Product Description

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita is a master of game theory, which is a fancy label for a simple idea: People compete, and they always do what they think is in their own best interest. Bueno de Mesquita uses game theory and its insights into human behavior to predict and even engineer political, financial, and personal events. His forecasts, which have been employed by everyone from the CIA to major business firms, have an amazing 90 percent accuracy rate, and in this dazzling and revelatory book he shares his startling methods and lets you play along in a range of high-stakes negotiations and conflicts.

Revealing the origins of game theory and the advances made by John Nash, the Nobel Prize—winning scientist perhaps best known from A Beautiful Mind, Bueno de Mesquita details the controversial and cold-eyed system of calculation that he has since created, one that allows individuals to think strategically about what their opponents want, how much they want it, and how they might react to every move. From there, Bueno de Mesquita games such events as the North Korean disarmament talks and the Middle East peace process and recalls, among other cases, how he correctly predicted which corporate clients of the Arthur Andersen accounting firm were most likely engaged in fraudulent activity (hint: one of them started with an E). And looking as ever to the future, Bueno de Mesquita also demonstrates how game theory can provide successful strategies to combat both global warming (instead of relying on empty regulations, make nations compete in technology) and terror (figure out exactly how much U.S. aid will make Pakistan fight the Taliban).

But as Bueno de Mesquita shows, game theory isn’t just for saving the world. It can help you in your own life, whether you want to succeed in a lawsuit (lawyers argue too much the merits of the case and question too little the motives of their opponents), elect the CEO of your company (change the system of voting on your board to be more advantageous to your candidate), or even buy a car (start by knowing exactly what you want, call every dealer in a fifty-mile radius, and negotiate only over the phone).

Savvy, provocative, and shockingly effective, The Predictioneer’s Game will change how you understand the world and manage your future. Life’s a game, and how you play is whether you win or lose.


From the Hardcover edition.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #2858 in Books
• Published on: 2009-09-29
• Released on: 2009-09-29
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Hardcover
• 272 pages

Features

• ISBN13: 9781400067879
• Condition: NEW
• Notes: Brand New from Publisher. No Remainder Mark.
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Amazon.com Review
Book Description
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita is a master of game theory, which is a fancy label for a simple idea: People compete, and they always do what they think is in their own best interest. Bueno de Mesquita uses game theory and its insights into human behavior to predict and even engineer political, financial, and personal events. His forecasts, which have been employed by everyone from the CIA to major business firms, have an amazing 90 percent accuracy rate, and in this dazzling and revelatory book he shares his startling methods and lets you play along in a range of high-stakes negotiations and conflicts.

Revealing the origins of game theory and the advances made by John Nash, the Nobel Prize-winning scientist perhaps best known from A Beautiful Mind, Bueno de Mesquita details the controversial and cold-eyed system of calculation that he has since created, one that allows individuals to think strategically about what their opponents want, how much they want it, and how they might react to every move. From there, Bueno de Mesquita games such events as the North Korean disarmament talks and the Middle East peace process and recalls, among other cases, how he correctly predicted which corporate clients of the Arthur Andersen accounting firm were most likely engaged in fraudulent activity (hint: one of them started with an E). And looking as ever to the future, Bueno de Mesquita also demonstrates how game theory can provide successful strategies to combat both global warming (instead of relying on empty regulations, make nations compete in technology) and terror (figure out exactly how much U.S. aid will make Pakistan fight the Taliban).

But as Bueno de Mesquita shows, game theory isn’t just for saving the world. It can help you in your own life, whether you want to succeed in a lawsuit (lawyers argue too much the merits of the case and question too little the motives of their opponents), elect the CEO of your company (change the system of voting on your board to be more advantageous to your candidate), or even buy a car (start by knowing exactly what you want, call every dealer in a fifty-mile radius, and negotiate only over the phone).

Savvy, provocative, and shockingly effective, The Predictioneer’s Game will change how you understand the world and manage your future. Life’s a game, and how you play is whether you win or lose.

