Product Description

Written by the chief military correspondent of the New York Times and a prominent retired Marine general, this is the definitive account of the invasion of Iraq.

A stunning work of investigative journalism, Cobra II describes in riveting detail how the American rush to Baghdad provided the opportunity for the virulent insurgency that followed. As Gordon and Trainor show, the brutal aftermath was not inevitable and was a surprise to the generals on both sides. Based on access to unseen documents and exclusive interviews with the men and women at the heart of the war, Cobra II provides firsthand accounts of the fighting on the ground and the high-level planning behind the scenes. Now with a new afterword that addresses what transpired after the fateful events of the summer of 2003, this is a peerless re-creation and analysis of the central event of our times.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #89031 in Books
• Published on: 2007-02-27
• Released on: 2007-02-27
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 784 pages

From Publishers Weekly
On one level, narrator Wasson's mostly neutral delivery is apt. The authors' dispassionate prose imparts their impeccably researched story of the 2003 Iraq invasion—from concept to insurgency. Sourced at the highest levels, Cobra II captures the fog of war and war planning. But Wasson's read too often feels routine, as if recounting a local board meeting. Because he renders the numerous players and backdrops with equal tones, differentiating between them can be a challenge. This style of narration creates an anti-tension when juxtaposed with the book's revelations that an invasion plan was being formed not long after September 11, despite administration denials. Strictly supervising the plan was defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who was intent on transforming the military into a lighter, leaner force. False assumptions, faulty intelligence, willful ignorance, personal politics and a lack of foresight all fed into the invasion strategy and subsequent messy outcome. During the audiobook's second half, which documents the march to Baghdad and enemy engagements, Wasson's energy picks up and he paints some impressive scenes of war. But in the end, a more vibrant read would have better complemented the significance of this penetrating work. Gordon reads the introduction and epilogue.
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

From The Washington Post
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made headlines last week by conceding that the Bush administration had made "tactical errors, thousands" in waging the war in Iraq. But, she argued, the administration pursued the right underlying strategy in toppling Saddam Hussein, and history's judgment will be based on whether "you make the right strategic decisions."

In their "inside story" of the war, Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E. Trainor stand Rice's assertion on its head. They show that the U.S. military's tactical brilliance during the war's early stages came despite the strategic miscalculations of senior civilian and military leaders -- and that the Bush team's misjudgments made the current situation in Iraq far worse than it need have been. As it turns out, in addition to the war with Iraq's tyrant, there was an ongoing war between U.S. field commanders, their own senior commander (Gen. Tommy Franks, the head of Central Command) and civilian leaders in Washington.

The Bush administration's two major strategic miscalculations are by now familiar: first, a broad-based intelligence failure regarding Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, the viability of its economic infrastructure and the reception Iraqis would give invading U.S. forces; and second, underestimating the challenge of stabilizing post-invasion Iraq. Gordon and Trainor -- respectively a New York Times reporter and a retired Marine Corps lieutenant general, and collectively the authors of a widely hailed 1995 book on Operation Desert Storm, The Generals' War -- go beyond these issues to focus on logical flaws in prewar planning that should have raised eyebrows among senior U.S. officials. For example, they report that when the CIA identified nearly 950 suspected WMD sites, military planners argued for additional troops to secure them lest the terrorists purportedly in league with Saddam Hussein spirit the WMD away during the chaos of war, thereby producing the very outcome the administration was trying to avoid. But Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was determined to attack with a "lean force."

The book's core, however, centers not on Beltway deliberations but on the dash to Baghdad by the Army and the Marines.The authors do a fine job making one of the most lop-sided campaigns in memory interesting, but the surprises that the Americans encounter turn out to be even more compelling. Senior U.S. field commanders soon realize that their principal enemy is not the Iraqi army but irregular forces -- many of them foreigners -- employing guerrilla tactics. These are portents of the full-blown insurgency to come, but no one back in Washington proves capable of connecting the dots.

While U.S. soldiers and Marines shifted their focus on the fly, the Bush administration failed to recast its strategy for the postwar endgame. Consequently, once American forces seized Baghdad, U.S. troop deployments were curtailed and units were instructed to prepare for a rapid drawdown -- even while the Iraqi police and military forces that the administration expected to preserve order were being disbanded.

