Product Description

In what former U.S. Ambassador to Britain Raymond Seitz calls "a superlative record of Anglo-American intelligence collection, cooperation, and competition," noted historian Richard Aldrich reveals startling new information about the relationship between Britain and the United States during the Cold War. Making use of the formidable mass of material recently declassified by the United States, as well as files released by the British, Aldrich details the "special relationship" of cooperation between the British and the Americans, as well as the rampant rancor and suspicion that followed this public amity. The timing is perfect for this volume, as interest in secret intelligence soars higher than it has in years.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #1101020 in Books
• Published on: 2003-10-28
• Released on: 2003-11-25
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 733 pages

Amazon.com
America and Britain have long enjoyed what leaders in both countries have deemed a "special relationship." Their closeness has long been cemented, Richard Aldrich writes, by shared intelligence--"the hidden hand" of his title, even if their intelligence communities have sometimes been at odds and worked to different purposes. In the postwar era, writes University of Nottingham professor of politics Aldrich, American intelligence was aided immeasurably by Britain, which had had considerable experience in keeping tabs on Russian agents for decades, thanks to the long-played "great game" in Central Asia. One successful joint enterprise took place in Iran, threatened by Soviet invasion after World War II: even with a few missteps, joint American-British efforts led to victory in a battle largely fought through propaganda, even if that battle gave America strategic advantage in the Persian Gulf region at Britain's expense. Other joint efforts were less successful, including the cynical abandonment of the Hungarian rebels of 1956, and relations between the two powers were often strained by competing interests, such as those made evident by the Suez crisis. Despite errors of judgment, spy scandals, interagency and international competition, and other blights on the record, Aldrich observes that "Cold War intelligence was neither fruitless nor a zero-sum game, and its most substantial benefits might be measured through inaction"--that is, the fact that the war stayed for the most part cold. Aldrich considers the whole range of operations in this detailed account, which will be of considerable interest to students of cold war history. --Gregory McNamee

From Publishers Weekly
We do not yet know the full story of the Cold War, writes Aldrich near the beginning of this impressive study of Anglo-American secret intelligence. Indeed, we may never know. Nevertheless, Aldrich, co-editor of the journal Intelligence and National Security, gives it his best shot. Beginning in 1941 with the Nazi invasion of the U.S.S.R., and concluding in 1962 with the Cuban missile crisis, he details an astonishing range of covert activities by British and American intelligence units. Some of these, like the British effort to break the German Enigma code, are now well-known; others have remained largely obscure, for example, Operation Unthinkable, Churchill's appropriately named plan to attack the U.S.S.R. immediately after WWII or the British parachuting of agents into the Ukraine, where nationalist guerrillas fought against the Soviets well into the 1950s. Such revelations can be found on almost every page. Aldrich builds a convincing case that much of the Cold War was fought behind the scenes, manipulated by the hidden hand of spies, counterspies and secret analysts. Much of the important history of the Cold War, Aldrich says, remains locked away in the vaults of the CIA, MI6 and KGB. And even when information is released, the sheer volume precludes comprehensive analysis Aldrich notes that the U.S. National Security Agency alone now produces more documents in a single day than anyone could read in a lifetime. Despite these obstacles, Aldrich succeeds in throwing open the door on the grim secrets of recent history. Though the book's academic tone and sheer size may overwhelm some readers, those who persist will dramatically expand their understanding of the Cold War. 32 b&w photos not seen by PW.
Copyright 2002 Cahners Business Information, Inc.

From Booklist
Fans of detail-rich, just-the-facts books about the spy game will flock to this massive tome, but those looking for lively presentation to go with the details may be disappointed. The author, an expert on the intelligence community, has compiled an enormous amount of research; the book chronicles the post-World War II development of the British and American intelligence agencies and the evolution of the Cold War. It's full of familiar names--Anthony Eden, William Donovan, Kim Philby, et al.--but they never really seem like living, breathing people. Similarly, Aldrich charts the troubled relationships between the British and U.S. intelligence agencies but fails to generate any real tension; the facts are here but not the drama. Like Stephen Dorril's masterful and enormous MI6 (2000), this book is a wealth of information; unlike Dorril, however, Aldrich writes dry, textbookish prose. Still, the material here is genuinely fascinating, and that alone will be enough for many readers. This is an essential addition to the history of twentieth-century intelligence gathering; it's too bad reading it seems like homework. David Pitt
Copyright © American Library Association. All rights reserved

Customer Reviews

recent reviews submitted by a UK reader
Max Hastings in The Sunday Telegraph `Books of the Year' 2 December 2001 >

The Hidden Hand by Richard Aldrich (John Murray) is as good an account of Cold War Intelligence between 1945 and 1962 as we are likely to get for some time.

George Walden in The Evening Standard 23 July 2001 >

From riveting case-histories of individual operations to the furious intrigues of the transatlantic intelligence community , from the unsung role of the low-level agent to the evolution of electronic espionage - everything is here ... Aldrich has a gift for conveying a sense of living history, combing colourful detail of this or that episode with the grand strategies that drove the intelligence men.

Cal McCrystal in The Financial Times 1 July 2001 >

What makes Aldrich's book so delightful is its abundance of marvellous anecdote ... Miles Copeland, the CIA's new station chief in Cairo at the time of the Suez crisis, had little time for US ambassadors and was a bit of a cowboy. As station chief in Syria in 1950 Copeland was blamed for a series of army coups that "eventually led to an increasingly pro-Soviet dictatorship". He was moved to Cairo after a wild party during which guns were fired through the ceiling. Indeed, an Aldrich sub-theme is the extent to which British and American secret agents frequently unnerved their own governments more than the regimes they were supposed to monitor subvert or liberate.