Street Without Joy: The French Debacle In Indochina (Stackpole Military History Series)
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Average customer review:Product Description
Originally published in 1961, before the United States escalated its involvement in South Vietnam, Street without Joy offered a clear warning about what American forces would face in the jungles of Southeast Asia: a costly and protracted revolutionary war fought without fronts against a mobile enemy. In harrowing detail, Fall describes the brutality and frustrations of the Indochina War, the savage eight-year conflict-ending in 1954 after the fall of Dien Bien Phu-in which French forces suffered a staggering defeat at the hands of Communist-led Vietnamese nationalists. With its frontline perspective, vivid reporting, and careful analysis, Street without Joy was required reading for policymakers in Washington and GIs in the field and is now considered a classic.
Product Details
- Amazon Sales Rank: #24442 in Books
- Published on: 2005-06-10
- Original language: English
- Number of items: 1
- Binding: Paperback
- 408 pages
Features
- ISBN13: 9780811732369
- Condition: NEW
- Notes: Brand New from Publisher. No Remainder Mark.
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Editorial Reviews
Review
"...A dramatic treatment of a historic event ... the vast panorama of the Indochina struggle emerges with graphic impact." -- The New York Times Book Review
"A poignant, angry, articulate book . . ." -- Newsweek
About the Author
Bernard B. Fall was born in France and fought with the French Resistance during World War II. While traveling in Vietnam in 1967, he was killed by a Vietcong explosive. His other works include Hell in a Very Small Place (030681157X) and Last Reflections on a War (0811709043).
Customer Reviews
Washington Should have Heeded This Book's Message
This is the masterpiece that introduced Bernard B. Fall to the elite of the US political, diplomatic and military decision makers who made the fatal and tragic error to involve the United States in the internal deliberations of Viet Nam and her people after the ened of the French colonial period in Indo-China.
While many in Washington in the early 1960s claimed to have read this book, obviously, very few heeded its message. Had they done so, it would seem that the United States, despite all its arrogance, might have avoided the quagmire that Viet Nam became and the multitude of deaths that occurred as the result of our hubris.
Published in 1961 (more than 4 years before the beginning of the US build-up in SE Asia), Fall provided his readers with an exceptionally strong historical and political analysis of the region, its people and their leaders. Again, the Washington elite seemed to have disregarded the quality of the material and the skill of the messenger as they barged head-long into our longest and most divisive war. It was one that would ultimately cause America to question itself and to cause the American people to question the honesty and integrity of their leaders. That could have been avoided had more people heeded the message contained within the covers of Fall's outstanding treatise.
To be sure, Fall's loyalties were divided and often conflicted. Born and raised in France, he came to the USA after WW II to study. He first saw Viet Nam as a Fulbright scholar. He returned many times and became a recognized expert in the cultural, political and economic realities of the region. He knew Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap personally and had great admiration for their ability to unify and motivate the Viet Minh against the French Expeditionary Corps and later, the armed forces of the most powerful nation on earth. But, he also respected and admired the courage and professional ablities of French soldiers fighting for a cause few at home cared about. At the end of the supply and communications lines, the French Army in Indo-China was mired in a war they had little control over and governed by successive regimes in Paris that had no clue as to what might be needed to effectively and successively defeat the Communist Viet Minh. Despite all these failings, Fall never lost sight of the fact that the soldiers from metropolitan France did their best for a lost cause and a populace at home who cared less.
After the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954, France realized that continued attempts to hold onto Indo-China were futile. They eventually left, only to be replaced by the United States as the benefactor for the nominally democratic republic of Viet Nam, which had established itself south of the 17th Parallel. American arrogance and pride of position surpassed anything before by the French and the proof in the pudding is that we heeded none of the lessons offered in this fine book or others coming from on-scene observation.
Much as in his outstanding successor volume on the Battle of Dien Bien Phu entitled HELL IN A VERY SMALL PLACE, Fall doesn't miss a thing as he writes of the end of France's empire in Indo-China. The key personalities are all here, as well as the battles that undid the French military position in the region. His descriptions are accurate and unbiased, although on occasion they do carry a melancholy tone as he reveals the thoughtlessness of the French commanders and colonial administrators in the region.
If you want to read a single volume that will lead you to an understanding as to how the United States could have made such a colossal error in its thinking by choosing Viet Nam as a place to make its anti-Communist stand, then you need to read this book. Like its companion volume on Dien Bien Phu, it is a must for any serious student of Viet Nam and the war that drained the best from two of the world's most modern and professional armies. This book is also must reading for teachers of recent American and European history because the events of the late 1940s through the late 1950s were instrumental in what followed in the 1960s and 70s.
If you really care about the hows and whys of America's part in the tragedy of the Viet Nam War, then you MUST read "Street Without Joy."
Paul Connors
Essential Background to Our War in Vietnam
"Street Without Joy" is a must for the library of anyone interested in the 20th Century's Indo-China wars. Bernard Fall explored the French disaster brilliantly -- exposing the foolishness of the French military and political leaders while honoring the valor and dedication of the fighting men. Fall was a Frenchman who immigrated to America and accompanied French Union forces for graduate research at a U.S. university. His writing brought to light the hidebound French military leadership's failure to grasp the realities of counter-insurgency warfare. The French knew mobility was the key to thwart the Viet Minh, but they applied European concepts of mobile warfare that depended too heavily on roads and vehicular transport. The cruel fate of Mobile Group 1 in central Annam unveiled the limitations of French military vision more completely than the renowned fiasco at Dienbienphu.
The French bungled and miscalculated everywhere. They failed at tactical intelligence gathering, routinely neglected to conduct adequate reconnaissance, mismanaged the propaganda war, underestimated the capabilities and tenacity of their enemy and squandered troops and scarce material resources in defense of worthless fixed installations. In virtually every respect, French leadership ceded the initiative to General Giap and Ho Chi Minh - and you don't win by simply reacting to your enemy. One of war's oldest maxims is: Carry the war to the enemy. The French did not. The Viet Minh carried it to them - again, and again, and again!
"Street Without Joy" drew lessons from the French debacle applicable to America's growing involvement in Indo-China; unfortunately Fall was a prophet without honor in his adopted country. While a few forward-looking American officers appreciated the value of effective counter-insurgency warfare, conventional forces generals held sway in Saigon, Hawaii and Washington. Some of our greatest successes in Vietnam resulted from effective operations by Special Forces, Long Range Penetration Groups, SEALs, and native guerillas, but most of our vast resources went into conventional operations. Bernard Fall told us what to expect in the jungles of Southeast Asia, but too few of our generals and politicians heeded the admonition.
If only we had listened
Thirty six years ago I read Street Without Joy and after two tours in Vietnam and alot reflection and anguish since then, I still am at a loss for words. How could we have gotten into such a conflict without someone paying attention to history. This author told a saga of what strife and terrible history that southeast Asia has had and no-one listened. I have re-read this book many times and still am amazed at its context. Unfortunately I have loaned it out too many times and now have to order another copy. Its a book that needs to be read by every politician that has any thoughts of trying to change history.