Knowing what will happen around the world can be awfully useful. Forewarned, after all, is forearmed, whether the questions of the day are about business, national security, or our day-to-day lives. The Predictioneer’s Game provides a reliable way to anticipate the future, one you can experiment by using the online version of the game’s program on my website. Suppose, for instance, you want to work out likely future developments in Iran. You can build a data set and test it just as I have done.

We all know that Iran’s Ayatollahs faced a pretty stiff challenge following that country’s June presidential election. As I predicted in February 2009. the Qum clerics, sometimes called the Quietists, are quiet no more and Iran’s Supreme Leader is facing the first real political challenge since Iran’s 1979 revolution. Iran is in for more challenging times in the months to come. You might wonder, what is likely to happen to relations between Iran’s and Iraq’s Shia-dominated governments now that the U.S. is withdrawing most of its forces from Iraq? How will the evolving relations between Iran and Iraq shape the interests of the United States in the region? These are some of the questions I try to answer in The Predictioneer’s Game.

I conclude that if the U.S. fully withdraws, then Iran and Iraq will form a strategic partnership and Iran might even intervene militarily on behalf of Iraq’s Shia government to put down a rising political threat from the pro-Baathist, anti-American, Sunni Vice President of Iraq, Tariq al-Hashimi. Hashimi’s power is predicted to increase markedly while Prime Minister Maliki’s declines if President Obama decides not to maintain 50,000 American troops in Iraq. If, however, he chooses to keep 50,000 or more troops in Iraq after August 2010, then Iran and Iraq will not forge a strategic alliance, Hashimi’s growing power will be contained, and Maliki will remain in charge. And in Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei’s power will continue to decline while the military, the moneyed interests and the Qum clerics will become the backbone of a more moderate, more pragmatic Iranian regime.

Predicting the future--whether you are concerned about Iran or about how best to settle a family crisis--is not all that mysterious. If people do what they think is best for themselves--and who doesn’t--then, with game theory’s help, we can anticipate what they will do. Working out other people’s incentives means also working out how altering their costs or benefits can be used to change their behavior and that, after all, is the essence of predictioneering.--Bruce Bueno de Mesquita

From Publishers Weekly
Mesquita (The Strategy of Campaigning) purports to show how we can predict... and engineer the future with applied game theory in this provocative tutorial. Mesquita has spent 30 years refining his approach to the science of predictioneering, and claims a 90% accuracy rate for his mathematical model that predicts choices based on the self-interest of decision makers. Although he argues that accurate prediction relies on science, he cannot escape the reality that the numbers in his model are based on human, i.e., fallible, assumptions and estimates. The author admits to a few mistakes—he predicted that former first lady Hillary Clinton's health-care reform would become law—but blames any missteps on unforeseen events and uses his model to boldly predict that President Obama is unlikely to quash the terrorist influence in Pakistan and that global warming will prove immune to government prescriptions but will produce its own solutions. Mesquita claims perhaps too much for his game theory model, but his cogently argued and fascinating brief will appeal to anyone interested in complex national-security issues. (Sept.)
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Review
“Bruce Bueno de Mesquita has demonstrated the power of using game theory and related assumptions of rational and self-seeking behavior in predicting the outcome of important political and legal processes. No one will fail to appreciate and learn from this well-written and always interesting account of his procedures.”—Kenneth Arrow, Nobel Prize-winning economist; Professor Emeritus, Stanford University

“The Predictioneer's Game teaches us that we can predict how a conflict may be resolved if we carefully consider the incentives for all parties in the conflict.  In an extraordinary range of applications, from ancient history to tomorrow's headlines, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita demonstrates the power of the game-theoretic approach.”—Roger B. Myerson, Nobel Prize-winning economist; Professor, University of Chicago
 
“Organized thought applied to problems can illuminate and help solve them.  This easy and enjoyable read is, in many ways, a how-to book for that very purpose.”—George P. Shultz, former U.S. Secretary of State
 
