Product Description

Why do people go to war? Is it rooted in human nature or is it a late cultural invention? How does war relate to the other fundamental developments in the history of human civilization? And what of war today--is it a declining phenomenon or simply changing its shape?
In this sweeping study of war and civilization, Azar Gat sets out to find definitive answers to these questions in an attempt to unravel the riddle of war throughout human history, from the early hunter-gatherers right through to the unconventional terrorism of the twenty-first century. In the process, the book generates an astonishing wealth of original and fascinating insights on all major aspects of humankind's remarkable journey through the ages, engaging a wide range of disciplines, from anthropology and evolutionary psychology to sociology and political science. Written with remarkable verve and clarity and wholly free from jargon, it will be of interest to anyone who has ever pondered the puzzle of war.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #53944 in Books
• Published on: 2008-04-15
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 848 pages

Review

"A work of extraordinary scope and formidable erudition.... Gat definitively unravels the riddle of civilization and war."--Professor Robert J. Lieber, Georgetown University
"Gat's book is a rich undertaking definitely well worth reading and pondering."--William R. Thompson, The International History Review

About the Author

Azar Gat is Ezer Weitzman Professor of National Security in the Department of Political Science at Tel Aviv University. He has published widely in the field of military strategy and thought, including A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War.

Customer Reviews

A Remarkable Book
WAR has the shortest title but is one of the largest books I own. It is packed with information and well-written. A wonderful book to dip in any time to learn something new and unexpected.

