arise from militant Islam, North Korean communism, or Caribbean hurricanes." He is correct, of course, that natural disasters, like catastrophic terrorist attacks, can kill thousands of people and undermine confidence in governments unless they respond effectively. But lumping together such disparate incidents risks making counterterrorism so broad a term as to be meaningless. Hurricanes are invariable natural disasters; terrorism varies in reaction to the response, and U.S. policy affects the incidence of attacks as well as their severity.

To his credit, Bobbitt offers many policy recommendations. One is for the United States to build an alliance of democracies ready to undertake humanitarian and strategic interventions -- essentially, NATO on steroids. He contends that this intervention doesn't always have to be military. But his book leans heavily on the "hard" side of power, and it isn't clear why his rationale for intervention in Rwanda and Darfur wouldn't apply equally to Afghanistan (pre-Taliban), Algeria, Angola, Congo, Nepal, Somalia, Tajikistan and Yemen, among other places. His doctrine does not tell us when not to intervene or when military action, rather than economic and diplomatic pressure, is necessary. These are the hardest questions.

Readers might also ask whether the Iraq misadventure should make us cautious about interventions elsewhere. Bobbitt dismisses the question, saying it is "too soon to conclude that the removal of Saddam Hussein . . . will prove to be a mistake." But that is not a satisfying argument, given that even if the United States succeeds in Iraq in years to come, the human and financial cost already has been staggering. His dismissal is disappointing in a book that is otherwise quite fair to counterarguments.

My advice is that readers should approach Terror and Consent with a mixture of caution and open-mindedness. Not all of Bobbitt's pronouncements may be convincing. But his book constantly prods us to reexamine our preconceptions about terrorism, which is by itself some preparation for what may lie ahead.

Copyright 2008, The Washington Post. All Rights Reserved.

From Booklist
With The Shield of Achilles (2002), constitutional law and nuclear strategy scholar Bobbitt argued, among other things, that the epoch of the nation-state is ending. Governments of the twenty-first century and beyond, he argued, will increasingly be “market states”: global, networked, decentralized, and considerably privatized states whose primary objective is to maximize the (primarily economic) opportunities of its citizens. With his latest book, Bobbitt examines at great length the relationship between the emergent constitutional order and the emergence of modern “market state terrorism,” which, mirroring the market state and availing itself of the same technological advances, may be lethal enough to pose an existential threat to the very possibility of government by consent of the governed. Arguing that America is indeed in a war against terror itself, not merely terrorists, Bobbitt finds the key to preserving states of consent lies in increased state power, increased multilateralism, and especially a strengthening of both constitutional and international legal restrictions on unfettered state action. Not just another book about terrorism, this is a complete theory of constitutional evolution and a sophisticated set of far-reaching policy prescriptions. Frequently digressive, incredibly erudite, and frustratingly difficult to pin down on the political spectrum, Bobbitt aims for the big picture and succeeds. --Brendan Driscoll

Customer Reviews

New Laws for Counterterrorism ?
Since the time of the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), the nation state has been viewed as a "sovereign entity," designed to protect and promote the general welfare of its citizens. Now, according to Philip Bobbitt, in the age of globalization, this sovereign entity is becoming increasingly "porous." As nation states integrate into the global economy, the constitutional foundations dedicated to protecting their rights and liberties are no longer adequate. The new entity that is emerging is what Bobbitt calls the "market state," a term he borrows from a previous work, The Shield of Achilles, in which he traced the evolution of the nation state.

This new market state Bobbitt describes is no longer confined to a sovereign territory, it is a decentralized and privatized network of relationships. It has all the characteristics of a multinational corporation and it treats its citizens much like a consumers. The market state has many upsides in that it presents its citizens with unprecedented freedoms and opportunities.

This book, however, is about the downside of the market state and the opportunities it provides terrorists. Today's terrorist networks are a byproduct of the market state, indeed they are an opportunistic parasite of the market state. They harness its technology and networks to wage war against it.

Bobbitt is not a neoconservative, he is a law professor who sees the need for a new constitutional order that reflects the needs of this new market state. Although he supported the war in Iraq, he now emphasizes the need for stronger international alliances and a "commitment to globalize the systems of human rights and government by consent." In other words, market states must collectively protect human rights and liberties.

On the counterterrorism side, Bobbitt calls for more invasive intelligence gathering, not only domestically but across national borders. Something along the lines of the Total Information Awareness program. He also calls for "preclusive" actions on the part of governments. Containment and deterrence are no longer adequate since terrorists now have access to weapons of mass destruction; they must be neutralized before they act. In short, terrorism must be fought more aggressively without undermining fundamental human rights and within the framework of international alliances.

This is a very well-researched and very well-argued work on how to fight terrorism in the 21st century. Bobbitt concludes that there is something in his proposals to offend everyone. Liberals will not like his call for preclusive actions by the governments and conservatives will not like his call to abide by some international standards. Achieving a so-called state of consent is already difficult in theory, it will be even more so in practice.

A seminal work on terror, the state, and the law
The work is sophisticated and explores, among other things, how strategy must align with the rule of law if our policies on terror are to succeed. This is a good read and well ahead of the proverbial curve. You will see the themes of this book, again and again, in the popular literature on terrorism. Enjoy!

