Product Description

By the time Hitler declared war on the Soviet Union in 1941, he knew that his military machine was running out of fuel. In response, he launched Operation Blau, a campaign designed to protect Nazi oilfields in Rumania while securing new ones in the Caucasus. All that stood in the way was Stalingrad.

Most accounts of the Battle of Stalingrad have focused on the dismal fate of the German Army. Joel Hayward now chronicles Luftwaffe operations during that campaign, focusing on Hitler's use of the air force as a tactical rather than strategic weapon in close support of ground forces. He vividly details the Luftwaffe's key role as "flying artillery," showing that the army relied on Luftwaffe support to a far greater degree than has been previously revealed and that its successes in the East occurred largely because of the effectiveness of that support.

Hayward analyzes this major German offensive from the standpoint of cooperation between ground and air forces to attain mutually agreed upon objectives. He draws on diaries of both key commanders and regular airmen to recreate crucial battles and convey the drama of Hitler's frustrations and reckless leadership. Ultimately, Hayward shows, the poorly conceived strategies of Hitler, Goering, and others in Berlin doomed the efforts of air commander Wolfram von Richthofen, a courageous and resolute leader attempting to come to grips with an increasingly impossible situation.

Stopped at Stalingrad is a dynamic case study in combined arms warfare that fills in many of the gaps left by other studies of the eastern war. By reconsidering the campaign in the light of a wider body of documentary sources and analyzing many previously ignored events, Hayward provides military historians and general readers a much deeper and more complete understanding of the Battle of Stalingrad and its impact on World War II.

This book is part of the Modern War Studies series.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #707796 in Books
• Published on: 1998-11
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Hardcover
• 338 pages

Amazon.com Review
As General MacArthur's air commander in the southwest Pacific, General George C. Kenney has long been regarded as a key to American military success in that theater of the Second World War. Yet MacArthur's Airman is the first extensive treatment he has received from a historian. Using both official documents and Kenney's own private papers, Griffith reveals his subject to be a pioneer in the development of air warfare. Kenney employed flexible tactics to fit local circumstances but retained a consistent belief in the purpose of air power: to limit an enemy's ability to hurt friendly troops. This meant controlling the skies and attacking far behind the front lines. Flanking an enemy is a traditional battle strategy going back to the days of classical warfare, and Kenney understood that the development of reliable combat planes provided a critical new opportunity to employ the oldest trick in the book.

Griffith offers a few biographical details on the Canadian-born Kenney, but mostly concentrates on the command-level experience of airborne warfare, from actual operations to planning missions, gathering intelligence, and maintaining morale. In all, MacArthur's Airman represents an important contribution to our understanding of the war in the Pacific. --John J. Miller

From the Back Cover
"A model work of military history that brings to life the drama of air warfare in the Southwest Pacific."--Michael Schaller, author of Douglas MacArthur

"A cracking good operational history that raises Kenney to the front rank among American commanders in the war. An utterly fascinating book."--Richard H. Kohn, author of Eagle and Sword

"A critical and provocative assessment of Kenney's accomplishments and airpower's dominant role in the campaigns of Douglas MacArthur."--Edward J. Drea, author of MacArthur's ULTRA: Codebreaking and the War against Japan

"A well-written and lucid study of one of MacArthur's most important secret weapons in the Pacific War."--Stephen R. Taaffe, author of MacArthur's Jungle War

"George Kenney was perhaps the most effective combat air commander of World War II. An outstanding biography of a vitally important airman."--Phillip S. Meilinger, author of Hoyt S. Vandenberg

"An original and significant contribution."--Stanley L. Falk, author of Bataan: The March of Death

About the Author
Thomas E. Griffith, Jr. is a colonel in the U.S. Air Force who flew in the initial air strikes of the Gulf War. He earned a Ph.D. in history from the University of North Carolina.