A Must Read
The first line of Azar Gat's tome, War in Human Civilization, asks a seemingly innocuous question, "Is war grounded, perhaps inescapably, in human nature?" By examining a daunting array of fields--cultural and biological evolution, psychology, archeology, history, political science, sociology, and ethology--Gat constructs a comprehensive analysis of war unprecedented in scope and brilliance.
War in Human Civilization is split into three parts, "Warfare in the First Two Million Years: Environment, Genes, and Culture," "Agriculture, Civilization, and War," and "Modernity: the Dual Face of Janus." Gat begins by examining the fundamental motivations for violent conflict in nature. Adhering to the tenets of biological evolution, violent encounters were the product of competition for reproductive success--access to females and the resources necessary to attract and support them--and somatic resources, food. Gat proposes an "evolutionary calculus" in which the motivations for violent conflict are the direct or subsequent necessity of fitness. The evolutionarily selected behaviors that lead to violent conflict are (1) competition (2) retaliation to injure the enemy and/or reestablish deterrence, and (3) kin-based altruism, dictating that one's willingness for self-sacrifice decreases as the cost-benefit of genetic similarity decreases. Simply, the fight for survival and the protection of offspring, siblings, cousins, and so on, are innate.
Gat utilizes the ideologies of Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In drawing a distinction between hunter-gathers and pre-state agriculturalists, he finds that the Hobbesian view of intrinsic violence "closer to the truth," but not entirely dominating. He examines archaeological and historical data and reveals that state-based warfare is actually less lethal than pre-state violence, contrary to the Rousseauite thesis of a naturally peaceful man coerced into conflict over state-imposed materialism. In other words, civilization has, by coercive power, enforced (internal) peace, the reality of violent conflict more manifest in the dominating fear of it than its actual practice. However, Gat also recognizes the potential for error in using archaeological evidence that may neither be comprehensive nor representative. The sheer scale of state-based warfare renders it more "spectacular" while the mortality rate (among a much larger population) decreases. From this foundation Gat analyzes the relationship between cultural and biological evolution. Both are reproductive, restrained, and unendingly competitive systems, though cultural reproduction occurs far faster as transmission is possible horizontally from any mind to another. Culture, according to Gat, is largely restrained by biological predispositions that, in turn, affect the selection of biological traits. This, importantly, can even be harmful to our biological fitness, as selection against these traits--such as a taste for sugary foods that previously served to favor ripe, and thereby nutritionally valuable, fruit--is weak. Gat identifies the advent of agriculture and animal husbandry and the development of the state and civilization as the two most influential "'take off' transitions" in human culture.
Production in the form of agriculture and animal husbandry led to population increases and the concentration of peoples and resources. This concentration allowed resource monopolization as well as the differential concentration and appropriation of the limited surpluses. Here the Rousseauite notion comes into play, proposing that "existing natural differences between people were enormously magnified and objectified by accumulated resources." This, in kind, reinforced stratification by creating dependence on a few monopolizers necessary for subsistence. Coercive mobilization of peoples, resources, and the growth of scale increased the size of violent conflicts. Professional fighting forces were established along pseudo-kin lines (soldier brotherhood), dictating that "us" is cohesive against "them." This practice also led to sedentary fortification of settlements and the state-created distinction between murder and feud, and war.
Modern war between nations takes its definitional origins from Prussian military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz. According to Clausewitz war is a political act involving prolonged instances of conflict utilizing violent force or the threat of force to make unfavorable the conditions of resistance to one's will. According to Gat this definition is inadequate, explaining only large-scale war, and ignores the fact that the greater magnitude of state-based warfare is actually less lethal than pre-state violence. Nevertheless, despite his broad and thorough analysis, Gat's loose and implicit definition of war as any form of violent conflict reduces all motivations--political, spiritual, and material--to nothing more than complex manifestations of a desire for sex and survival.
At its most basic, civilization increased the material cost of fighting by harming people and their productivity while adding considerable complexity to the innate motivations of reproductive and somatic resources. Prestige, honor, and power were developed as channels of resource monopolization, demonstrated by rulers' coffers and harems. Cultural links created by language, custom, and even ethnicity and nationalism formed communities similar to kin groups, making defense of these practices and similarities akin to the protection of one's genetic family. Gat views these cultural bonds, religion in particular, as the product of man's biological ability for extreme intellectual adaptation and curiosity: "We are compulsive meaning seekers." The development of written language created another means of connection while permitting the storage and transmission of vast amounts of knowledge, religion and mythology included. Interestingly enough, Gat points out that despite the peaceful creeds of both Christianity and Islam, both structurally accepted war, were utilized in its pursuit, and have been unable to "eradicate the motivations and realities that generated war." War has been a part of human existence for hundreds of thousands of years, but what of its role in the modern world?
In the last section of War in Human Civilization Gat looks to the development of nation-states, the peculiarity of Western success, the impact of technological innovation, and the role of affluent liberal democracies. Immanuel Kant proposed in Perpetual Peace that liberal democracies, particularly constitutional republics, would not war with one another because of the price members of those republics would have to pay to do so. Gat quickly recognizes that some historic republics have been militant and successful contrary to this thesis, but also that quantitative analysis of wars in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries show that very few conflicts were between two democratic states. Gat thoroughly examines the prospect of a democratic peace and delves extensively into the relevant literature and contemporary arguments, pointing out significant exceptions (like India and Pakistan) and errors (oversimplification, assumption, and vague definitions of "war" and "democracy"). In its original form, Gat rejects the democratic peace theory, framing his own in a complex and intricate examination of the organization and operation of modern affluent liberal democracies.
Gat recognizes the significance of globalized commerce, economic interdependence, and the pacifistic tendencies of these societies, and proposes that economic development renders the benefits of peace, and not the costs of war, prohibitive. He supports this claim with evidence of an overall decline in war in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries independent of democratic governments. This suggests that the existence of powerful liberal democracies produces benefits that affect peace globally. The citizens in these democracies, for example, have difficulty justifying killing, conquering, or taking territory. The tolerant democratic process can even be seen as making more palatable and readily practiced negotiation and compromise. Gat's view in this case is highly optimistic, asserting that the tenets of liberal democracy (life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness) make war unacceptable in all but the most drastic and threatening situations, "sometimes barely even then." In this complex ideological system, Gat is careful to mention a variety of related factors--the sexual revolution, decreasing birth rates, wealth, the shrinking size of the modern family, women's vote, and the advent of unprecedented destructive force in the nuclear age. Gat's affluent liberal democratic peace reconstruction, while more inclusive and explanatory, still remains assailable, if not only for its complexity and admitted exceptions.
In a modern sense, war can be symmetrical or asymmetrical, the force and advantage heavily in favor of one participant. The growing use of terrorism and guerilla tactics, combined with the replacement of the nation by the ideological sect as the center of gravity, has historically proved insurmountable for even the most powerful liberal democracies. Vietnam, Korea, Malaya, Algeria, Afghanistan, and Iraq are prominent examples. Gat's examination of insurgency, terrorism, deterrence, weapons of mass destruction, and the particular character of modern asymmetrical war are provocative. If deterrence, countermeasures, and prevention all fall short of effectively countering assault, then what?
War in Human Civilization is undoubtedly an exhausting and impressive work. "Is war grounded, perhaps inescapably, in human nature?" Gat says yes--and it is natural, explainable, and most importantly exceptional from other forms of conflict in nature because of human culture and the development of civilization through agriculture and animal husbandry, not any quality of its intrinsic character. The motivations and realities are the same. "That `war' is customarily defined as large-scale organized violence is merely a reflection of the fact that human societies have become large and organized." The ultimate causes of war are deeply rooted in our evolutionary history. War is a political act, but the politics that underlie its assumption were created in pursuit of the same elementary biological ends. The same evolutionary calculus that pushes us to crave candy and sex encompasses the array of variables necessary (though not always sufficient) that bring us to war. Gat, using a colossal reservoir of interdisciplinary knowledge, has forever changed our interpretation of war, violence, and our very nature.

He explains it!
The comments provided by the other reviewers are fair and accurate, I agree with them, so I would only point out that this book does not merely describe what happened but above all it explains why it happened. I hold it as a masterful work that can be savored by the professional historian and educated layperson alike. My rate is between 5 (content) and 4 (pleasure, sometimes falling to 3, sometimes raising to 5). I highly recommend it.

Other books on war that I would recommend would be "War before Civilization. The Myth of the Peaceful Savage", by Lawrence Keeley; "How War Began" by Keith F. Otterbein; and "War and Peace and War: The Rise and Fall of Empires" by Peter Turchin.

Additionally, as a complement to "War on Human Civilization", I would also suggest reading the following works, whose scope is as amazingly global as Gat's: 1. Agrarian cultures: "Pre-industrial societies" by Patricia Crone; 2. Economy: "The world economy. A millennial perspective" (2001) plus "The world economy: Historical Statistics" (2003) by Angus Maddison (a combined edition of these two volumes is to appear on December 2007); 3. Government: "The History of Government" by S.E. Finer; 4. Ideas: "Ideas, a History from Fire to Freud", by Peter Watson; 5. Religion: "The Phenomenon of Religion: A Thematic Approach" by Moojan Momen.