"Shakespeare said that poetry was giving ‘to airy nothingness a local habitation and a name.’ Game theory has never been airy nothingness, but to those who through lack of exposure or (like me) the wrong kind of exposure years ago may have had such thoughts, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita follows Shakespeare's path and opens a new world.  In Bueno de Mesquita's hands, game theory becomes a fascinating tool for understanding everything from how to steer the selection of a CEO to great swaths of both the past and future.  Don't miss this one if you care about understanding how decisions are made–pretty much all decisions."—R. James Woolsey, former Director of Central Intelligence; Annenberg Distinguished Visiting Fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution

“Bueno de Mesquita has successfully turne...

Customer Reviews

Brilliant and intensely irritating
This review has been edited to correct some misstatements pointed out by the author. I was working from a prepublication version that did not have all the end-notes, nor a reference to the website. Moreover, the author's comment to this review adds some useful material. On the basis of that, I would raise my rating from three stars to three and a half if that were allowed, but my basic opinion has not changed.

This book is likely to teach you some fascinating and useful material, but I can't recommend it wholeheartedly because it may drive you crazy as well. The basic idea is simple. Experts know a lot, but are bad at making predictions about human affairs. Simple models based on quantitative game theory are more accurate, and even when they're incorrect they expand your thinking in useful ways. Moreover, these models allow you to simulate alternatives and generate outcomes as good or better than the best human strategists can achieve.

To evaluate this book, it's useful to separate that claim into two parts. I'm a quant, and therefore I think it's pretty well established that you make better decisions by asking experts what they know and letting a computer trace the logical implications than by following the experts' recommendations. I also accept that simple quantitative models do remarkably good jobs, and are only rarely surpassed by complex qualitative analysis. Anyway, if you don't accept those positions, there's no point in even opening this book. So to me and probably to you if you're still reading, asking experts simple questions with answers on a scale from 0 to 100 and combining the results in a reasonable way, is an excellent approach to most decisions. Call this the basic quant position.

The author goes further than the basic quant position in three respects. First, he makes much stronger claims for the superiority of his approach. Second, he advocates specific game theory analysis that involves complex modeling, as opposed to simple rules such as guessing that the outcome will be somewhere near the average opinion weighted by salience and power. He doesn't justify his methods as practical shortcuts that seem to work, he repeatedly claims that they are backed by science and logic, unlike alternatives. Finally, he goes beyond prediction to use his model to engineer outcomes. This is quant-on-steroids. It made me recall that John Nash, the most important game theorist with respect to this kind of work, maintained he was Emperor of Antarctica.

To paraphrase Dizzy Dean, it ain't megalomania if you can back it up. This is where it starts to get irritating. In the preface, before you get to page 1, he writes, "I've been predicting future events for three decades, often in print before the fact, and mostly getting them right. . . . I have made hundreds, even thousands, of predictions--a great many of them in print, ready to be scrutinized by any naysayer." This guy makes extraordinarily bold claims about his quantitative prediction ability, and he doesn't keep track of his record? He can't even recall within a factor of ten how many predictions he has made? Who decided he was "mostly right?" And why is anyone who wants to know the record a "naysayer?" Even if you did all the work, unearthed all the printed predictions (he only references a few in the book) and found he was zero for 200, he could just say he got thousands of other ones right, ones you didn't find. This sounds more like a Nostradamus defender than the "science" he's always claiming.

To bookend that frustration, by the end of the book, despite frequent promises, he has not revealed his model! He does have a version on-line that allows you to play around with it, and has more details on how it works, but still no clear, top-down description. In the book, you get hints and bits and pieces, but no clear explanation of how he arrives at his predictions. And this is not the only broken promise, there are frequent comments that he will "go into this further" or "provide more details," later; I can't find one example where he follows through. On the other hand, there are a few facts that get repeated far too many times.

