Product Description

A comparative history of Union and Confederate decision making at the highest levels looks at mobilization, organization, planning, and operation and analyzes and evaluates the command of Lincoln and Davis and Generals Grant and Lee.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #818221 in Books
• Published on: 1992-03-16
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Hardcover
• 338 pages

From Library Journal
In this masterful reappraisal of the Civil War commanders and the effectiveness of their strategies for attaining victory, Jones forcefully develops the revisionist concepts about Civil War leadership initially advanced in his and Herman Hattaway's How the North Won (Univ. of Illinois Pr., 1983). Informed readers conversant with Jones's sources will be challenged by his persuasive reevaluation of the performance of Halleck and Beauregard, among others. Likewise, those holding conventional notions about the military conduct of the Civil War will be startled or provoked by his singularly unconventional analysis of the strategies employed. Highly recommended for college and university libraries supporting military studies. History Book Club main selection.
- Lawrence E. Ellis, Broward Community Coll. Lib., Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.
Copyright 1992 Reed Business Information, Inc.

From Kirkus Reviews
A skillfully argued if not always convincing explanation of how Union and Confederate political and military leaders executed their respective game plans for winning the Civil War. Here, Jones (History/North Dakota State Univ.; The Art of War in the Western World, 1987) expands on the major ideas in his essay in Gabor S. Boritt's Why the Confederacy Lost (p. 151). One reason why the war was so protracted, he says, was that the antagonists were so evenly matched: ``With sophisticated tactics, logistics, and strategy adapted to the industrial revolution and low population density, and political aims and strategic means usually well harmonized, the combatants conducted their war well.'' At times, such conclusions leave the reader at a loss as to how the North ever won. More importantly, this eagle's-nest view is weakened by its sympathy for such oft-maligned figures as Jefferson Davis, timorous Union Chief of Staff Henry Halleck, and pompous Confederate General P.G.T. Beauregard, as well as by its inadequate treatment of how evolving weaponry turned the conflict into a blood bath that generals could not begin to comprehend. Yet these deficiencies are more than offset by Jones's impressive erudition and clear explanations. At his best, in his description of such strategic concepts as the turning movement (used with varying degrees of success by both sides), concentration of force in space and time, and the raid (exploited by Grant and Sherman with devastating results), Jones masterfully illustrates how North and South adapted Napoleonic maneuvers to such recent inventions as the steamboat, the telegraph, and the railroad. Provocative and illuminating. (Twenty pages of maps.) -- Copyright ©1992, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved.

Customer Reviews

A New Look at an Old War
Archer Jones's book Civil War Command and Strategy breaks the war down into its elemental strategic pieces and analyzes and explains the how and why the Civil War was fought the way it was. By breaking the process of victory and defeat down into several important themes Jones destroys many common misguided beliefs and puts the war into a proper perspective that is not clouded by anachronism.
When I teach the Civil War to my 8th grade students I find that I am guilty of unjustly criticizing many union and confederate generals for being too cautious, stupid, ignorant, or foolhardy. That is because I did not look at their situation from their perspective. I was guilty of applying modern standards of war to their actions. By following Jones's contention that "by grounding [my] understanding of the war in the art of war as the participants knew it, this work of military history adopts a good vantage point for understanding and evaluating their performance." Through this boo I have developed a new found respect and understanding for many civil war commanders who previously earned by contempt. In addition, Jones's book addressed many of the common civil war clichés found in textbooks and narratives that fail to address the reality of the war: the effect of the blockade, the impact of the extended range of the rifles, the poor supply of the confederate troops, the damage of states rights, and the general incompetence of the generals all seem to need a thorough reworking.
Jones reworks these beliefs throughout his book by addressing the war in a chronological manner and assigning each phase of it a different theme. A dominate theme of Jones throughout the book is the relative equality of both sides. From the presidents to the troops the war was more a battle of doppelgangers than unique adversaries. Despite Davis and Lincoln's differences in military experiences they both ultimately functioned as very competent war time leaders. Davis had a deep and natural military ability fostered by years in the army and graduation from West Point. Lincoln had no military experience but devoted himself to learning everything he could and found capable advisors such as Scott and Halleck. Both were not afraid to make the hard decisions and were willing to let their generals do their jobs without to much political interference. In this latter appraisal many still claim Davis was an arrogant hands-on commander-in-chief but, in reality, his orders were infrequent and usually for the best such as his order to Johnston to reinforce Beauregard at Manassas. Davis also had little need to interfere as he made many quality appointments that were based on military necessity and not, as Lincoln had to do, on political necessity. And even Lincoln stopped trying to influence his generals once he found one with ability, namely Meade.
A second theme discusses the concentration of troops in time and space. This very Napoleonic strategy of massing troops at the point of contact with the enemy found a home in the Confederate strategy. From the first battle of Manassas the Southern command used the telegraph and railroad to respond to Federal advances. Such technology went a long way to mitigating the disadvantage of trying to defend such a huge area. Nowhere was this better performed than at Shiloh where troops from 800 miles away were concentrated in time to fight in the two day battle. While the confederates effectively used their interior lines to concentrate in space the Federals tried to counter this with concentration of time. By launching simultaneous attacks at different points Confederates found that they were unable to pull troops from one area to concentrate in another. At the battle of Stones River the Confederates were caught at a disadvantage when one of their divisions was caught in transit and unable to help in either battle. But both strategies had their problems. Concentration on interior lines is still depended on quality railroads (that the south had in short supply) and quality maps (that were almost nonexistent) to move the troops in a timely manner. Concentration in time requires a harmony of logistics and command that just did not exists in the Union. While both strategies were useful they needed to be augmented by other less elaborate strategies.
While much hoopla has been given to the foolhardy frontal assaults of Burnside at Fredericksburg and Lee at Gettysburg Jones points out that it was the strategic turning movement that was the mainstay of the civil war battlefield. While the tactical turn had been negated by the flexibility and firepower of the new infantry regiment, the strategic turn was the answer to the supremacy of the tactical defense. The failures of Burnside and Lee are just illustrations of the futility of a frontal assault. To overcome the entrenched defender the savvy civil war general simply moved his army to the rear of the entrenchment or defensive line. At Chanslorsville, Hooker turned Lee's entrenched flank only to be turned by a mobile Lee in response. Hooker, once again facing a frontal assault and not a flank attack wisely withdrew.
Jones explains that the threat of a turning movement not only caused armies to move and abandon their defensive positions but also had the possibility to force the defender into an attack thus giving the turning force the advantage of the tactical defense. It was this theory that motivated McClellan to try to turn Richmond on the Peninsula. Indeed, from the Seven Days to Cold Harbor it was the strategic turning movement that dominated strategy on both sides.
Another strategy illustrated in the book was the raid. The raid found use on both sides during the war but for different reasons. The confederacy used the raid as a defective weapon to slow, stop, or redirect Union forces. The raid was particularly effective because of the heavy reliance that the Union forces had on their supply lines. The Confederacy found many ways to exploit this weakness; like guerrilla raids such as those in Tennessee, organized cavalry raids like those of Forest, and raids in force such as Lee's two invasions into Pennsylvania. It was to the Confederacy's dismay that Davis has trouble grasping the usefulness of such a strategy. For without theater support such activities were left to regional commands and were not as successful as they could have been.
It was not until the last years of the war that the North took to raiding as a military policy. And when they did it is for offensive purposes as opposed the South's defensive ones. Grant decided to abandon the stalemated territory acquisition approach to conquering the South and instead turned to raids that would destroy the South's infrastructure. Sherman's Mississippi and Georgia campaign are excellent example of the policy in effect.
Jones's book did a fantastic job of putting the command and strategy of the civil war into its proper context. In addition to its well documented challenges to many civil war myths and clichés, the reader will be treated to a firmer grasp on the reasons behind the commander's decisions and why the strategy on both sides developed the way it did. For those looking for a unique and interesting take on the civil war Archer Jones's Civil War Command and Strategy is worth the time.

Good facts, Poor analysis
This book has some good points in it, most notably that it was really much more difficult for the north to win the war, and that overall the sides were basically evenly-matched, which is a rare but relatively valid assessment. The books judgment of the generals and some of the other leaders, mostly Davis and Lincoln, are more puzzling. He states that Davis recognized that Bragg was inadequate, but did not know who to replace him with. Perhaps this is true, but the author does not document anything, and it runs contrary to everything else I have read.

