Product Description

The Iran-Iraq War, which ended in August 1988, one month short of its eighth anniversary, was one of the longest, bloodiest and costliest Third World armed conflicts in the twentieth century. Professor Karsh addresses the causes of the Iran-Iraq War, unpacking the objectives of the two belligerents and examining how far objectives were matched by strategy. He assesses the war's military lessons regarding such key areas as strategy, tactics and escalation and in particular the use of non-conventional weapons, Finally, he examines the utility of armed force as an instrument of foreign policy.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #365698 in Books
• Published on: 2002-04-25
• Released on: 2002-04-25
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 96 pages

From the Publisher
This unique series studies every major war in history looking at all the aspects of war, from how it felt to be a soldier to the lasting impact of the conflict on the world around it.

About the Author
Efraim Karsh is Professor and Head of the Mediterranean Studies Programme at King's College, University of London. He has held various academic posts at the Sorbonne, the London School of Economics, Columbia University, Helsinki University and Tel-Aviv University. Professor Karsh has published extensively on Middle Eastern affairs, Soviet foreign policy and European neutrality.

Customer Reviews

Good Source for History and Politics of the War
The historical content and political analysis in the book is so much in line with the way the war was perceived by the media and general public in many countries in the Middle East.

On the other hand, the analysis of the strategy and grand strategy of the war on page 84 is erroneous, and contradicts the basic principles of the theory of strategy. This part of the book shows lack of understanding of the theory of strategy. That is, the analysis is in favor of a general military operation, rather than a limited operation, which is strategically incorrect based on the conclusion that Iraq's limited military operation failed. What really makes the war analysis not convincing is the conclusion that a limited war failed and a general war might also have failed if Iraq pursued it. Added to that, the Iranian strategy was not discussed. The analysis also gives contradicting concepts about the reason behind the failure of Iraq's strategy. In one paragraph the reason is said to be Iraq was trying to "bite off more than it could chew", and in another paragraph the failure of Iraq's strategy was because Iraq "assigned to its military forces tasks which were too limited".

In analyzing any offensive, the author criticized the army that failed to achieve its goals and the army that succeeded by saying it could have achieved more. This type of analysis is the theme of the strategic analysis in the book.

Too biased for the series
The essential histories series is supposed to provide brief, readable accounts of major wars. The inherent problem with this idea is that often times the wars being discussed are much too complex to be covered in substantially less than 100 pages. That doesn't mean the series is without value, but that it should only be used as a first step towards understanding a subject, not the only step. The biggest drawback in this particular installment is that the lack of background info really robs the reader of valuable context. Even though the amount of space devoted to the Iran-Iraq war in one of the general Iraqi history books like Tripp's or Marr's is considerably less, the coverage is ultimately better because of the back story of the 70s that created many of the necessary conditions for the war. Beyond that however, Karsh's book provides a limited and somewhat helpful overview of the military and political aspects that influenced the war.

Karsh's book on the Iran-Iraq war not only suffers from only skimming the surface of a complex subject, but there is also a fairly obvious pro-Iraqi bias. If someone had absolutely no background in Middle Eastern history, they would come away with the impression that Iraq was completely blameless, when in fact Iraq initially began the war. When compared with the accounts of the war in other works on Iraqi and Iranian history, Karsh's version stands alone in its willingness to absolve Iraq of any wrongdoing. Considering that the series is supposed to provide an introduction to the conflict, this type of bias is really misplaced. The editors should have taken a serious pass at Karsh's finished version or had someone else write this particular installment.

The Cliff Notes of military history
The "Essential Histories" series from Osprey could easily be compared to the Cliff Notes series. They'll give you a nice introduction to a topic you are not familiar with, but no real depth. Most volumns are under 100 pages; therefore, don't expect many "man in the trenches" stories.

This volumn is a nice introduction to a recent war, and presented a bit better than most in the series.