Product Description

Jerry Sutton examines the twenty-year struggle to restore the destiny and distinction of the Southern Baptist Convention by describing the context of the struggle, the reformation that began in the Convention and how it took place, and the institutions in which the resurgence took place. This book serves as a testimony and an expression of gratitude to those who worked to bring about the Baptist Reformation.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #254182 in Books
• Published on: 2000-05
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Hardcover
• 560 pages

Customer Reviews

A mind-numbingly tedious account of a necessary reformation
Synopsis

The Baptist Reformation is a meticulous account of the why's and how's of the Southern Baptist Convention's conservative resurgence. Sutton chronicled in mind-numbingly tedious detail the events and persons that shaped the twenty-year struggle to restore the institutions of the Southern Baptist Convention back to their historically conservative moorings. He wrote from the perspective of a self-proclaimed participant-observer to help other conservatives understand the need for the conservative resurgence, to overview the strategies employed, and to assess the resurgence's effects on the agencies of the convention. Additionally, Sutton sought to respond to the liberal-moderate critics who, in his opinion, unfairly slandered the conservative resurgence and its leaders.

Analysis

If it is true that the winners in any struggle get to write the history, then with regard to the Southern Baptist conservative resurgence, The Baptist Reformation is that history. One could probably describe Sutton's account of the events as polemical history. Sutton did not approach the task as an unbiased historian. His objective was not to present a fair and balanced profile of the conservative resurgence, but to justify it and praise it. Beginning with the 1961 "Elliot Controversy," Sutton detailed the examples of theological liberalism conservatives felt had displaced centuries of historic Baptist orthodoxy within the convention's boards, agencies, and institutions--especially the six seminaries. Foundational to all these left-leaning theologies was the Bultmannian neo-orthodox view of the Scriptures espoused by a few within the liberal-moderate faction. Specifically, Sutton and other conservatives charged that the application of the historical-critical hermeneutic method to Scripture interpretation did violence to the true meaning of the text. Higher criticism at its core casts doubts upon the veracity of years of traditional interpretation. In fact, conservatives faulted the historical-critical method for casting doubt upon the inspiration and very nature of Scripture itself. Conservatives charged that once one no longer viewed Scripture as authoritative, inerrant, and infallible (the historic Baptist position) then one could interpret Scripture to mean whatever he or she wanted it to mean.

Sutton, and by extension other conservatives, rightly rejected higher criticism as a valid hermeneutic method. However, they did not specify the hermeneutic technique that would lead the scholar in a proper "Baptist" exegesis. This reader was left with the impression that a proper Baptist hermeneutic would be guided by at least four exegetical keys: historical, grammatical, Christological, and orthodoxy. In other words, no proper interpretation of Scripture could refute historic Baptist beliefs. Thus, one is to interpret Scripture by historic Baptist beliefs instead of Baptist beliefs being informed by the Scriptures. Such a position would make Baptists the sole arbiter of orthodoxy for all Christianity leaving no room for honest disagreement.

Additionally, conservatives and liberals did constant battle in the realm of semantics. Conservatives rightly supported the view that the Scriptures were infallible, inerrant, and a completely trustworthy revelation of God and his plan for creation. When pressed by liberals to define their terms, the conservatives contended that the Scriptures were infallible and inerrant in their original autographs. Liberals accurately charged that the autographs are lost, but wrongly assumed that infallibility was consequently lost. Furthermore, the conservatives failed to demonstrate how inerrancy continued through the millennia (chapter 19 notwithstanding). Several questions remained unanswered from Sutton treatise.

In general, conservatives failed to identify which surviving manuscripts retained the original inerrancy and infallibility of the autographs. If the surviving apographs are as equally inerrant as the autographs, then is one particular text-type (Alexandrian versus Byzantine versus Western versus Caesarean) more inerrant than another text-type? Is the "majority" Textus Receptus more infallible and inerrant than the eclectic Nestle-Aland? What about the inerrancy of the vernacular translations? Every translation is in some way an interpretation of the meaning of the original language. How does a translation retain the original infallibility and inerrancy? Are some translations more infallible (because of superior scholarship) than others are? Who then decides these issues? For the conservatives to claim that inerrancy and infallibility apply only to the autographs plays into the hands of liberals and opens the door of doubt for grassroots Baptists who want and need to believe that the Bible they hold in their hands is the Word of God. Conservatives failed at this point. It is foolhardy to appeal to the teachings of dead theologians, as Sutton did. Doing so only gives the impression that this is the way it always has been, so do not rock the boat--an intellectually unsatisfying position.

