Product Description

Some have claimed that "War is too important to be left to the generals," but P. W. Singer asks "What about the business executives?" Breaking out of the guns-for-hire mold of traditional mercenaries, corporations now sell skills and services that until recently only state militaries possessed. Their products range from trained commando teams to strategic advice from generals.

This new "Privatized Military Industry" encompasses hundreds of companies, thousands of employees, and billions of dollars in revenue. Whether as proxies or suppliers, such firms have participated in wars in Africa, Asia, the Balkans, and Latin America. More recently, they have become a key element in U.S. military operations. Private corporations working for profit now sway the course of national and international conflict, but the consequences have been little explored.

In this book, Singer provides the first account of the military services industry and its broader implications. Corporate Warriors includes a description of how the business works, as well as portraits of each of the basic types of companies: military providers that offer troops for tactical operations; military consultants that supply expert advice and training; and military support companies that sell logistics, intelligence, and engineering.

The privatization of warfare allows startling new capabilities and efficiencies in the ways that war is carried out. At the same time, however, Singer finds that the entrance of the profit motive onto the battlefield raises a series of troubling questions—for democracy, for ethics, for management, for human rights, and for national security.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #508557 in Books
• Published on: 2003-08
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Hardcover
• 330 pages

From Publishers Weekly
A security analyst at the Brookings Institution, Singer raises disturbing new issues in this comprehensive analysis of a post-Cold War phenomenon: private companies offering specialized military services for hire. These organizations are nothing like the mercenary formations that flourished in post-independence Africa, whose behavior there earned them the nickname les affreux: "the frightful ones." Today's corporate war-making agencies are bought and sold by Fortune 500 firms. Even some UN peacekeeping experts, Singer reports, advocate their use on grounds of economy and efficiency. Governments see in them a means of saving money-and sometimes a way to use low-profile force to solve awkward, potentially embarrassing situations that develop on the fringes of policy. Singer describes three categories of privatized military systems. "Provider firms" (the best known being the now reorganized Executive Outcomes) offer direct, tactical military assistance ranging from training programs and staff services to front-line combat. "Consulting firms," like the U.S.-based Military Professional Resources Inc., draw primarily on retired senior officers to provide strategic and administrative expertise on a contract basis. The ties of such groups to their country of origin, Singer finds, can be expected to weaken as markets become more cosmopolitan. Finally, the overlooked "support firms," like Brown & Root, provide logistic and maintenance services to armed forces preferring (or constrained by budgetary factors) to concentrate their own energies on combat. Singer takes pains to establish the improvements in capability and effectiveness privatization allows, ranging from saving money to reducing human suffering by ending small-scale conflicts. He is, however, far more concerned with privatization's negative implications. Technical issues, like contract problems, may lead to an operation ending without regard to a military rationale. A much bigger problem is the risk of states losing control of military policy to militaries outside the state systems, responsible only to their clients, managers, and stockholders, Singer emphasizes. So far, private military organizations have behaved cautiously, but there is no guarantee will continue. Nor can the moralities of business firms be necessarily expected to accommodate such niceties as the laws of war. Singer recommends increased oversight as a first step in regulation, an eminently reasonable response to a still imperfectly understood development in war making.
Copyright 2003 Reed Business Information, Inc.

Review
". . . .[T]he first notable book on the subject." -- The Financial Times, August 11, 2003

"The creeping military-industrial complex about which President Dwight Eisenhower warned us five decades ago has reached critical mass. . . .[I]lluminating." -- Christian Science Monitor, August 14, 2003

"This is a new area for policymakers to debate and scholars to explore." -- Library Journal, July 2003

"[P]rovides a sweeping survey of the work of MPRI, Airscan, Dyncorp, Brown & Root, and scores of other firms..." -- The Atlantic Monthly, October 2003

From the Inside Flap
"After reading this book, it is impossible to see the landscape of insurgencies, civil wars, and inter-state wars the same way again. Peter Singer's book is a rare find: a study of the breakdown of the state monopoly on war that challenges basic assumptions in international relations theory; an exploration of the many different ways in which privatized military firms pose both problems and opportunities for policymakers; and a fascinating read for anyone interested in the changing nature of both international security and international politics."—Anne-Marie Slaughter, Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University

"A must read for anyone interested in the art of war, Corporate Warriors is a fascinating analysis of a new, often secretive, global industry. Marked by impressive research, this path-breaking study describes a pattern of increasing reliance on private military firms by individuals, corporations, humanitarian groups, governments, and international organizations. This is a masterful book that will appeal to students, scholars, policymakers, and lay readers alike."—Stephanie G. Neuman, Director of the Comparative Defense Studies Program, Columbia University

Customer Reviews

Brilliant foundation, commands further studies
Throughout history, private interests have performed military duties and always proved a critical political factor. Celts and Germans worked in the Roman Emperor's personal Praetorian Guard, King Edward I employed professional companies of archers, and the Swiss fought all over Europe, and are still guarding the Vatican. It's only in the 19th and 20th centuries that the state has become the sole legitimate agent in the conduct of military operations. The 1990s, however, have witnessed the emergence of private organized interests at every level of military operations. The twist comes because today these private military firms (PMFs) are organized as twenty first century corporations, with business plans and long term profit objectives.

