Augustine is most widely associated with the notion that 'a law that is not just is no law at all'. The natural law greats include: Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Augustine, Aquinas, and Blackstone.

Here, B posits a comprehensive view of English law. Legal standards which conflict with natural law are not valid. Valid laws derive their authority and force from natural law.

Pufendorf's natural law treatise grounds law's normative features on individuals. Further, for P, justice refers only to a part of morality. Pufendorf & Grotius provided the intellectual foundation for 19-20c. codifications.

Kelsen takes a strict separation approach - law neither intersects with morality nor politics. He posits an ROR which is internal to the law itself - the grundnorm. The grundnorm is the first rule in a legal system which details how legal authority gets started. For Kelsen, interpretation is an application of judicial legislation - hence, an application of politics to law.

A collection of valuable essays which add perspective to Hart's postscript - an unpublished essay at the time of Hart's death which address's Dworkin's critique.

Using Hart's framework, Finnis argues practical reason narrows the scope of legitimate sources for determining valid law. Practical reason replaces Hart's internal view among legal professional (judges and lawyers). So long as a set of seven basic goods is fulfilled to a minimum threshold, law may be considered valid.

This is a collection of several essays which form in part the background of Dworkin's Law as Integrity (Law's Empire). A crisp critique of the Law and Economics view is found in Section 4.

Raz's Sources Thesis was first posited in The Authority of Law. Raz is the lead proponent of 'exclusive legal positivism'. ELP holds if law is a social fact then law can only be made via positive action through a rule which decides who makes law (e.g. it's impossible to include morality in ROR). Moral principles may become law so long as they are introduced via legitimate forms of lawmaking.

Marmor is an exclusive legal positivist. Other ELPs include: Raz, Shapiro, and Gardner. Marmor defends an intentionalist conception of statutory interpretation.

Coleman is a well-known analytic philosopher - especially on tort law and economic analysis of law.

Llewellyn is a notable legal realist (along with Roscoe Pound, Felix Cohen, and Jerome Frank). A key theme of realists is instrumentalism - legal rules should be interpreted in light of their purposes. If application of the black letter law undermines its purpose, then the rule should be interpreted so as not to apply. On LR, law is reduced to a hodge podge of variables.

Unger's work provided the discourse for follow-on CLS movement. Unger's early work was closely tied to CLS.

Here, Habermas argues Rawls's original Theory of Justice is typical of 1960s welfare liberalism in the US.

Relying on Kant, Fried argues promising is a convention which creates a moral obligation on the parties b/c it is the expression of the willingness to be bound. Breaking a promise uses the other as a means. Fried's account may be understood as a defense of expectation interest.

Weinrib posits an ethical account of private law. For Weinrib & others, private contractual relations are excluded from justice considerations.

RB is a committed originalist - like Scalia, RB takes originalism to mean 'original meaning' rather than intent. The idea is discretion is dangerous and/or infringes upon the goal of democratic self-governance. RB takes his view to be embedded in the Constitution - a principal source for his libertarian-inspired jurisprudence.

Waldron is hostile to judicial review in general and intentionalist statutory interpretation in particular. Waldron's views are grounded on disagreement as a norm indicative of the political and legislative authority.