The conservatives had charged that neo-orthodoxy had crept into the convention's seminaries aided and abetted by a complicit, complaisant, and complacent bureaucracy. However, when conservatives were asked to name names, Paige Patterson released his 1980 "Reply of Concern" naming seven men whose teachings were outside of historic Baptist beliefs (111). Seven! Are Sutton's readers to believe that the conservatives went to battle for the convention over seven liberals? Conservatives had repeatedly charged that the convention was overrun with liberal heretics, and all they could name were seven. Additionally, the seventh meeting of the Peace Committee gave clean bills of health to four of the six seminaries, finding fault only with Southern and Southeastern, mostly because those seminaries were unresponsive to Peace Committee requests (156-158). Perhaps liberalism in the seminaries was not as rampant as conservatives led Baptists to believe.

For their part, the liberal-moderates gave the conservatives plenty of ammunition with which to fight the battle. Liberal-moderates at first came to the battle armed only with an elitist mentality. They adopted an air of intellectual superiority. To the liberals, conservatives were intellectually lazy if not intellectually bankrupt. Later, liberals hung their hat on the principles of academic freedom, "unity amid diversity," and the doctrine of the priesthood of all believers. However, as conservatives rightly pointed out, orthodoxy can stand only so much diversity before it becomes heresy. The conservatives argued that there were certain "irreducible minimums in theology" (185). To the conservatives, if convention official made their living off the largess of Southern Baptist labors, then their work should conform to Southern Baptist doctrines. Additionally, liberals made the false assumption that grassroots Southern Baptist did not care about doctrinal integrity.

Both sides used emotionally charged language to define their cause as well as each other. Liberal-moderates used terms like "fundamentalist" and "ultra-conservative." Conservatives freely used the word "heresy" when describing the liberal-moderate position. Unfortunately, the conservatives defined heresy as anything that fell outside of historic Baptist beliefs without honestly admitting that Baptist have never been a singularly monolithic group (General Baptists versus Particular Baptists or Separate Baptists versus Peculiar Baptists) and their beliefs have been far from ubiquitous throughout history (Arminism versus Calvinism). Conservatives also hurt their case when they found only one issue of concern with certain professors or writers. They tended to throw the baby out with the bathwater. For example, conservatives objected to Southern Seminary professor Dale Moody's assessment that the New Testament teaches the possibility of apostasy--an unsettled issue within Christian orthodoxy in general, although repudiated by Baptist specifically. Furthermore, Moody was accused of suggesting that people may be "saved" apart from conscious personal faith in Jesus Christ. However, Moody's position paralleled Calvin's "Secret Christian" doctrine. However, in Sutton's discussion, to be un-baptistic on one point of theology was to be heretical in toto--an overreaching premise.

Much of Sutton's book dealt less with the "why" of the conservative resurgence and more with the "how." Specifically, frustrated conservatives realized that change within the duplicitous bureaucracy required electing conservative presidents who would appoint conservatives to the Committee on Committees. The Committee on Committees in turn would recommend conservative appointments to the Committee on Boards (now Nominations), which in turn would recommend the appointment of conservative trustees to the convention's various agencies, boards, and institutions. These trustees would oversee the selection of conservative chief executives and set conservative policies for their respective agencies.

The conservatives' takeover strategy was two-fold: support the election of conservative presidents at the annual SBC meeting and rally conservative messengers to attend the annual meetings in such numbers so as to overwhelm liberal-moderate supporters. Each of these strategies had its own set of implementation tactics. Conservatives needed to find and offer credible presidential candidate. The vetting process was highly nepotistic. Those who were the chief architects of the conservative resurgence each had their bite at the presidential apple. Additionally, future prospective presidents were groomed into national stardom through a series of national Bible conferences and the annual SBC Pastor's Conference. These conferences helped achieve the second main objective of rallying the troops, thus giving the conservative resurgence the appearance of a grassroots effort. Whenever the conservative cause seemed to wane among Baptists at large, the leaders reenergized the people by warning that the Cooperative Program was in jeopardy from liberal machinations. Political maneuvering and backroom deal making characterized both sides of the controversy. The conservatives saw their politicking through an altruistic filter; that is, they were God-ordained to the task. Liberal-moderates were politicking in an effort to safeguard the status quo and their own positions of denominational power.

Initially, conservatives mischaracterized their presidential victories as a broad-based endorsement of their effort to stem creeping liberalism. In 1979, Adrian Rogers was elected with 51 percent of the vote, which conservatives viewed a stunning victory (99). However, 51 percent cannot be characterized as a broad-based grassroots mandate for change, especially in light of the national name recognition Rogers enjoyed. Nevertheless, conservatives took advantage of their newfound power.

Subsequent presidential elections were equally close until the objective of mobilizing conservative messengers to attend the annual meetings could build steam. The liberal-moderates failed in their efforts to keep control of the convention because they were slow to organize themselves nationwide, which gave time for the conservatives to define the fight. Liberal-moderates mistakenly assumed they had a right to lead the convention. Again, their elitist attitude was their undoing. Their assumption that Bill and Betty Baptist sitting in the pew did not care about such ethereal issues as theology proved fatal. Conservatives defined the fight as a battle for the Bible. Bill and Betty Baptist care about that issue above all others--evangelism and mission included.

The second half of Sutton's tome reflected upon how the conservative resurgence played out in each of the conventions major boards, agencies, and seminaries. Anyone who expressed hesitation at conservatives and their agenda were dealt with harshly (for example, Russell Dilday's firing). Those who were dismissed or forced into retirement where castigated for taking follow-on assignments at liberal institutions. Such actions were held forth as proof of their liberal bent and validation of the conservatives' cause. However, Sutton could have been more generous by realizing that these fine men still had to make a living and they were persona non grata within the SBC. They still had gifts and talents that could be used in the larger Kingdom work outside the SBC.

Liberal-moderates responded to conservative successes by forming splinter groups such as the Cooperative Baptist Fellowship. Liberals complained that conservative changes had excluded them from effective dialogue about the issues. Liberals failed to realize that they were feeling the same sense of isolation conservatives felt when they were rebuffed when trying to get a hearing for their concerns. Conservative resolutions in the 1960's and `70's went unheeded by liberal-moderate leaders. Later, liberal moderates went from being simply dismissive of conservative concerns to outright defiant. If liberal-moderates had taken conservatives' concerns seriously earlier, and had realized that neo-orthodoxy was outside mainstream Baptist theology, much of the controversy could have been avoided.

During the controversy, conservatives charged that liberals dominated the convention's bureaucracy and institutional processes so as to perpetuate their own beliefs and shut out dissenters. Now that the tables have turned, the conservatives have complete control of the processes. Bylaw revisions give the Committee on Order of Business near-absolute control on deciding which motions would be debated by the convention and which would die a silent death in committee. When motions are debated, the leadership's position is often voiced by a well-groomed program personality from a platform microphone, thus giving the speaker an air of authority. Opposing debaters are relegated to floor-level microphones. The presidential nomination process is tightly controlled. The heir-apparent is vetted early and the nomination speeches neatly scripted by the conservative oligarchy. While some presidential nominations from the floor continue (Indianapolis, 2004), in reality grassroots Southern Baptists still do not control the convention operations. Virtually nothing happens at the annual meeting that has not already been predetermined by the conservative leadership. The current leadership is well entrenched; and for the most part have repeated the error of the liberal-moderates by exhibiting a elitist attitude that says, "Trust us. We know better than you do."

Conclusion

After twenty-five years, the conservative resurgence is complete. One wonders where the guardians of Southern Baptist conservatism will find their next fight. Will the next fight be over some particular issues of theology (Dispensational Premillennialism versus Historic Premillennialism versus Amillennialism or perhaps pre-, mid-, or post-tribulation rapture)? Perhaps the next fight will be between Calvinists and non-Calvinists (Is God's grace resistible or irresistible?). Perhaps, the next fight will be within conservatism itself. In other words, what does it mean to be a true conservative? Conservatives would do well to learn the lessons from the fate of the seventeenth century Puritans in American. In his book, The Puritan Dilemma: The Story of John Winthrop, Yale historian Edmund S. Morgan recounted the tale of John Winthrop leading a group of separatist Puritans to leave the corrupt Church of England and establish a "City on a Hill" at the Massachusetts Bay Colony. Those early settlers had an initial unity because of a common enemy. However, once the enemy ceased to be a concern, they began to turn on one another. Those Puritan who once separated from a corrupt church began to find corruption and compromise in one another. The result was that they began separating from one another, weakening the fabric of their society. Thus, their City on a Hill was lost within a generation because they lost their unity by refusing to allow any diversity at all. Conservatives should take warning.

Thoroughly documented, fair, and reasonable account
Dr. Jerry Sutton chronicles one of the most remarkable church movements in the late twentieth century: the reformation of the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC). This was remarkable because it was so exceptional, against the trends of nearly every other "mainline" denomination and Western culture as a whole. Sutton, who earned a Ph.D. in church history and is a Southern Baptist pastor, offers us here the first major, formal account of the "conservative resurgence" that I know of from the conservative (or evangelical) side. Until this book, "the controversy," as Southern Baptists called it, had been interpreted by self-described "moderates" with predictably skewed perspectives. One such "moderate" account, Bill Leonard's God's Last and Only Hope makes a suitable contrast to Sutton's evangelical view.

