Product Description

The scope and applicability of risk management have expanded greatly over the past decade. Banks, corporations, and public agencies employ its new technologies both in their daily operations and long-term investments. It would be unimaginable today for a global bank to operate without such systems in place. Similarly, many areas of public management, from NASA to the Centers for Disease Control, have recast their programs using risk management strategies. It is particularly striking, therefore, that such thinking has failed to penetrate the field of national security policy. Venturing into uncharted waters, Managing Strategic Surprise brings together risk management experts and practitioners from different fields with internationally-recognized national security scholars to produce the first systematic inquiry into risk and its applications in national security. The contributors examine whether advance risk assessment and management techniques can be successfully applied to address contemporary national security challenges.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #392489 in Books
• Published on: 2008-09-01
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 336 pages

Review
"An innovative and refreshing book. By applying concepts of risk management to the study of international relations, Managing Strategic Surprise not only makes an important intellectual contribution, but also advances new ways of thinking about mainstream foreign policy challenges."
Charles A. Kupchan, Georgetown University and Council on Foreign Relations, author of The End of the American Era

"A superb collection of our best thought leaders and a welcome return of academia to the critical discussion of how to think about strategic surprise in the 21st Century. The authors thoughtfully capture the opportunities of risk management and its associated analytical paradigm as the next generation process to contend with strategic surprise. Of considerable note for further review is the suggestion that the United States has a competitive advantage in information technology and agile military response which could potentially serve as the framework for a successful interactive process to prevent strategic surprise. A must read for all those who seek to integrate risk management and risk assessment into an effective process to prevent strategic surprise for generations to come."
Kenneth A. Minihan, Lieutenant General, United States Air Force (Ret) and Former Director, National Security Agency

"Not still an art, not yet a science we have much to learn about understanding and responding to strategic surprise. From finance to government, strategic surprise has been our most challenging and often our most opportune phenomenon. This book has more enlightenment per page on the subject; it should be read by all of you whose lives, jobs and fortunes depend on fathoming surprise - almost all of us!"
Thomas R. Pickering, Former Under Secretary of State and Career Ambassador of the United States

"The authors stare such horrors as nuclear proliferation and mass terrorism in the face and, rather than shuddering, analyze, parse, balance, and judge. Conclusion: don't try to predict the future - it's about insight, not numbers. Bravo, Bravo, Bravo."
R. James Woolsey, Venture Partner, VantagePoint, and former Director of Central Intelligence

"Managing Strategic Surprise is a masterpiece. Cutting across a wide swath of academic disciplines, the book shows how risk management approaches used everywhere from Fortune 500 companies to environmental agencies can improve US national security policy. Whether you're a senior policymaker, a graduate student, or a concerned citizen, this book will change the way you think about post-9/11 threats and how to combat them."
Amy B. Zegart, Associate Professor of Public Policy at the University of California, Los Angeles, and author of Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11

"In a volatile, globalized world, we worry about surprises. We fret over how to predict low probability - high risk events. Since no one has a crystal ball, engineers have worked on methods for managing unpredictable risks. But the use of 'risk screens', now so widely accepted in the private sector has been largely ignored in the far more consequential realm of international politics. To offer help, Bracken, Bremmer, and Gordon have assembled a world-class team of contributors to outline the methods and show how to apply them in international policymaking. This is a huge service in an area where the need is so great yet the methods and professional training are so weak. Aided by these excellent essays, readers will find that these ideas are practical too."
Philip Zelikow, Former Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission

About the Author
Paul Bracken is Professor of Management and Political Science at Yale University. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and works with private equity and hedge funds on using scenarios for investment strategies.

Ian Bremmer is President of Eurasia Group, the world's largest political risk consultancy. He is also Senior Fellow at the World Policy Institute and a columnist for the Financial Times. His research focuses on states in transition, global political risk, and US national security.

David Gordon is Director of Policy Planning at the US Department of State. He previously served as Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council (NIC) in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and is the former Director of the CIA's Office of Transnational Issues (OTI). He has directed major analytic projects on country-level economic and financial crises, emerging infectious disease risks, global demographic trends, and the changing geopolitics of energy.

Customer Reviews

Risky Business
The principal theme of this book is that risk management must be integral to any national security strategy. To explore this theme the editors of the book have compiled a series of essays by various subject matter experts to explore risk management and its corollary warning intelligence as they affect national security. Like all compilations some essays are better than others.

The lead essays on "How to Build a Warning System" and "Intelligence Management as Risk Management" are also the weakest of the lot. In both a basic misunderstanding of intelligence processes and capabilities is apparent. Remarkably both also manage to misread the conclusions of Roberta Wohstetter in her book, "Pearl Harbor: warning and decision" which although it does emphasize the failure of intelligence on that occasion, it also makes it clear that the failure as a part of a wider breakdown of the U.S. national defense system. In both essays one is left with conclusion that both authors (Bracken and Arad) have not done their homework.

There are also two essays in this book that are absolutely first rate and well worth the price of admission. "Managing Energy Security Risks" by Van Der Linde does a masterful job explaining the complex issues of energy and national security in a global economy. And "Political Stability Frameworks and Country Risks" does an outstanding job of explaining the risks and opportunities of globalization for national security.

The editors of this book are to be commended for raising the important issue of risk management in the formulation of national security policy. Even if not perfect the book lays a firm foundation for further studies on this important issue.