The author also contradicts himself in the book, saying that Lincoln did not believe that the northern armies had to attack and destroy the other armies to win the war, but then the author provides evidence to the contrary, justifying his conclusion by saying that Lincoln never gave orders to other commanders. One could just as easily argue several other points, especially if no sourcing is required, only conjecture. Even if the authors assertion is true, it ignores the fact that Lincoln did in fact set the ANV as the main objective in the east.

The author also falsely assumes that the destruction of an army was impossible. This most probably comes due to a further false assumption of why the Battle of Second Mannasas was lost. The author contends that Longstreet's (very delayed) flank attack failed to result in a decisive victory because "Pope, exploiting the excellent articulation and responsiveness of his now-veteran troops, succeeded in bending his line into an arc." This is, of course, ridiculous to anyone who has studied the campaign in detail. The only reason Pope was not totally annihilated was because darkness fell, and the Confederate advance stopped. It had very little to do with anything on Pope's part. If the attack had come any sooner, Pope's army would have been destroyed.

The author's views on Halleck are somewhat more believable, based more on actual fact, even if many will disagree with his assessment of Halleck, which is as a brilliant overall strategist and soldier. Of course, this is somewhat off set by the fact that the author seems to call every general he mentions a strategic genius, making the term seem somewhat worthless, and muddying just what exactly the author feels the best strategies were. He seems to criticize and praise the same strategies in alternate places, although perhaps he is simply not being clear enough. This reviewer, however, being not as well acquainted with regards to the pros and cons of Halleck and his actions, is not qualified to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of this author's arguments.

He also sees pursuit as a "myth" and a bad practice, although his idea of pursuit seems to be rather unconventional. He fails to show just why it is a myth, instead giving examples of pursuits that failed. This may sound as though it in fact gives credit to the author's position, but one pursuit he sites as proving the folly of pursuit is the battle of Winchester, where the pursuit failed because Ashby's cavalry were not around to conduct it. Instead, the author seems to define pursuit as chasing infantry with infantry, which in some cases will be good, and others will not, depending on the state of the pursuing army. Napoleon rolled the Prussian army across Europe by a pursuit as defined by this author, although the author seems to have neglected this. Anyone who has studied the Campaigns of Nathan Bedford Forrest will realize that a pursuit is a very effective weapon if conducted properly.

This belief lead the author to an even muddier conclusion, though it is grounded in solid fact. The author rightly notes that many of Lee's victories were costly frontal assaults, which gave him little in terms of results. He then seems to advocate that battles were thusly not important to the war, they were not decisive, and could not be decisive. This is faulty logic, however, based mostly on his previous faulty conclusions. His believe that pursuit was a myth and a poor strategy, as noted are based on a few isolated incidents. The author contends that Lee acknowledged the folly of pursuit, when the reality is probably more along the lines of his lack of understanding the power of a successful pursuit, which is more likely considering Lee's misuse of cavalry in nearly every engagement. As Clausewitz said, "The importance of the victory is chiefly determined by the vigor with which the immediate pursuit is carried out. In other words, pursuit makes up the second act of the victory and in many cases is more important than the first." The victories seemed so meaningless due to the fact that a pursuit was hardly ever employed, much less a vigorous one. A single battle had an incredible potential politically, but it had to be decisive and mostly total, something which only an effective pursuit (after all, where is the folly in continuing to pressure a beaten foe? Why allow him to recover if you yourself are perfectly capable of keeping him on a disorganized retreat?) or trapping of a Union army by cutting off its escape route could bring about. (This latter strategy Lee had the opportunity to attempt on his Gettysburg campaign, but his lacking this vision led instead to the opposite of what might have happened. He also had such an opportunity at 2nd Mannasas, during the battle itself, and also beforehand, when Pope had placed himself in such a precarious situation that annihilation would have been perhaps the only result if Lee had only carried out the necessary maneuver. At Chancellorsville, the enemy escaped due only to the wounding of Jackson and then immediately afterward of Hill.) Contrary to the author's statements, a field army could most certainly have been destroyed. Remarkably, the author surveys the previous wars to the 1700s, and while there is in fact an example of an army being destroyed, concludes that such a scenario is virtually impossible. Apparently, the author failed to observe the possibilities that came about in the civil war, which showed that it was quite possible indeed. Saying this may sound like a step into judgment in hindsight, but at the time the potential was recognized by Stonewall Jackson at and before 2nd Mannasas, but not by Lee, who was in overall command. The author also recognizes the fact that the weaponry was far more deadly than in the past, but fails to see how such weaponry would aide in such a trap. The trapped army would have almost no hope of escape considering how ineffective the frontal assault is. And the effect politically of such a defeat would likely be sufficient to bring victory. It was, however, a strategy which only a very few understood, and Lee was not one of them.