While Gordon and Trainor recount the misjudgments of many senior civilian and military leaders, Gen. Franks fares the worst. Many of his statements defy explanation, including his mystifying declaration that "I am not gratified by enough forces on the ground" and his fondness for terms like "functional componency" and "strategic exposure." The general's battlefield guidance is often, well, general; he tells his commanders to take "action on all fronts," which, as the authors note, is "no better than issuing no guidance at all." The authors conclude, scathingly, that Franks "never acknowledged the enemy he faced nor did he comprehend the nature of the war he was directing."

The senior military leadership in Washington comes off little better; they are depicted as a bunch of empty suits. Then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Richard B. Myers, is portrayed as a reflexive team player incapable of expressing an independent view. The Army chief of staff at the time, Gen. Eric Shinseki, warned before the war that projected U.S. troop levels were too low to stabilize Iraq, but the authors report that he failed to press home his case once his views were dismissed by senior civilian leaders around Rumsfeld and his then-deputy, Paul Wolfowitz.

Unfortunately, the focus of Cobra II (which takes its title from the Army name for the drive to Baghdad) is limited by Gordon's experiences as a reporter embedded at the U.S.-dominated coalition's land command during the invasion. The book thus emphasizes ground combat; the "shock and awe" air campaign, for example, receives far less attention than it deserves. Moreover, while the book's subtitle claims to cover the occupation of Iraq, the narrative essentially ends in the summer of 2003. Finally, key policymakers such as Vice President Cheney and Rumsfeld declined the authors' requests for interviews; Franks offered only an hour. Thus the views of those at the center of the war were often not captured. Still, Cobra II stands as the best account of the war to date.

Toward the end of the book, some Marines fighting to capture Baghdad come upon a group of Iraqis outside a walled compound who keep waving their hands at knee level. Initially confused, the Marines break into the compound to find that the Iraqis had been trying to signal that it housed children: more than 100 of them, dirty, bruised and malnourished, apparently imprisoned by the regime for their families' supposed disloyalty. The episode comes as a chilling reminder of the horrors of Baathist rule. When Rice speaks of the "strategic" decision to depose Saddam Hussein and his barbaric regime, she is referring to a laudable goal, not a strategy. The war is not over, and good strategy is still very much needed. Cobra II offers an instructive lesson on the consequences of inadequate strategic planning. If its message is heeded, Americans may yet look back on this conflict and recall the words of Georges Clemenceau, France's leader during World War I: "War is a series of catastrophes that results in a victory."

Reviewed by Andrew F. Krepinevich
Copyright 2006, The Washington Post. All Rights Reserved.

Review
Praise for the Authors’ Previous Book
The Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf

“Focuses on high-level decision making and offers the most comprehensive and probing examination thus far of the Gulf War’s strategy and operations. It is likely to remain for some time the best single volume on the Gulf War.”
—Eliot A. Cohen, Foreign Affairs

“A truly remarkable piece of research and reconstruction . . . extraordinary: a richly detailed human drama, impeccably documented, sure in judgment, and not likely to be matched, still less surpassed, for a long time.”
—John Barry, national security correspondent, Newsweek

“Provides a behind-the-scenes look at the highest levels of military decision making that determined the outcome of the first Gulf War.”
—U. S. Army Chief of Staff’s Professional Reading List

“A superb account and analysis of what went right and what went wrong in the Gulf War. All of the inside stories of the people and the policies, the triumphs and the blunders, are here.”
—Jim Lehrer, The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer

“This model of investigative military history punctures the self-aggrandizing manipulations of commanders and the self-serving hype of politicians . . . [It leaves] the battlefield strewn with burned-out myths.”
—Daniel Schorr, senior news analyst, National Public Radio

“A fascinating account of the war. I recommend it to my friends as something that gives them a different element of some of the key decisions that were made.”
—Dick Cheney, former Secretary of Defense


From the Hardcover edition.

Customer Reviews

A sure fire bestseller
I must say that having almost completed Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq that I'm relieved by the fairness of the book. While it does point up an abundant list of mistakes in judgement by those at the highest levels of the command structure, it also makes clear that war is a foggy business at best. It is my opinion only that Cobra II avoids the pitfalls and traps by staying as impartial as possible. I found no axex being ground for either the right or the left.

I am also impressed by the degree of access to materials that Gordon must have had access to. I know that the prepub releases mentioned that Gordon had unprecedented access to both reports and personnel in researching this book. That is even more apparent as you read through the content. Gordon, who is chief military correspondent for the New York Times does a masterful job of telling the story of the Iraq War. Retired General Trainor, a Marines Marine, lends his insight and expertise and I'm sure made sure that Gordon stayed on task.

