The Origins of the First World War (3rd Edition)
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Average customer review:Product Description
James Joll's study is not simply another narrative, retracing the powder trail that was finally ignited at Sarajevo. It is an ambitious and wide-ranging analysis of the historical forces at work in the Europe of 1914, and the very different ways in which historians have subsequently attempted to understand them. The importance of the theme, the breadth and sympathy of James Joll's scholarship, and the clarity of his exposition, have all contributed to the spectacular success of the book since its first appearance in 1984. Revised by Gordon Martel, this new 3rd edition accommodates recent research and an expanded further reading section.
Product Details
- Amazon Sales Rank: #30546 in Books
- Published on: 2006-11-06
- Original language: English
- Number of items: 1
- Binding: Paperback
- 360 pages
Editorial Reviews
Review
'This succinct and, above all, admirably clear volume...will be essential reading for all students of the subject, from the sixth form onwards. It is written with lightness of touch and an eye for the telling anecdote that will commend it to the general reader too.' British Book News (of the First Edition)
Review
From the Back Cover
‘Gordon Martel has done the impossible: he has madeJames Joll’s The Origins of the First World War once more the premier study on why war came in 1914…Martel has not simply updated Joll’s contribution but enhanced and improved it… A triumph of both scholarship and editorial talent; James Joll would have been pleased.’
Samuel R. Williamson Jr., University of the South.
‘Probably the best comprehensive history of the origins of World War I available in the English language… Gordon Martel’s [revision] will make certain that the book's deep insights will continue to captivate and inspire future generations of students and others interested in…the Great War.’
Volker Berghahn, ColumbiaUniversity.
Of the Second Edition:
'This succinct and, above all, admirably clear volume...will be essential reading for all students of the subject… It is written with lightness of touch and an eye for the telling anecdote that will commend it to the general reader too.'
British Book News
‘...this scholarly, comprehensive and subtle analysis should be made compulsory reading for all students of the period and, most of all, for the decision-makers of today.’
John F V Keiger, History
James Joll was one of the 20th century’s most eminent historians of international history. In this now classic text he produced a careful, clear and concise evaluation of the multitude of explanations that had been advanced to explain the causes of one of the most significant events in modern history.
In this new edition Gordon Martel has seamlessly weaved into the original text the enormous amount of new research on the subject that has been conducted by historians over the past twenty years. New arguments and the new debates that this research have generated have been integrated, and the bibliography expanded and updated.
The Origins of the First World War is an ambitious and wide-ranging analysis of the historical forces at work in the Europeof 1914, and the very different ways in which historians have subsequently attempted to understand them.
The late James Joll was Emeritus Professor of the University of London and a Fellow of the British Academy.
Gordon Martel is Professor of History at the University of Northern British Columbia. He is a leading historian of war and empire in the modern world.
Customer Reviews
Into the vortex - from all the angles
The Origins of the First World War is a highly readable and enlightening tour of the world in mid-1914. Joll doesn't come at you from any particular political perspective and grants you access to all the arguments for the conflict. Nationalism, politics, military expansion, big business interests, imperialism along with conditions in each of the beligerents are examined in a free flowing easy style.
Joll does a very nice job in demolishing the Marxist line that WW1 was the result of imperialism and big business interests. By the end you are left convinced that, while the German naval expansions of 1912 were ultimately to blame for the process that led to war, each country got involved for entirely different reasons. There are good maps which give are easy to understand.
I do have some criticisms though. Each chapter is self contained but doesn't have any sub-headings or breaks. The editors could have spent a little time breaking up the text in each chapter to make the text a bit more readable. There isn't a great deal of attention to longer term history - such as the lingering impact left by the Crimean war and its peace treaty. But these are relatively minor quibbles about history writing that almost ranks as a work of art. Joll was a highly gifted historian.
A Topical Approach to the Causes of World War I
The Origins of the First World War by James Joll was a concise but informative study of the major causes of the catastrophe that engulfed Europe and much of the world from 1914-1918. Joll began the book with a summary of the July Crisis of 1914 which was the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back. The rest of the chapters examined the major problems in Europe that made war inevitable. This review will examine each chapter and its importance in making World War I inevitable.