In the first page, Professor Bobbitt introduces a broad definition of terror which includes the socially debilitating effects of natural disasters, such as earthquakes, as well as man-made disasters, including terrorism and human rights violations. This is both an accurate and elegant definition - it encompasses things that diminish the human condition; and it is a practical definition in an age of transnational threats where multi-lateral action is a necessity. "We are fighting terror, not just terrorists." I like that.

Yet how does a state effectively and legitimately pursue such policies and enact such cooperation? This question inevitably raises strategic and constitutional issues.

Professor Bobbitt's approach compels a reexamination of strategy, which includes how we organize our resources and conceptualize intervention - peaceful or otherwise - in the highly complex and uncertain environment of the 21st century. And here he makes the case that the alignment of strategy with law is absolutely essential. Our response to terror must be from the legal high ground; which, one hopes, also corresponds to the moral high ground.

I especially liked his detailed discussion of bio-terrorism and the detailed rebuttal to the International Institute for Strategic Studies Adelphi Paper - Nuclear Terrorism After 9/11. This, in conjunction with the background surrounding the A. H. Khan nuclear proliferation network, drives home the importance of a sound and multi-dimensional response to the proliferation of WMDs. Bobbitt draws on the likes of Brian Jenkins, Mary Kaldor, and Sir Michael Howard to both sustain his points and provoke argument. This is good stuff!

I have touched on one element in this brief review. There are numerous theoretical forays in this book that is rich with historical detail and anecdote, as well as legal and policy theory...much more than can be adequately summarized in a few paragraphs.

One should never judge a book by its cover; however, one can judge the credibility of the message and that of its author by looking at the citations in the back of the book. Professor Bobbitt is meticulous. There are over 100 pages of detailed footnotes; and in the text, there are often 5 or 6 citations per page! This detail is invaluable in providing a deeper and more contextually rich background to the text. Compare this level of professionalism with some of the popular literature on terrorism that, if the author is an especially generous mood, has 12 or so footnotes per Chapter.

Professor Bobbitt is "the best of the best." His work demonstrates an intellectual tradition the hallmark of which is well reasoned argument supported by detailed references and intellectual rigor. Why would you settle for anything less?

A PRIVATIZED WORLD AND ITS ENEMIES
Bobbitt graciously sent me a pre-production copy of this book. Unfortunately, the book is a complex and legalistic edifice based on several flawed assumptions.

To save you the time required to read it. Here's a synopsis.

The premise of the book is that we are in the midst of a transition to a market-based global order. This means that the nation-state (and even the entire notion of public governance) will be replaced by corporate surrogates (via outsourcing) operating on a global level. The basis for the legitimacy of this new order will be that it offers individuals more choices than ever before (the political parallel to a fully stocked supermarket). However, its emergence will be at the expense of minimal safety nets and communitarian efforts.

The enemy of this newly emerging market-based system, and the main focus of this book, are (naturally) terrorists. Terrorists, Bobbitt claims, fight us because they hate the choices provided to us by this emerging market-world.

The way they fight us is by limiting our choices through terror. Terror, in this context, is essentially theater. In this theater, disgruntled people (Islamic terrorists and beyond) will use the threat of flamboyant attacks to limit the choices offered by the market-world. Since the market-state will continue to produce ever greater levels of choice to an ever greater number of people, this clash is inevitable. Therefore, our societal objective is to harden ourselves (through smart legal maneuvers and investments in infrastructure) to limit the the levels of terror that can be produced by our opponents. By doing this, we can buy time as the market-world continues to expand to ever greater numbers of people.

_________________________

I was hopeful that Bobbitt would approach terrorism in a more nuanced way than merely through the lens of the prevailing narrative fallacy (for example: "The Looming Tower"). Unfortunately, he didn't and his depiction of terrorism is merely as a means for disgruntled groups to negate choice (a variant of Bush's "they hate us for our freedoms").

A more complex and realistic view of terrorism is to approach it as illegal warfare directed against civilians. This warfare also has more complex objectives that merely limiting choices through the production of terror. In many cases, it advances the groups that conduct it economically, socially, etc. (usually at the expense of state competitors). For example: Nigeria's MEND, Brazil's PCC, Mexico's Cartels/Zetas, Lebanon's Hezbollah, Colombia's FARC, Peru's Sendero Luminoso and most of the groups in Iraq/Afghanistan (who advance through smuggling/corruption/etc.). Unfortunately, Bobbitt didn't deviate from the simplistic view of terrorism and his book suffers mightily from the result.

I also have a problem with the market-state and market-world construct. First, it's vague. Second, it is potentially ruinous. While choices may be available, it says nothing of your ability (your means) to exercise those choices. Who cares if the supermarket offers unlimited choice if you can't afford anything but the generics? It's very likely a market-state would reduce human worth to a mere economic value at the cost of the bonds that hold us together as a community. Perversely, this would serve to create the very violent groups that use terrorism to advance their own economic/social level, since no other values have any power to mitigate/dissuade an impulse to violence. In short, Bobbitt's market-state, a society legitimized by "choice" alone, is insufficiently credible as something we should a) help emerge and b) defend.

Hope this helps.

John Robb, author of:
Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization