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The Forgotten Man: A New History of the Great Depression

The Forgotten Man: A New History of the Great Depression
By Amity Shlaes

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In The Forgotten Man, Amity Shlaes, one of the nation's most-respected economic commentators, offers a striking reinterpretation of the Great Depression. She traces the mounting agony of the New Dealers and the moving stories of individual citizens who through their brave perseverance helped establish the steadfast character we recognize as American today.


Product Details

  • Amazon Sales Rank: #31 in Books
  • Published on: 2008-06-01
  • Released on: 2008-05-27
  • Original language: English
  • Number of items: 1
  • Binding: Paperback
  • 512 pages

Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly
This breezy narrative comes from the pen of a veteran journalist and economics reporter. Rather than telling a new story, she tells an old one (scarcely lacking for historians) in a fresh way. Shlaes brings to the tale an emphasis on economic realities and consequences, especially when seen from the perspective of monetarist theory, and a focus on particular individuals and events, both celebrated and forgotten (at least relatively so). Thus the spotlight plays not only on Andrew Mellon, Wendell Wilkie and Rexford Tugwell but also on Father Divine and the Schechter brothers—kosher butcher wholesalers prosecuted by the federal National Recovery Administration for selling "sick chickens." As befits a former writer for the Wall Street Journal, Shlaes is sensitive to the dangers of government intervention in the economy—but also to the danger of the government's not intervening. In her telling, policymakers of the 1920s weren't so incompetent as they're often made out to be—everyone in the 1930s was floundering and all made errors—and WWII, not the New Deal, ended the Depression. This is plausible history, if not authoritative, novel or deeply analytical. It's also a thoughtful, even-tempered corrective to too often unbalanced celebrations of FDR and his administration's pathbreaking policies. 16 pages of b&w photos. (June 12)
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

From AudioFile
Terence Aselford does an excellent job with Shlaess revisionist account of the Great Depression. He narrates in a lively manner and manages to maintain clarity during the authors interesting, but lengthy, digressions. Listeners will meet many men, and some women, who were once household names but are now hardly remembered, including New Dealers Tugwell, Perkins, Wallace, and Wendel Willke, who ran for president against Roosevelt in 1940. Shlaes interweaves informative mini-biographies of these and many of the periods major political characters, forming a reconsideration of the causes of the Great Depression and the relative effectiveness of the New Deal. This is a genuinely interesting story well told. R.E.K. © AudioFile 2007, Portland, Maine-- Copyright © AudioFile, Portland, Maine

From Booklist
Its duration and depth made the Depression "Great," and Shlaes, a prominent conservative economics journalist, considers why a decade of government intervention ameliorated but never tamed it. With vitality uncommon for an economics history, Shlaes chronicles the projects of Herbert Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt as well as these projects' effect on those who paid for them. Reminding readers that the reputedly do-nothing Hoover pulled hard on the fiscal levers (raising tariffs, increasing government spending), Shlaes nevertheless emphasizes that his enthusiasm for intervention paled against the ebullient FDR's glee in experimentation. She focuses closely on the influence of his fabled Brain Trust, her narrative shifting among Raymond Moley, Rexford Tugwell, and other prominent New Dealers. Businesses that litigated their resistance to New Deal regulations attract Shlaes' attention, as do individuals who coped with the despair of the 1930s through self-help, such as Alcoholics Anonymous cofounder Bill Wilson. The book culminates in the rise of Wendell Willkie, and Shlaes' accent on personalities is an appealing avenue into her skeptical critique of the New Deal. Gilbert Taylor
Copyright © American Library Association. All rights reserved


Customer Reviews

Good Thesis but Tough Read3
The author does a great job expounding her theory that World War II ended the great depression and FDR's New Deal only helped prolong it. With plenty of examples of flamboyant socialist policies, overzealous prosecutions, and the unconstitutional court packing plan, she certainly makes a good case. This work, however, is pretty dense and can be hard to get through at times. This book would make an excellent source for an Economics class, but could be a little much for the average reader looking for an overview of the time period.

too many names3
This book has a great title and seems like it should be in-depth history. Unfortunately it's a barrage of names that seems to never complete a thought. I couldn't figure out what the author was getting at in most chapters. I wanted to read about cause and effect when it comes to the depression, the stock market, inflation and deflation, FDR's programs, trade, and common people's decisions and lives. Instead I got the attendance at a zillion meetings and the destinations of politicians trips.
Here's a sample sentence: "On March 11 came news that Homer Cummings, Roosevelt's attorney general, was preparing a tax suit against Mellon, as well as against T.S. Lamont of J.P. Morgan and Thomas Sidlo, a law partner of the reformer Newton Baker of Cleveland." Try reading an entire book like that.
So even though I gave it three stars (some people enjoy thick stuff like this) if you're an average inquisitive reader I'd say save your money.

She's Right: We Did It4

I was interested in reading another history of the Great Depression, having only read a single book on the subject, John Kenneth Galbraith's, 'The Great Crash: 1929'. Amity Shlaes' book was highly recommended by many authoritative sources as well-suited to the non-expert in economics who is interested in understanding the conditions which lead to the Depression, those factors that perpetuated it and, more particularly, what steps, if any, might be taken to avoid a repetition of those sorrowful times.

As the author of a general-interest book, Shlaes tries to hold the reader's attention by abundant use of anecdotes to illustrate what otherwise might appear as arcane economic concepts. This yields a somewhat encyclopaedic survey of the times, but also familiarizes the reader with many important historical personalities that are currently obscure, e.g. Rex Tugwell, Raymond Moley, Adolf Berle and Felix Frankfurter.

As I understood the book, the major points were: 1. FDR's penchant for experimentation, 2. His susceptibility to influence from his cohort of advisors the so-called 'Brain Trust', a frequently mutating group of intellectuals, recruited on the basis of their appeal to Roosevelt's current fancy and, most importantly, 3. That New Deal policies needlessly prolonged the Depression, simultaneously creating 'identity' and 'interest' politics. A corollary of New Deal policies was the creation of indebted constituencies: this resulted from developing conditions tantamount to 'class warfare' and by putting more and more people on 'the dole'.

Shlaes, however, is candid enough to point out FDR's shrewd abilities as a political thinker, citing, for example, his swift reversal of course by adoption of the formerly vilified scions of 'big business' when he realized the liklihood of an impending European war and the need for support from this quarter. Another interesting and politically adroit move was FDR's appointment of Joe Kennedy as first head of the Securities and Exchange Commission: who better to monitor fraudulent securities trading activity than an insider and master of the method?

John Maynard Keynes and his theories, adapted to various New Deal programs by FDR, receives a few pointed rebukes. The most telling point in favor of Shlaes' perspective came in the form of an endorsement by the current head of the Federal Reserve Board, Ben Bernanke. In November, 2002, at a ceremony honoring Milton Friedman's ninetieth birthday, he was quoted as remarking, 'I would like to say to Milton and Anna: Regarding the Great Depression. You're right, we did it. We're very sorry. But thanks to you, we won't do it again.' Let's hope he's right. But, What better vindication could Shlaes' arguments wish for?

In summary, an interesting book, well worth reading.