Those two things would be enough for a lot of people to conclude he's a fraud. But there's an awful lot of good, clear, insightful analysis in between. He gives examples of political and diplomatic predictions he has made, discussing the inputs and basic form of the analysis. There are accounts of corporate and legal struggles where he maneuvered to an outcome favorable to his clients. He also applies the methods to history, to ask what might have happened. This is all fascinating stuff, and the data and conclusions speak for themselves. They show plausibly that this approach could work, it is practical to implement and it leads to conclusions that are surprising, but can shown to be logical. Without a lot more details these stories don't prove the model works, but they represent a coherent claim that it does.

However, this brings us to another problem. Some of the accounts are not credible. An account of how he maneuvered a fifth-choice candidate into a CEO job requires us to believe the board of directors split into five groups of three that agreed among themselves on the exact preference order for the five candidates, that these generated a cyclic preference order that included all five candidates (a mathematically possible but unlikely result only previously observed in game theory textbooks), that all this information was known with certainty beforehand and that none of the board members was smart enough to consider coalition-building or voting a second choice when it was clear a first choice vote would be wasted. Moreover, the Rube Goldberg scheme that worked seems far less promising than simple politicking to either build a coalition or change a slight preference.

This is the least credible account (unless you include the million dollars he was offered by Libya to engineer the removal of Anwar Sadat from power in Egypt, or the 10% of Zaire dictator Mobutu's external wealth offered to keep him in power), but none of the stories include basic information to allow fact-checking. In some cases the need for confidentiality is clear, but why no names of the government officials who hired him, or the partners at Arthur Andersen? Why is he protecting the agents of Libya and Mobutu? Does the brokerage firm that bought his advice in 1992 still insist on remaining anonymous? (And does it even still exist?) Some discretion is understandable, but this book reminds me of the fictional spies who have all labels removed from their clothing and possessions.

The final irritation is only one account of a missed prediction is given, and it is explained implausibly. The author predicted Hillary Clinton's healthcare plan would pass in 1994. He claims that the outcome was changed by the Rostenkowski scandal. That's hard to believe, since Rostenkowski resigned from his leadership position before the first bill came to Congress. Rostenkowski was not a strong supporter of healthcare reform. There's no doubt that his political skills would have been useful, had he chosen to push the plan, and the scandal did weaken the Democrats in general, but many other things happened that seemed to be at least as important. So either the prediction was dependent on lots of unpredictable events, and therefore should have been given as a probability distribution instead of a point estimate, or Rostenkowski was special, in which case the prediction should have been healthcare will pass or fail based on how Rostenkowski does. And why was the prediction not updated as the scandal worsened?

I know this is a long review, but I've only covered some of the bigger irritations. If you're an easy-going, tolerant sort who wants to learn some important practical and theoretical aspects of prediction, by all means read this book. If not, you might want a blood pressure check before you attempt it.

The most intriguing and accurate political science model
Please note, this book introduces the author's model for a general audience. If you seek greater math disclosure read his equally excellent PREDICTING POLITICS.

The author, a political science professor at NYU built his reputation developing Game Theory models that predict foreign affairs outcomes with a 90% accuracy as confirmed by a publicly released CIA study. This is amazing given that Game Theory is not effective at forecasting (Kesten Green/International Journal of Forecasting). The reason why the author's forecasting performance is so good is that he often uses many quantitative methods beyond Game Theory. For instance, his model to predict company fraud is a Logit Regression model. His work on the Cold War seems like a combination of Discriminant Analysis and Monte Carlo Simulation. His Global Warming regulation projection seems also based on Monte Carlo simulation.

When he first developed his model in 1979, he was shocked that it would often contradict his own expert opinion and most often turn out right. The Defense Department made him predict 17 different foreign negotiation issues. His model got all 17 outcomes right!

He states that a computer can readily grasp what no human mind can because his model can capture readily all the layers of information being traded among decision makers. With just 10 players, this number of info exchange is already 10 factorial or 3.6 million exchanges.