Sutton's account, as a "participant observer," is divided into four sections. The first describes the shabby theological and institutional condition into which he believes the SBC had fallen under "moderate" leadership. Proving that some of the professors in the seminaries and agencies in the bureaucracy had strayed far from the will of the SBC, as expressed in resolutions at their annual convention and their Baptist Faith and Message (their de facto creed) is essential to his case that conservatives were not just out for power but driven by a passion to restore the evangelical faith. I believe Sutton proved his point. The second part chronicles the way the SBC began to change. He describes the elections of successive conservative presidents to the SBC since 1979 and the opposition they met from incensed "moderates." Here we get a glimpse of the fervent politicking that swept the SBC. Sutton shows that despite the "moderate" charges that the conservatives were playing dirty politics, the "moderates", if anything, were more political. As a student in a SBC college during "the controversy," I remember some of the "moderate" religion professors using our class time for partisan ecclesiastical politics and derisive remarks about the "fundamentalists." The third part records the resistance of the entrenched bureaucracy to the conservative changes, including one SBC agency that continued to use denominational funds to advocate the legitimacy of abortion despite increasingly pro-life resolutions by the annual convention. In the fourth part, Sutton interprets the key issues that were at stake. He emphasizes that the "conservative resurgence" was genuinely motivated by a concern to restore faithful adherence to the reliability of scripture, especially in SBC seminaries.

Sutton's book is not as polemical as one would expect. He does not even take full advantage of all the contradictions the "moderates" are shown to be guilty of. Instead he allows the new president of Southern seminary, R. Albert Mohler, Jr., to tell us about "the fundamentalism of the left" - the liberal tendency to talk about "tolerance" and "diversity" while excluding conservatives. He also records, but does not exploit, the way the "moderates" hid behind SBC bureaucracies before the conservative resurgence and then suddenly wanted to change the rules to protect themselves after the conservatives began to take over. In addition, he shows how the "moderates" used denominational loyalty to attack the conservative movement during the early years of the resurgence but quickly formed splinter groups, even a shadow denomination (the Cooperative Baptist Fellowship - CBF), after it was clear the conservatives had won. Sutton does not use his admission to a bias as a license to commit character assassination.

Incidentally, since the publication of Sutton's book, Bill Leonard has become, as dean at Wake Forest, a champion for legitimizing homosexuality within the church and over 41% of the CBF voted to affirm homosexuality with many in the majority voting against the measure simply because they were afraid of losing financial support, points conveniently overlooked by news reports from the Baptist General Conference of Texas - BGCT (allied, unofficially, with the "moderates"). That leaders of the "moderates," as now found in the CBF and BGCT, have so quickly moved to affirm what the Bible condemns as perversion reveals that the "conservative" concerns which motivated the reformation were Biblically grounded all along.

Sutton's book is, at points, awkwardly worded and occasionally repetitious. (Often this is the result of fully quoting or paraphrasing other people.) Sutton's analysis could have been more supple at points, turning the "moderates'" arguments on their heads. For example, he simply dismisses Leonard's proposition that the SBC controversy was caused by a change in American culture. Leornard seems to think that excuses the "moderate" and liberal theological deviance. I wish Sutton had explored the point further, perhaps granting it to Leonard but then defined liberalism, as has Professor Robert Yarbrough of Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, as that theological movement which allows the secular culture to be normative. In addition, I would have liked to have seen some reflection on what exactly the Baptist claim to "have no creed but the Bible" means. This is at the crux of the controversy. Sutton and the conservatives were certainly right to reject the "moderates'" implicit claim that such a position allows them to take any position, even those explicitly rejecting the veracity of scripture. Unfortunately, Sutton does not describe in positive terms what it means in practice. However, Sutton has given us a valuable text not only about America's largest Protestant denomination but about the nature of and resistance to reform movements.

How Philistines destroyed our denomination for personal gain
As a lifelong Baptist I am ashamed that someone would write a book glorifying how fundammentalists overtook our convention for their own personal gain. Before the takeover, our seminaries were world-class institutions educating and empowering men AND women to serve our Lord according to their own conscience as led by the Holy Spirit. Now our seminaries are a laughing stock and nothing but glorified bible colleges. All employees must affirm their allegience to the "Baptist Faith and Message", a creed that is amended at the convention leader's every whim and is placed above the Bible and Christ as our guide for faith and practice. (The SBC recently deleated from the BF&M the provision that Jesus Christ is the criteria for interpreting scripture-I guess now our enlighted clergy have usurped that role from him). This book is nothing but propaganda from those who stole our convention.