Customer Reviews

Well written WW II chronicle of Gen George C. Kenney
For a man of whom Gen MacArthur stated "I believe that no, repeat, no officer suggested for promotion to General has rendered more outstanding and brilliant service than Kenney... Nothing that Spaatz or any other air officer has accomplished in the war compares to what Kenney has contributed and none in my opinion is his equal in ability", surprisingly little has been written about this innovative and charismatic air power proponent. Griffith changes that with this well written, fast-paced biography. While not a comprehensive biography, Griffith focuses on Kenney's leadership in the Southwest Pacific Area during World War II. Taking command of a weary, demoralized group of flyers in which MacArthur had lost confidence, and turning them into an offensive-minded, hard-charging unit was perhaps Kenney's greatest victory. Griffith clearly explores Kenney's philosophy of how to train and treat his men as well as the five point of his air power formula. Over and over again Griffith points out how Kenney stuck to his formula with resultant success against the Japanese war machine. While lacking the depth and completeness of an exhaustive biography, Griffith's book is nonetheless the best and most balanced account of General George Kenney's life to date; especially regarding his role as air component commander in the Southwest Pacific. The rather abrupt ending of the book at the conclusion of WW II leaves the reader wanting more and perhaps some future writer will examine Kenney's post-war life. Regardless, MacArthur's Airman is an excellent place for one to start any research on this superb, somewhat neglected air commander who was instrumental in turning the tide against the Japanese in World War II.

A Fine Biography of One of the Less Well-known Air Commanders of World War II
George C. Kenney was one of the most significant air officers of the World War II generation. That is saying quite a lot because such well-known American air commanders as Hap Arnold, Carl Spaatz, Claire Chennault, and Curtis LeMay are also members of that cadre. But Kenney is less well-known than the others. This biography of Douglas MacArthur's air commander in the Pacific Theater is a welcome addition to the literature of air power, rescuing Kenney from obscurity. Born into an elite New England family and educated at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, rather than West Point, Kenney became enamored with flight during World War I and enlisted in the Army Air Service where he became a pilot. He flew 75 combat missions in Europe and shot down two enemy aircraft. He ended the war as a captain, and received the Distinguished Service Cross and the Silver Star for his valor.

The air arm of the Army during the period between the two world wars was small but filled with young officers fired with a vision of independence based on the possibility of strategic bombing to win future conflicts. Kenney was one of those young men. He served in a variety of positions, concentrating on aeronautical development and its application to warfare and pursuing the chimera of victory solely through air power.

In August 1942 with the United States entering the Second World War less than a year earlier, Kenney assumed command of all allied air forces in the Southwest Pacific, and worked throughout the war as MacArthur's air component commander. Kenney found that meeting MacArthur's stiff requirements was not easy. The Japanese were at first stronger, of course, but the distances in the Pacific, the unique climate, the difficulties of logistics, and the dearth of virtually all resources made every campaign a challenge. His abilities as a leader, his willingness to cut through regulations and to innovate with both tactics and equipment, and his unique conceptions on how to organize forces and mass them for victory were critical to success in the Pacific. For instance, as this biography points out, experimentation with ordnance made possible the unusual but successful tactic of skip-bombing Japanese ships. In addition, Kenney's organizational approach of composite units with bombers, fighters, transports, and all support ingredients ensured that smaller units could conduct effective warfare in the expanses of the Pacific.

In 1946 Kenney became commander of the Strategic Air Command, the central organization charged with nuclear bombardment. In October 1948 he became commandant of the Air University. While in this position in 1949 he published a significant book, "General Kenney Reports," a work available in reprint from the Office of Air Force History, which was not only a memoir of his career in World War II but also an explanation of his theories on air superiority.

All of this and more is explored in this biography by Thomas Griffith. It is well-done and fully worth the time necessary to read and absorb its lessons.

Somewhat of a dissappointment
I purchased this book with high expectations, but they haven't been met. While there are some interesting facts, it appears that the author depends to a large extent on his own opinion and that of other historians. There are also contradictions - he accuses Kenney of exaggerating certain events, then a few paragraphs later will comment on his military brilliance. It also appears that the author failed to do all of the research he should have. In one instance he refers to a mission in Europe when B-26s went into Holland at low altitude as evidence that Kenney's faith in low-altitude attack was ill-founded. But while the missions - there were actually two - resulted in very heavy losses, about half of the losses were due to operational causes and most of the airplanes shot down were lost to German fighters. Such claims distract from what could have been an excellent book. The author also fails to place the Kenney's decisions in the context of World War II where casualties were expected and accepted, but rather follows the modern military aviation philosophy that casualties of any kind are unacceptable. While I would recommend the book for lack of anything else on the subject, the reader should beware.