Product Description

"... a major contribution to our knowledge of the place of the Civil War in the history of warfare.... I have long hoped for a sound history of Civil War military staffs... I need hope no more; Hagerman has covered this subject also, with the same assured expertness that he gives to tactics and technology." -- Russell F. Weigley

"... this fine book deserves a place on the shelves of all military historians in this country and abroad." -- American Historical Review

"... a first rate book... impressive... an imposing work... " -- Journal of American History

"This book is filled with enlightening information.... ought to be a standard for many years to come and should be required reading for any serious Civil War military historian." -- Journal of Southern History

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #459379 in Books
• Published on: 1992-09-01
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 384 pages

From Publishers Weekly
Hagerman argues that the Civil War inaugurated a new era of industrial-age warfare.
Copyright 1992 Reed Business Information, Inc.

Review
"...[An]important work on tactical and strategic military history." --Wig Wags (military history and American Civil War blog) Sept 27, 2008

Customer Reviews

Why CW combat degraded into trench warfare
While author Edward Hagerman agrees with the questionable assumption that the rifled musket transformed warfare by strengthening the defense, he takes a broad view to explain why Civil War combat degraded into trench warfare. Hagerman stresses Mahan's doctrine of using field fortifications in one area in order to allow maneuver elsewhere on the battlefield. Lower population density than Europe meant that Napoleonic logistics assumptions were completely inadequate. Making frequent mention of an army's wagons per 1,000 men, as well as the distance it could march from its railhead, the author shows how wide ranging maneuver was impractical, forcing all commanders, but Lee in particular, to confront his adversary directly. The author also states that American ideology prevented staff development, which combined with generally poor use of signals and the telegraph, helped lead to indecisive combat. As a result of all these factors, Civil War combat was indecisive, and trench warfare was the inevitable result. Minimal mention is made of the failure of Civil War armies to make combined use of infantry with cavalry. This could be explained by the author's conclusion, without discussing weapons in any meaningful way, that the rifle musket was a significant improvement over smoothbores. The book is strongest on the Army of the Potomac, and some of the author's conclusions are questionable, but the book is full of thought provoking insight and is well worth reading. It is an invaluable addition to our understanding of the war. Unfortunately, a conclusion, which could have made his thoughts more clear, is not given, and the book ends abruptly. Although it is well written, the book may not appeal to beginning Civil War buffs.

Fascinating
It has long been suggested that the Civil War was so bloody because the technology had outpaced the tactics. This is true and this book examines the other half of the story: how the technology was shaped by the Civil War and what its consequences were after the war. In the wake of the Civil War the U.S army became a behomoth especially when it came to engineering and Total War. Although it would be another generation before this would be seen on the battlefields of Cuba, this book is a very interesting examination of this aspect of the Civil War's affects on the Armed Forces.

Seth J. Frantzman

One for the specialist ...
I enjoyed this book, but must admit it comes behind Archer Jones, Bruce Catton, Peter Cozzens, Paddy Griffith and the other great historians who have tackled military aspects of the Civil War. It is rather dry, but one can see how the US army became one of the best equipped armies in history with an enormous logistical 'tail' compared to (say) the Russian, Chinese or British armies. What Hagerman showed for me the falsity of the claim that the Civil War was the first 'modern' war - e.g. while railways were important, away from the railhead, the armies depended on horses and oxen, much as Napoleon did. McClellan does emerge as somewhat of an innovator in his proposal for 'flying columns' living off light rations. Oddly enough, Grant put this experiment to an end when he became commanding General - perhaps he felt that with such hard fighting ahead, it might be unwise to cut the amount and variety of rations. Similarly, while there were innovations in staff organisations (Jackson, for example, make very effective use of his staff), there was no revolution such as was then taking place in the Prussian army. I suppose the Civil War was on the 'cusp' of a military revolution - neither exactly the last of the old wars, not the first of the new. An engaging book, but one for the specialist, I'm afraid.