Singer's analysis begins with an account of private military interests in ancient and modern times. This gets us used to the idea that PMFs have been around before and are really nothing new. In the second section, Singer classifies PMFs in three segments, each characterized by how far its activities are from actual fighting. First and most obvious there are the military provider firms that place frontline military units (e.g. Executive Outcomes) second there are the consulting firms who train and shape a client's military (e.g. Military Professional Resources Inc.) and third there are the firms that provide logistical and support services such as food delivery (e.g. Brown and Root).

Lastly, Singer examines the implications of using PMFs, which of course being corporations are motivated by profit. Singer illustrates how seemingly simple precepts result in fiendishly complex moral problems.

Do we feel uneasy at for-profit military firms? Of course we do and so we are tempted to dismiss any question of using them. But In 1994, one of the more unsavory firms, Executive Outcomes, created a plan that for some 150 million dollars could have stopped the Rwandan genocide and saved hundreds of thousands of lives.(*) The UN Security Council balked at the costs, nothing was done until the genocide was well under way and half a million people were butchered.

Do we support relief organizations such as CARE? Do we give them money? I do. But how should we feel about the Red Cross and CARE using that money to hire PMFs as protection? Is it right for them to support PMFs? Is it right of us to expect them to go into dangerous situation with inadequate UN or local military protection?

Singer's conclusions are only tentative, and given the emphasis he's placed on how complex the moral dilemma is, this is only proper. He neither condemns nor supports the rise of PMFs, he merely states that they exist and are on the rise, he describes how they operate, and he points out the practical and moral dilemmas that arise from making use of them. He ends with a rewording of the proverb that war is too important to be left to generals: war is too important to be left to private industry. In other words, he warns us that while PMFs are here to stay we must keep them in check and on a leash.

Vincent Poirier, Tokyo

(*) See comments for more on this.

VP

essential for our times
Singer's categorizations of military assistance organizations confer clarity in a fragmented, heterogenous field of activity. When one thinks of quintessential 'government-provided' services, one thinks of education, prisons, policing, and the military. While privatization in the first three such areas has been studied extensively, Singer has provided here an essential overview and analysis of how privatization has unfolded, to a much greater extent than we may realize, in the military sphere. 5 stars- as readable as it is insightful.

An great look inside the modern private military companies
P.W. Singer has written a very insightful and detailed look into the modernization and globalization of the private military firms. The private military firm is not a new concept but actually dates back thousands of years. These firms are better known under the more controversial name: mercenaries.

It'd be unfair to say that all private military firms are like the mercenary companies of old. Sure there are still flight-by-night firms that hire themselves out to the highest bidder, switching allegiances on a dime, and committing acts of brutality that made them so infamous during the African civil war and wars of liberation in the late 1950's and through most of the 1960's. The modern private military firm as described by Singer has more in common with corporations that deal in outsourcing specific jobs.

Corporate Warriors goes through in describing the many different types of firms. From the provider firms like Executive Outcomes (a famous early 90's firm created by former South African military operatives) which take a fron-line role in training, advising and fighting for their clients. Then there's firms like the US-based MPR who provide military assistance in the form of advisors that range from ex-generals to former veteren noncoms. The third type would be firms like Halliburton who provide non-combat services (mess hall, laundry, logistics, etc...) for the US Military and its allies.

What all these types of private military firms have in common is in the way they are run. These firms are run like Fortune 500 firms and alot of the companies in the Fortune 500 make use of these firms' services. Whether for help in negotiating with the governments of third world nations to security detail for corporate officers. These firms in the last decade or so have seen a rise in their profits as the US government and its military services have begun outsourcing noncombat duties to outside firms. It is this new practice begun by the US and mirrored by its allies that Singer points should be a concern.

Such firms are not bound by the rules of war and engagement. They also don't fall under the rules of the Geneva Convention in terms of prisoner status in the event employees of such firms become so. With the proliferation of PMF operatives and advisors in combat zones around the world it's inevitable that such employees will become front-line participants in such conflicts instead of staying out in the sidelines. One prime example of such an occurence was the ambush and killing of four Blackwater security operatives in Iraq. In fact, employees of these PMF's account for a very lrage percentage of civilian contractors killed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Another example where the line between military and civilian has blurred has been the use of civilian contractors to advise and conduct interrogations not just in Abu Ghraib, Iraq but also in Guantanamo Bay. Such a blurring of the lines has led to corruption and criminal acts.

Singer points this out in detail and sees the trend of governments using civilian contractors to supplement their military more and more in the years to come as a dangerous shift in miitary policy. Singer doesn't just point out the negative consequences of overuse of the PMF's. He also acknowledges that such firms does provide great service to their clients and have become an integral part of the global economy. Singer knows that like any industry the private military firms are here to stay, but with more governmental accountability and oversight of these firms then their negative impact on the political and strategic arena can be minimized.

I highly recommend this book as it takes a centrist approach in dealing with the subject of private military firms and the issues their sudden rise as a power industry has brought to the forefront.