Product Description

Applying evolutionary biology to traditional philosophical problems, this volume establishes a naturalistic approach to our understanding of life's major problems. Ruse argues thoughtfully that to understand the problems of knowledge and moral thought and behavior, we must know that we are the end-products of the natural process of evolution rather than the special creation of a supernatural god.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #1220051 in Books
• Published on: 1998-08
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 340 pages

Customer Reviews

very good resource
This is an engaging read for students who want to grapple with a lot of
the details of Darwinism that tend to get left out of more fluffy
popularizations of evolution. For example a good chapter reviewing
the basic (but rarely reviewed) facts supporting the theory--
in particular the subtle difference between early hominids' and
homo sapiens' abililty to develop articulate speech. Particularly
excellent, though, is the last chapter dealing with the rhetorical
(but scientifically empty) attacks on Darwinism made by some
conservatives.

Ruse Again an Enigma
This book claims to evaluate two Darwinian off-shoots: Evolutionary epistemology and evolutionary ethics. Ruse claims he is a Darwinian naturalist, philosopher, and historian. Charitably, Ruse's interpretation of Karl Popper differs widely from my own, but Ruse's own juxtaposition of texts betrays his own interpretation. He quotes Popper, "growth of our knowledge is the result of a process closely resembling what Darwin called 'natural selection'," to which Ruse retorts, "Popper is still convinced that scientific knowledge is truly exactly analogous to the change which occurs within organic groups" (62). Yes, "resembling" is a form of analogy, but not "truly exactly analogous." Ruse is misstating Popper with interpolated hyperbole. Why? Then Ruse complains that Popper makes these "mistakes" to preserve his "metaphysics" (64). The mistakes are all Ruse's, especially if Ruse thinks Popper has a "metaphysics." One is free to misinterpret and mis-characterize Popper, but claiming Popper's mistakes flow from his metaphysics is one of the most outrageous claims I've ever read, unless Ruse's private language has a special meaning for "metaphysics."

It gets worse. Apparently Ruse does not know the difference between "ethics" and "morality," which is incredible if he claims to be a philosopher. But he uses "ethics," when he clearly means "morality." And Ruse means deontic morality in specific (which excludes de facto ethics). "Morality," writes Ruse, "is about what we 'ought' or 'should' do . . . it is a set against universal prohibitions . . . there is a certain 'prescriptive' as opposed to descriptive, air to morality . . . about 'good,' 'bad,' and 'right,' and 'wrong'" (69, passim). But he really wants "ethics," despite his dogged moral deontology. For only benevolence ethics fits an evolutionary ethics, and evolutionary ethics is his focus. So, who does he cite for his "evolutionary ethics?" Why Kant and Bentham, the two most deontic moralists, who cannot be "fit" into an evolutionary ethics.

Of course, Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Adam Smith, and Thomas Reid, the 18th C. benevolence theorists would have been the "obvious" candidates for Ruse to use to describe benevolence ethics, which, as history has shown, anticipates beautifully "reciprocal altruism" empirically validated two centuries later by Trivers, Williams, and Hamilton. Does Ruse cite these Scots? He briefly introduces Hume, but mischarcterizes Hume too! Does he draw the "obvious" connections between Smith's benevolence ethics in the "Theory of Moral Sentiments" and Trivers's "Reciprocal Altruism?" No. Smith isn't mentioned. Nor is Trivers. So what "evolutionary ethics" does Ruse have in mind? Why Kant's categorical imperative and Bentham's utilitarian calculus! Huh? One cannot get to an evolutionary "ethics" from the deontological moral imperatives of Kant and Bentham!

The final straw was Ruse's use of Hume's "is/ought" (fact/value) distinction, which Ruse identifies as the "naturalistic fallacy." (Technically, many philosophers do this, even through the latter is G. E. Moore's jargon for a different species of distinction altogether.) But then, Ruse cites G. E. Moore and proceeds to ignore the fact that Moore's naturalistic fallacy is NOT the "is/ought" distinction of Hume! If Moore had not been introduced, we'd overlook the retrograde nominalism of Hume's "is/ought" distinction and call it the "naturalistic fallacy" without being too technical about the misuse. But to raise Moore just won't allow the conflation of Moore's naturalistic fallacy with Hume's is/ought distinction. And Ruse then misses the whole point behind Moore's idea (Moore was addressing the "good" which is not the Humean fact/value distinction at all.)

These three examples allow a charitable description of Ruse as "confused, naive, and ignorant." But, if Ruse cannot get right what are ostensibly his "targets," it really matters not what he attacks, because he's attacking his own straw men or other fanciful notions, but not the ACTUAL subjects that he mislabels evolutionary epistemology and ethics at the outset. Unfortunately, similar ruses occur in other Ruse works (another whopper is his "Homosexuality"). One has to wonder where he gets his mistaken ideas, or why he thinks he "slays" targets that don't even exist? Or else just ignore his particular projects as tangential incoherences at best.

Really disappointing
The biggest mistake that a non-fiction author can make is not writing for their intended audience. Ruse claims to write for both the professional and the general reader, but if you aren't a professional philosopher, this book is NOT for you. Trust me.

The idea is great, and I would like to see more books like this. The execution, however, leaves much to be desired. Ruse seems to get constantly sidetracked on what, to me, seem to be obscure philosophical discussions. Maybe they are actually quite pertinent to his argument, but if so, I didn't see it, and he didn't explain it. That's the problem. There is no explanation as to why he is following certain reasoning paths. The professional philosopher will probably pick it up, but the general reader is left lost and bored.

There are some interesting ideas here, and Ruse does come to some useful conclusions, but there is not nearly enough in here to justify the read. He spends too much time trying to reconcile his philosophical view with the views of past philosophers like Kant and Hume. This seems to have very little to do with what the book was actually supposed to be about, and once again is of interest to the professional philosopher only. I honestly feel that this book could have been reduced to a quarter of its size without losing any original content. And at under 300 pages, that amounts to not much worth reading.