There were two major alliance systems in Europe in 1914: the Triple Alliance of Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Italy and the Triple Entente which consisted of France, Great Britain, and Russia. The lesser powers in Europe sided with one alliance or another, and their loyalties changed when it suited them. Joll explained how those alliances were formed. It was surprising how weak they were, as Austria-Hungary was frequently at odds with both Germany and especially with Italy. Great Britain also had problems with both France and Russia in the colonial sphere. If it was not for these alliances, then the July Crisis would have either never resulted in a war or the war would have remained localized in the Balkan Penninsula.
I found the next chapter on armaments and strategy to be especially useful. While many nations were spending vast amounts of money preparing for war and conscripting their young men, other states such as Austria-Hungary were spending a relatively low percentage of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense. I was surprised that France was investing far more of its resources preparing for the next war than Germany (the French had a three year conscription program).
There were several aspects of strategy that I found especially interesting. General Conrad von Hotzendorf of Austria-Hungary desperately wanted a war as soon as possible to unite the multi-ethnic nation and prevent Serbia from being able to incite the Slavic population. It was also interesting that both Austria-Hungary and Russia were both expanding into the Balkans, making a collision course inevitable. Finally, Germany and Austria-Hungary wanted a war in 1914 because Russia was in the midst of a vast building program (with French money) and they would be virtually unstoppable if the war was delayed until 1916 or 1917.
The chapter on domestic politics demonstrated that many of these nations viewed the war that arose from the July Crisis as a potential diversion from problems at home. The situation in Austria-Hungary has already been mentioned. The Russians believed that they could not back down from the conflict because they had failed to support the Slavic peoples in the Balkans twice before in 1878 and 1911; they would lose virtually all credibility if they backed down a third time in 1914. The Russians also hoped that a victorious war would enable them to achieve their dream of capturing Constantinople. According to Joll, the issue of Irish home rule was tearing the British apart, and they looked forward to a distraction on the Continent.
While France still coveted the lost provinces of Alsace-Lorraine, they did not expect to liberate them anytime soon. Joll believed that the French would have preferred to delay the war until her Russian ally had completed her militarization program.
Imperial rivalries proved to be a minor cause of the war. The author wrote about both the Fashoda conflict and the Moroccan crises in detail. These crises proved how weak the two alliance systems were, as England and France nearly went to war over the former and Italy failed to support Germany in the latter. Nonetheless, nobody was willing to go to war over colonies in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific. The most important consequence of imperialism to the outbreak of World War I was that Russia was forced to turn west to the Balkans as an avenue for expansion after they were defeated by Japan in 1904-1905.
Joll's overall opinion of the mood of the Europeans towards war was ambiguous. While there were some ultra-nationalist groups in all countries, they were balanced out by Socialists who opposed war. The Socialists hoped that a general strike might prevent Europe from mobilizing for war in the summer of 1914. According to Joll, there were some strikes (especially in France), but this movement was essentially killed when a French nationalist assassinated Jean Jaures ended any possibility that the Socialists could prevent the war; in reality, nationalism proved more powerful that Socialism in 1914.
I was impressed by The Origins of the First World War. This book was clear and concise. It analyzed the major issues in enough detail to give the reader a clear idea as to why war was declared. Not only did one learn about the July Crisis that officially began the war but also the underlying causes that led to this crisis.
Superlative
Joll's second edition of 'The Origins of the First World War' is without question one of the finest, most informative, and yet concise and easily readable treatises on the entire complicated topic. His analysis examines multiple factors influencing the war, and is admirably neutral, not displaying taint or bias (particularly that of Fischer), and provides one of the most excellent and succinct general analyses of the failure of the Second International that I have yet come across. Joll's bibliography is an excellent data mine and starting point for further research. Combined with Jannen's treatise on the diplomatic events of July 1914 ('The Lions of July') and Tuchman's classic 'The Guns of August', Joll's work is an essential element in any study of the origins of the single most important cataclysm in 20th century history.