In chapter 4, when dealing with North Korea nuclear containment negotiation he explains the underlying basics of his predictive model. He states his model needs only four inputs (converted from English into quantitative scores) to predict an outcome:

1) The relevant players influencing the outcome;
2) The players' position on the issue (No = 0, Yes = 100);
3) How much they care about the outcome (salience; does not care = 0, cares a lot = 100); and
4) How influential they are (with an Influence weight).

To figure the answers to the above questions, you talk to the relevant experts or research the media (The Economist, NY Times, etc...).

Regarding the North Korea situation with 6 defined potential outcomes, the author first generates a baseline forecast as shown in Appendix I. He calculated the weighted average position of all players that came out to 60 corresponding to "slow reduction in nuclear development and capability in exchange for U.S. granting diplomatic recognition." To refine the estimated position of 60, he makes manual adjustments reflecting minute shift in players positions. And, he reruns the numbers until all realistic change in players' positions are accounted for. And, this gives him how a position on an issue evolves over several rounds of negotiations.

He has used his model in a wide range of circumstances including: foreign policy negotiations, company mergers, company fraud, and litigation. And, the related predictions were surprisingly accurate.

The author is quite a historian. His analysis of historical flows from Christopher Columbus to nowadays and his many related model applications are pretty fascinating. He uses the data from the Correlates of War Project, an amazing resource for budding historians.

Later he moves on to contemporary issues to develop forecasts with his students at NYU. The one on Global Warming green house gas regulation is particularly interesting. His resulting model outcome that any regulation implementation will fail makes sense. His optimism that ultimately technology will solve what regulation could not is also commonsensical.

On the other hand, the author states his model did not predict the failure of the Clinton Health Care plan. But, he advances it was solely due to Rostenkowski retiring from Congress. But, the Clinton Plan never gathered adequate support in Congress because Hillary was unwilling to compromise (no way to pass a legislation through Congress).

Sometimes his proposals appear far fetched. His implementation of altering Board members voting system for a new CEO into a Byzantine single elimination system is hard to believe. Why would any Board member agree to such burdensome procedure? Also, his Palestinian vs Israeli tourism revenue sharing proposal is probably Utopian. Nevertheless, those few minute rebuttals do not distract from the overall excellence of the model.

More about the predictor than the prediction process
The Predictoneer's Game is a story about the author and the accuracy of his predictions than a discussion on the application of Game Theory to decision making. While the book contains descriptions of Game Theory, the majority of its pages are dedicated to the author explaining past predictions and how they were destined to be accurate. If you are looking for a book on how to understand and apply game theory for yourself, then you will need to look elsewhere in my opinion.

In many ways, Bruce Bueno De Mesquita's book is similar to those written by Nicholas Taleb. Both authors explain their thoughts and tools in a self-referential style that you will notice throughout the book. In more than one place, this tone can be a bit overbearing. This is more of a book for those that admire game theory rather than people who want to learn how to apply game theory. This does not mean that the book is not enjoyable and worth the read - it is just not what I expected.

The Predictioneer's Game is organized around the authors experience applying game theory to a wide range of situations from peace in the Middle East, North Korea nuclear disarmament to how to purchase an automobile. Each of these case stories is interesting examination of the events and the motivations leading to the actor's decisions.

The book does describe approaches for applying game theory. The appendix contains sample calculations all of which will get people started. These will help get people started in applying game theory to understand the behaviors and motivations of players in a decision, but according to the author there is more to the model than a table of influence, salience and position figures. As an example of this limited support, the author talks about weaknesses in the model, errors you should avoid, but it provides limited examples of how to fix it.

It is an interesting, but challenging read. This book requires a quiet room where you can concentrate on reading and understanding the game theory ideas by reading between the lines.

The stories and case studies are interesting and make this book worth the read. However, I had expected more from one of the founding minds and leading practitioners of game theory. So it's a good book, more from the perspective of reading about the forces behind current and past events than identifying tools that the reader can use to make their own predictions.