The fact that Lee's victories appeared so meaningless is due mostly to the fact that many of them were hardly victories at all, and that none of them were carried out in such a manner to make them decisive. (Due mostly to Lee, not to any impossibility of doing it) They were consistently pyrrhic victories which hurt his army without actually helping his cause. After all, the Union army was still there just as much as the Confederate and such continually pyrrhic victories hardly had any effect at all politically. The fact that Britain and France were on the verge of recognition further gives credence to the fact that all Lee needed was a decisive victory. His victories prior to Antietam were not overly impressive in actuality, but still nearly led to recognition and an end to the war. Lee was no superior military genius, and whenever his victories actually had any potential, he totally failed in following up on and in following through with them.

Against the author's opinion, the war could well have been won on the battlefield. Many of the wars victories had seemingly small effect because they were hardly victories at all, with each side suffering similarly. To contend because of this that the war could not be won in battle with the enemy is pure folly, and ignores the very real and almost simple opportunities missed.

The book covers raiding in a somewhat new light, giving it probably more credit than it is due, but still giving it better recognition than is usually the case. Generally good here.

The author does in fact point out many things which are contrary to popular opinion but which are in fact quite valid, but draws faulty conclusions from nearly all of his new insights.

He does, however, give too much credit to Lee, who engaged in numerous frontal attacks. He states that Lee had learned his lesson after the seven days, but this is difficult to reconcile with the record. While Lee did not conduct as many frontal attacks later, there were some, such as the most brutal at Gettysburg, but also similar actions later at the Wilderness and into 1864. Even when Lee finally learned (or more likely was forced onto it because he had destroyed his army) the lesson of the strong defense near the end of the war, he always sought to go back over to the offensive. It is debatable whether Lee ever really learned the lesson or not, especially considering victories such as 2nd Mannasas and Chancellorsville were successes due more to his lieutenants than actually to Lee. With Jackson gone, Longstreet could not dissuade him from his frontal attacks, and Lee reverted right back into them, and at Gettysburg it was worse than anything on the Peninsula.

As a final note, the author fails in his assessment of Lee's position at Gettysburg, saying that if he were to threaten a city such as Baltimore after a victory at Gettysburg, he would have no way of retreating south later, and that he would be laid siege by the AoP. This, of course, does not address the whole issue. If Lee were to have won a battle on northern soil, and then proceeded to threaten a city, Lee would not have had to retreat south, as the war would end. Such a move would cause panic among the civilian populace, and even a President such as Lincoln cannot ignore public opinion indefinitely. This authors opinion of such a threat rests on a faulty assumption on his part. Lee's army would not have to capture the city, and thusly would not be put under a Vicksburg-like siege. Instead, it would constitute cutting rail lines and the food supply to the city and damaging northern industry. This is sound doctrine, and is quite in line with what Clauswitz said concerning such civil wars. The only basis that the author seems to have suggesting that Lee would have to retreat is one of logistics and that Lee could not have supplied his army for any length of time. This fails in that an extended length of time would not have been required. The Union army would not be at leisure to follow at its own, pace, but would instead engage in a foot race after Lee's army. Lee could choose his own ground anywhere on the way to Pennsylvania, and fought a battle he knew he could win. This, of course, would in any likelihood end the war. Such a logistical objection also fails to note that even when Lee lost horribly at Gettysburg, he was able to forage for a week or so afterward before he eventually went south, and not even because of supplies. Supplies were not going to cause the defeat of Lee's army. His cavalry were perfectly capable of foraging and there would be plentiful food as he moved to Philadelphia.

The biggest assumption the author makes is that all battles are equal. This leads to many faulty conclusions about the war winning potential of some battles in relation to others. A battle above Philadelphia would have a monumental effect on the north and end the war, as would the destruction of a Union army.

Overall, the book is forcefully written, but only convincing if you know little of much of the strategy and political situation of the time. It simply fails in too many respects.