All together, Cobra II is a masterful book, written by two experienced individuals....experts in their respective fields. I think you will feel informed in a way that perhaps you haven't felt in the past after reading this book. You'll want to read this one.

Eye opnening
When it comes to writing a book about the inner workings of the war plan in Iraq and its execution, one can hardly think of a better suited team than Michael Gordon, the chief military correspondent for the NY Times and General Bernard Trainor, formerly of the Marines and now a noted academic. This teams first work, a history of the first Gulf War, is the definitive work on the subject. With unparalleled sources and careful analysis, these two men bring the readers a front seat view of the Iraq War. What they find, to put it bluntly, is not pretty.

Far from a well coordinated strategy, their work paints a portrait of a war plan almost entirely driven by twin ideological beliefs, the first being that a military victory could be won by a small agile army of fewer than 100,000 men and the second that their would be no need for a long term American presence. The reason for the last belief, so tragically mistaken in retrospect, was the idea that the Iraqis would quickly and peacefully form a civil society and, to the degree it was needed the international community would pick up the slack. The holders of these two beliefs? Vice President Dick Cheney and Sec. Def. Rumsfeld, to whom President Bush gave full authority to run the war as they saw fit. As this work demonstrates with a shocking degree of detail, all those who opposed this world view found themselves sidelined in the lead up and the execution of the war.

Gordon and Trainor offer examples such as the State Department and Sec. Powell who warned the President, the VP, and the Sec. Def of the near certainty of a break down of civil society following the conflict. They were ignored. Military officers with experience in Bosnia and Haiti made raised similar warnings. They too were ignored. Indeed, when military commanders on the ground in the race for Baghdad began to understand that the US faced a well planned and coordinated gorilla insurgency and requested the manpower and time to quell it, they were threatened with being pulled from command. Reading this work, one finds General Franks in well over his head, lacking the background to deal with the chaos that followed the war's end, nor willing to confront his bosses with problems on the ground.

While these authors do an impressive job keeping their analysis free of ideology, the work allows the reader only one conclusion, that the current gorilla war in Iraq was perhaps avoidable and certainly could have been less violent if the civilian leadership had taken the right steps at the beginning. These were not cases of hindsight being 20/20, but events predictable by experienced professionals that the President, the VP and the Sec Def chose to ignore. All of this begs at least one important question, which is why Don Rumsfield still has a desk at the Pentagon.

Gordon and Trainer produce a superbly written and informative history of the 2003 Iraq War.
Michael Gordon and retired Marine Lt.Gen Bernard Trainer are famed as the authors of the definitive history of the 1991 Iraq War entitled the General's War. Their latest history, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, is by far the most factual, balanced, and comprehensive book written to date about the 2003 Iraq invasion.

Gordon and Trainer draw from an incredibly diverse and wide range of sources: personal interviews, military planning documents, news reports, and experiences as embedded reporters during the ground campaign. The book smoothly details the process of the war from early planning to execution and to the occupation afterwords. Exceptional detail sheds light on the tension between CENTCOM, the Pentagon, and the White House, the tactical decisions and movements of the Army 3rd Infantry Division, 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, and special operatros who operated in Western Iraq. The amount of detail and the straightforward writing style give an intimate glimpse into the decision making process, and help the reader form their own conlcusions based on the evidence at hand.

Considering the controversial topic, it is most impressive that the authors remain non-partisan throughout. Criticism is leveled where appropriate. Secretary Rumsfeld's decision to push for lower troop levels and the lack of US post-war planning contributed directly to the post-war choas and ongoing insurgency. CENTCOM commander Franks is shown as an abrasive personality determined to win the war, without much regard to what would happen after. The authors also do an excellent job clearing up commonly held misconceptions about the war. For example, the President was not as eager to invade Iraq as commonly believed; Al-Qaida was the highest priority, and his decision for invasion came only after the Pentagon, Intel Community, and military all agreed that Iraq presented a long term threat to the United States. It is also revealed that senior leaders in the Iraqi government believed they possessed large chemical and biological stockpiles, and it was not until the eve of the war that Saddam told his shocked generals that they had no weapons. The fact that Saddam hid that information from all of his closest advisors makes the US government's incorrect WMD assessments more understandable in hindsight.

Ultimately, it will take several decades and the release of millions of documents before a more comprehensive analysis and history can be written. At that point, the players involved can be judged for posterity. For now, Gordon and Trainer presents the facts as they are currently known, and let the reader judge the rest. Cobra II is by far the best book on the subject and will likely remain so for years to come. This book is highly recommended.